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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Characterizing and Managing Risk from Environmental Release of Pathogens of Concern 
Tao Hong 
Patrick L. Gurian, Ph.D., Supervisor 
 
 
The 2001 anthrax letter attacks not only caused the deaths of 5 people, the 
distribution of prophylactic antibiotic therapy to more than 30,000 people, and the cost of 
hundreds of millions of dollars to decontaminate the affected buildings, but also 
reminded decision makers of the urgency of having a risk management framework for 
response and recovery from a biological incident in a timely manner. In order to address 
this concern, the overall objective of this dissertation is to develop mathematical models 
to promote the understanding of a biological attack, to reduce uncertainty and variability 
in risk assessments of bioterrorism agents, and to provide information for decision-
making steps to minimize the associated mortality and economic loss. This dissertation 
first adopted the Bayesian Monte Carlo (BMC) method to validate a previously published 
risk assessment framework by the author, which developed surface concentration 
standards for B. anthracis by linking surface contamination levels with estimates of risk 
to exposed individuals. The benefit of this analysis significantly reduced uncertainties in 
the estimated human health risk, which provided more accurate information for the 
decision makers seeking to identify the proper response. Then this dissertation focused on 
characterizing the risk of a biological release. It developed a 7-step evaluation framework 
for choosing the sampling and modeling approach which most accurately recovers details 
of a release from surface samples. The findings of this analysis not only answered the 
question "what is the best place to sample?", but also provided insights as to the quantity 
xii 
 
 
of samples that should be taken. The last chapter of this dissertation extends the fate, 
transport, and risk assessment model by synthesizing available information on five 
Category A pathogens (Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Francisella tularensis, Variola 
major and Lassa) to develop quantitative guidelines for how environmental pathogen 
concentrations may be related to human health risk. These findings provide critical 
information for developing a risk-informed biological attack response system. Questions 
such as "how to estimate if risks warrant the distribution of prophylactic antibiotics?", 
and "how to choose between active or passive decontamination approaches?" were 
addressed. 
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND 
 
 
It has been ten years since Al Qaeda's terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon, which were followed by the mailing out of a series of letters containing 
B. anthraces spores to multiple destinations in 2001. Since then, attention and resources 
(billions of dollars) have been spent by the US government in order to prevent future 
domestic terrorist attacks and to improve its emergency response system [109, 209]. 
Quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA), derived from chemical risk assessment, 
is a robust tool to prepare such a response system. It is designed to deliver critical 
information to decision makers, by estimating the casualties of a terrorist attack, and 
prioritizing different mitigation options [70, 71]. A standard QMRA framework is 
composed of four elements, hazard identification, dose-response evaluation, exposure 
assessment, and risk characterization [117]. However, a major challenge to a QMRA 
framework is the difficulty of handling uncertainty and variability, which can be due to a 
lack of precise knowledge or an inherent property of the factors under consideration [12, 
25, 122]. Thus, the overall objective of this dissertation is to develop mathematical 
models to promote the understanding of a biological attack, and reduce uncertainty in the 
risk assessment. 
 
1.1 The history of biological attack 
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) definition, 
bioterrorism is "the deliberate release of viruses, bacteria, or other germs (agents) used to 
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cause illness or death in people, animals, or plants" [31]. A narrower view expressed by 
Carus is that nonideologically motivated uses of biological agents belong to the category 
of biocrimes.[29]. Compared to conventional weapons, biological ones, also known as 
"the poor man's atom bomb" [144], can produce panic, havoc and casualties which 
profoundly disrupt the stability of a society [190]. Four reasons can explain the 
emergence of bioterrorism: 1) natural access to the pathogens, 2) fewer technical 
challenges, 3) relatively low costs to launch an attack, and 4) more difficulty in detecting 
the victims' infection due to the pathogens' incubation period and the fact that many 
diseases not caused by bioterrorism have similar symptoms [192].  
 
Historically, the earliest record of employing biological agents as a warfare 
weapon can be traced back to ancient Roman civilization. The Romans threw carrion into 
their enemies' wells to pollute the drinking water [13]. In the 14th century, the Tatars 
utilized bubonic plague as a weapon to infiltrate the city of Kaffa, resulting in some of 
the inhabitants escaping in ships with infected rats and fleas. Later, those ships' multiple 
entrance to various Italian ports became the source of the Black Death, which wiped out 
nearly a third of Western Europe [13]. In the modern era, infamous instances of 
biological warfare happened during World War II (WWII), including the Japanese 
military's release of plague in China, and the Soviets' tularemia attack towards German 
Panzer troops [13]. Even after WWII, investigations of biological weapons were still 
continued. It was reported that more than 10 types of pathogens were able to be 
effectively delivered in forms of aerosol spray or bomblets [126, 190]. 
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In recent years, prior to the 2001 anthrax letter attacks, identified bioterrorism 
attacks and biocrimes included the release of Salmonella typhimurium to eleven 
restaurants' salad bars in order to influence an election in the city of Portland in 1984, 
causing the infection of 750 people; the release of Shigella dysenteriae into pastries by a 
co-worker, sending 12 people to the hospital in Dallas in 1996 [70]; and the release of 
Bacillus anthracis spores in Tokyo by the religious group Aum Shinrikyo between 1990 
and 1995, which failed to infect any people [13, 157]. After comparing attacks that 
happened before and after the 1990s, terrorist scholars found there was a revolutionary 
transformation in nature of terrorism, since the 'new terrorism' 1) is more inspired by 
religious beliefs; 2) has amorphous irreconcilable objectives; 3) has global targets; 4) has 
a horizontal and loose network; 5) pursues symbolic violence; 6) employs more lethal 
and indiscriminate violent tactics; and 7) is closely related to weapons of mass 
destruction [7, 64, 83, 105, 145, 165, 208]. 
 
1.2 The 2001 anthrax letter attacks 
The 2001 anthrax letter attacks have changed the realm of public health [95]. 
These letters not only caused the deaths of 5 people and the distribution of prophylactic 
antibiotic therapy to more than 30,000 people, but also required hundreds of millions of 
dollars to decontaminated the affected buildings [163]. Although the 2001 anthrax letter 
attacks are considered to be the "worst case of bioterrorism in U.S. history", they are 
treated as relative small scale attacks compared to the ones with the potential to bring 
thousands of deaths [65]. In 1970, the World Health Organization (WHO) predicted that 
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if 50 kg of B. anthracis spores were released by aircraft over an area with a population of 
5 million, the number of casualties would be around 25,000 [206]. In 1993, the US 
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment estimated that the lethality of releasing 
100kg of B. anthracis spores upwind of Washington, DC area was equivalent to a 
hydrogen bomb, causing 3 million deaths [187]. In a recently study, Wein et. al. indicated 
that if the released amount of B. anthracis spores were reduced to 1 kg with 50% 
dissemination efficiency over a large U.S. city of 1.39 million people, there could be as 
many as 146,269 mortalities [197]. Based on the above three estimates and the 2001 
anthrax letter attacks, a large-scale biological attack on a U.S. city could contaminate 
both indoor and outdoor environments, requiring a resource consuming decontamination, 
and rendering a city uninhabitable for long time period [65]. 
 
From the 2001 anthrax letter attacks, decision makers realized the urgency of 
having a risk management framework, for response and recovery from a biological 
incident in a timely manner [136, 188]. This framework should address a number of 
critical knowledge gaps in perspectives of risk characterization and future damage control, 
including propagating the uncertainties in the risk assessment, developing consensus-
based surface sampling methods and validating their results, justifying the selection of a 
decontamination endpoint, and creating a publicly acceptable prophylactic antibiotic 
storage and distribution plan [67, 176].  
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1.3 Pathogens of Interest 
In the year 1999, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reclassified biologic 
agents into three categories based on their ease of transmission, mortality rate, disruption 
of social order, and level of public panic. Table 1-1 lists the features of the three 
categories of pathogens and their representatives [30, 150, 190]. In this study, five 
pathogens (Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia. pestis, Francisella tularensis, Variola major and 
Lassa) from Category A are selected, and their risk to exposed people will be investigated. 
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Table 1-1 Features and representatives of biological agents  
Category Feature Pathogens 
Category A 
• Easily to disseminate 
• High mortality rates 
• Might cause public panic and 
social disruption 
• Require special action for public 
health preparedness 
• Bacillus anthracis 
• Clostridium botulinum toxin 
• Yersinia pestis 
• Variola major 
• Francisella tularensis 
• Ebola, and Lassa 
Category B 
• Moderately easy to disseminate 
• Moderate or low mortality rates  
• Require specific enhancements of 
CDC's diagnostic capacity and 
enhanced disease surveillance 
• Brucella species 
• Clostridium perfringens 
• Salmonella species 
• Burkholderia mallei 
• Burkholderia pseudomallei 
• Chlamydia psittaci 
• Coxiella burnetii 
• Ricinus communis 
• Staphylococcal enterotoxin B 
• Rickettsia prowazekii 
• Alphaviruses 
• Vibrio cholerae 
• Cryptosporidium parvum 
Category C 
• Available to be engineered and 
disseminated 
• Low mortality risk 
• Emerging infectious diseases 
such as Nipah virus and 
hantavirus 
Information extracted from [30, 150, 190] 
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1.3.1 Bacillus anthracis  
Bacillus anthracis is an aerobic, Gram-positive, non-motile, spore-forming 
bacterial species which is the causative agent of anthrax, a potentially fatal bacterial 
infection. The bacteria will sporulate when the environment is not suitable for continuous 
multiplication. Bacillus anthracis spores are resistant to heat, ultraviolet, drying, and 
many chemical disinfectants [50, 191]. Two reasons can be explained for terrorists using 
Bacillus anthracis spores as their weapon. One is that Bacillus anthracis particles can be 
readily obtained from scientific and natural sources, cultivated, possibly “weaponized”, 
stored, transported, and released as aerosols using a variety of delivery systems [94]; the 
other reason is the high mortality rate once people are infected. 
 
1.3.1.1 Forms of anthrax 
a) Cutaneous anthrax  
Cutaneous anthrax is the most common form of anthrax and accounts for 90%-95% 
of anthrax infections all over the world [50, 191]. Neck, head and extremities are 
common areas where infection may initiate after direct or indirect contact with infected 
animals or their products, while transmission by insects after feeding on infected animal 
is rare [143]. Antibiotic treatment is recommended for cutaneous anthrax which can 
reduce the mortality from 20% to almost 0% [50, 94]. 
 
b) Inhalational anthrax 
Inhalational anthrax is less common. It occurs after spores entering the upper 
respiratory system are engulfed and transported by alveolar macrophages to the 
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peribronchial lymph nodes, where the spores germinate and spread throughout the body 
in blood [50]. Only 18 cases of inhalational anthrax were reported in the US in the 20th 
century, most due to occupational exposure, such as meat-packing, animal hair-sorting 
and tanning [82, 94]. The early diagnosis of inhalational anthrax is difficult unless there 
is a known outbreak. However, the onset of symptoms can occur after several weeks from 
exposure [50]. Historically, the mortality rate of inhalational anthrax is over 90%, but the 
2001 anthrax letter attacks indicated that early antibiotic treatment could reduce the 
mortality rate to 45% [84]. 
 
c) Gastrointestinal anthrax 
Gastrointestinal anthrax is more common in herbivorous animals than in humans 
and usually occurs in undeveloped countries as a result of ingesting undercooked infected 
meat. There were no records of gastrointestinal anthrax in the USA before 1999 [50] or 
Britain before 1994 [191]. However, 24 cases of oral-oropharyngeal anthrax were 
attributed to ingesting contaminated water buffalo meat in the north part of Thailand, and 
6 infections were reported in Turkey in 1986 [168]. Since the symptoms of 
gastrointestinal anthrax are not specific, difficulties in diagnosing the disease may miss 
the recommended treatment period, which contributes to a relatively broad  mortality rate 
range from 4% to 50% [167, 191]. 
 
1.3.1.2 Epidemiology of anthrax 
Accidental human infection with Bacillus anthracis is very rare. It is estimated 
that there were only 2000 cases worldwide annually in the 1980s, and 80% of these cases 
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were initiated by industrial exposure [57]. The largest outbreak in the USA happened in 
1957. Nine (9) goat hair-processing plant workers were infected and 4 of them died. At 
worldwide level, 79 persons contracted anthrax and 68 of them died because of an 
accidental release of B. anthracis spores from a military laboratory in Sverdlovsk, 1979 
[1, 118]. It is estimated that aggressive antibiotic treatment could have increased the 
survival rate to 20% for people who suffered inhalational anthrax in Sverdlovsk [118]. 
Between 1979 and 1980, 182 died of anthrax out of 10,000 human infection cases in 
Zimbabwe; in Tibet, China, 162 deaths out of 507 infections occurred in 1989; and in 
western mountainous part of China, there were 898 human infections reported in 1996 
with a 5% fatality rate, and 1,210 human infections with a 3% fatality rate reported in 
1997. There are high numbers of human anthrax cases in Spain, from 152 in 1990 to 50 
in 1996 [57, 92]. Though the threat from accidental exposure to Bacillus anthracis has 
been reduced with the improvement of industrial hygiene and development of vaccines, 
the potential of employing this Category A agent as a weapon causing massive casualties 
is evidently high. 
 
1.3.1.3 Bacillus Anthracis as a weapon 
Before 2001, bioterrorism-related anthrax was a concern only in tabletop 
exercises [17]. However, since terrorists have employed Bacillus anthracis as a biologic 
weapon, the realm of public health has been changed. On September 18th, envelopes 
containing Bacillus anthracis spores were mailed to news media companies and 
government officials, leading to the first bioterrorism-related cases of anthrax in the 
United States [95, 135]. Around October 9th, a letter containing threatening language 
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along with Bacillus anthracis spores was opened in the mail handing area of a Senate 
office suite in the Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC [135, 199]. These 
attacks caused the deaths of 5 people and cost hundreds of millions of dollars to clean the 
contaminated buildings [163]. 
 
1.3.2 Yersinia pestis  
Yersinia. pestis (Y. pestis) is a facultative anaerobic, Gram-negative, non-motile, 
nonsporulating bacterial species which is the causative agent of plague, an acute and 
potentially fatal bacterial infection. Unlike B. anthracis, Y. pestis is susceptible to heat, 
ultraviolet, drying, and chemical disinfectants [76, 126]. 
 
1.3.2.1 Forms of plague 
a) Bubonic Plague 
Bubonic Plague is the most common form of plague. It is transmitted via the bite 
of an infected rodent flea which might inoculate up to thousands of organisms into 
patients' skin [27]. Surviving Y. pestis pathogens can enter the bloodstream, migrate to 
lymph nodes, cause hemorrhaging, and create painful buboes [44]. It is reported that 80% 
of bubonic plague cases can develop bactermia, 25% can develop septicemia and 10% 
can develop pneumonia as a complication, resulting in a 50%-60% mortality rate for 
infected people without medical interference [76]. Thus, antibiotic treatment is 
recommended for bubonic plague which can significantly reduce the mortality [32]. 
 
11 
 
 
b) Pneumonic Plague 
Similar to anthrax, pneumonic plague is less common. But it is human to human 
transmissible via close contacts (within 2 meters) with a final-stage patient whose red 
sputum contains an enormous number of pure culture bacilli [119]. Pneumonic plague 
occurs after Y. pestis is inhaled into the respiratory system [76]. Sometimes pneumonic 
plague can be misdiagnosed as influenza which may miss the best time for medical 
treatment [27, 100]. Literature reports indicate that appropriate antibiotic treatment can 
increase the survival rate to 85% from 0% survival probability without treatment. 
 
c) Septicemic Plague 
In septicemic plague, disseminated intravascular coagulation is caused by 
bacterial endotoxins, forming tiny clots throughout the body and uncontrollable bleeding. 
Usually, untreated septicemic plague is fatal, but early treatment with antibiotics is able 
to reduce the mortality rate to 4%-15% [27, 44].  
 
1.3.2.2 Epidemiology of plague 
Historically, at least 3 pandemics were caused by plague. The first recorded 
plague pandemic began in AD 541 afflicting the Eastern Roman Empire and caused the 
death of 100 million people (50% to 60% population loses) which is also known as the 
Justinian plague. The second pandemic, the black death, began in 1346 peaking in Europe 
which killed 30% to 60% of Europe's population (20 to 30 million). The third pandemic 
spread China in 1855, which killed more than 12 million people including people in India 
[44, 100, 115, 142, 169]. 
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The improvement of living condition, public hygiene level, and antibiotic therapy 
have blocked the possibility of plague-caused pandemics [44]. During the decade of 1994 
to 2003, the number of both suspected and confirmed human-plague cases was 28,530, 
with a fatality rate of 7.1% resulting in 2015 deaths, as reported by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) [203]. In the United States, 390 cases of plague were reported from 
1947 to 1996, with a median of 7 cases of plague per year approximately [33, 44, 76]. 
 
1.3.2.3 Y. pestis as a weapon 
Although it is technically challenging to weaponize Y. pestis, the feature of 
secondary person-to-person transmission makes it become a favorable biological weapon 
to some. In WWII, a secret branch of the Japanese army, Unit 731, attempted to use 
plague as a weapon in Harbin, the northern part of China. The former Soviet Union 
successfully created large quantities of Y. pestis that can be placed into weapons, while 
U.S. scientists failed due to pathogen's lack of persistence in the environment. Unlike 
naturally occurring plague, an outbreak of pneumonic plague, whose initial symptoms are 
similar to other severe respiratory illnesses, would be likely to happen if aerosolized Y. 
pestis were disseminated [44, 75, 99, 126]. In 1970, the WHO estimated that if 50 kg of Y. 
pestis were intentional aerosolized over a city with 5 million population, as many as 
36,000 people would die of pneumonic plague based on a mortality rate of 24% [202].  
 
1.3.3 Francisella tularensis 
Francisella tularensis (F. tularensis) is an aerobic, Gram-negative, non-motile, 
nonsporulating bacterial species which is the causative agent of tularemia. Humans are 
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very sensitive to tularemia, and it is reported that as few as 10 organisms are able to cause 
disease. Similar to Y. pestis, F. tularensis is often transmitted to humans via the bites of 
infected fleas [81, 144].  
 
1.3.3.1 Forms of tularemia 
a) Ulceroglandular Tularemia 
Ulceroglandular tularemia is the most common form of tularemia accounting for 
over 90% of cases in European countries. Ulceroglandular tularemia is usually caused 
through vectorborne transmission or direct skin contacts with infected animals, such as 
rabbits, moles, muskrats, and some domestic animals [81, 140, 180]. Once infected, a 
mosquito bite-like ulcer is developed, becoming tender and palpable by draining lymph 
nodes [62]. Other rare but initiated by membrane contact forms of tularemia includes 
oculoglandular tularemia, and oropharyngeal tularemia [62, 77].  
 
b) Pneumonic Tularemia 
If pathogens are inhaled through the respiratory system, pneumonic tularemia is 
likely to occur. The disease is transmissible from person to person. Although the 
mortality rate of inhalational tularemia is up to 30% without medical intervention, 
antibiotic treatment will greatly lower the rate to less than 2% [45, 48]. 
 
1.3.3.2 Epidemiology of tularemia 
The geographical distribution of tularemia is uneven with low prevalence in the 
southern hemisphere. Regions of high prevalence include Scandinavia, Russia, and the 
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United States. For the United States, the number of tularemia cases has been reduced 
from several thousand per year before 1950 to 125 during the last decade [15, 34, 35, 44]. 
High correlation has been reported between the outbreaks of human tularemia and rodent 
tularemia. For example, tularemia in voles and hares has been associated with human 
outbreaks in Sweden [181].  
 
1.3.3.3 F. tularesis as a weapon 
F. tularesis has been viewed as a candidate biological weapon for ages due to its 
combination of high infectivity and severe illness in humans [159]. It is one of the 
pathogens investigated by Unit 731, a branch of Japanese secret army, during the Second 
World War. Scientists from the U.S. developed weapons aerosolizing F. tularesis 
between the 1950s and 1960s, which were gradually destroyed after 1969. The former 
Soviet Union was reported to develop antibiotic-resistant F. tularesis, and a former 
scientist, Ken Alibek, implied the usage of tularaemia as a bioweapon during WWII on 
the Eastern Front [45, 99, 140]. In 1969, a group of experts from WHO estimated that if 
50 kg of virulent F. tularesis were intentional aerosolized over a metropolitan area with a 
population of 5 million, the number of causalities would be 250,000 including 19,000 
deaths [202]. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimated that the 
economic loss caused by a terrorist releasing F. tularesis would be $5.4 million per 
100,000 exposed persons, which is based on WHO's model [98]. 
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1.3.4 Variola major 
As a member of Poxviridae, Variola major is one of the most complex viruses. It 
is the causative agent of smallpox with a fatality rate of 30% [125]. Similarly to Y. pestis 
and F. tularensis, smallpox can be transmitted by directly contacting an infectious 
person's droplet nuclei or aerosols expelled from the oropharynx [194]. 
 
1.3.4.1 Forms of smallpox 
Clinically, there are two types of smallpox, variola major and minor, where the 
former one is the severe and most common one. Four types of smallpox caused by these 
viruses have been identified. The most frequent type is ordinary smallpox, which 
accounts for 90% or more of cases. The second type is modified smallpox, which is mild 
but can infect previously vaccinated persons. The third and fourth types are named flat 
and hemorrhagic smallpox, which are rare but fatal. Variola minor is a less common 
presentation of smallpox, and a much less severe disease, with death rates historically of 
1% or less [125, 126, 150].  
 
1.3.4.2 Epidemiology of smallpox 
The earliest evidence of smallpox is found in the Egyptian mummies from 3000 
years ago [89]. Historically, smallpox has been spread throughout the world [81]. In the 
mid-18th century, smallpox was considered a major endemic disease, since it infected 
people globally, and killed 400,000 people per year [79]. In the 20th century, around 300-
500 million people died due to smallpox [155]. To eradicate smallpox, an intensified 
global eradication program began in 1967, which aimed to vaccinate over 80% of the 
16 
 
 
population, and to develop a system of detecting and containing cases and outbreaks 
[155]. The eradication of smallpox was certified by WHO in the year 1979 [125, 155].  
 
1.3.4.3 Variola major as a weapon 
Smallpox is a good bioterrorism agent because it is easy to grow and can resist 
heat [78]. It was first used as a biological weapon during the French and Indian Wars by 
the British, who distributed blankets used by smallpox patients to the American Indians, 
killing more than 50% for the affected tribes [54, 78]. In 1980, the WHO recommended 
that all remaining samples of the variola major virus should be destroyed or transferred to 
the reference laboratories in the US and Russia [78]. However, concerns about whether or 
not these virus samples were securely held were raised after the emergence of a report by 
Ken Alibek, a former deputy director of the Soviet Union's civilian bioweapons program. 
Alibek believed that the smallpox based bioweapons, such as bombs and intercontinental 
ballistic missiles, were secretly prepared until at least 1992. If this is true, it would cause 
serious problems once terrorists have access to these weapons, since the financial support 
for those research agencies has been sharply declined recently, which provide motivation 
for rogue scientists to sell organisms to terrorist groups [13, 78]. 
 
1.3.5 Lassa virus 
Lassa virus, the causative agent of Lassa fever, is transmitted by rats and was not 
identified until 1969 in the town of Lassa, Nigeria [151]. The Lass virus is an enveloped, 
single-stranded, bisegmented RNA virus [138]. Humans can contract this disease from 
the bite of an infected arthropod, from the aerosol of infected rodent excreta, or from 
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direct contact with infected animal carcasses [107]. Lassa fever can be transmitted 
between humans via close contacts [14].  
 
1.3.5.1 Symptoms of Lassa fever 
Clinically, the symptoms of Lassa fever are indistinguishable from other 
hemorrhagic fevers such as Ebola and Marburg. After an incubation period of six to 
twenty-one days, an acute illness with multiorgan involvement develops. Symptoms 
include fever, sore throat, and vomiting, while complications include mucosal bleeding, 
sensorineural hearing deficit, pleural effusion, pericardial effusion, and hemorrhage [151]. 
 
1.3.5.2 Epidemiology of Lassa fever 
Lass virus is endemic in West African countries, where there are 300,000 to 
500,000 infections annually, with approximately 5,000 deaths [138]. It is estimated that 
about 15-20% of hospitalized Lassa fever patients will die from the illness, while this 
number can increase to 50% during epidemics [51, 151]. The prevalence of antibodies to 
the virus in the populations is 8-52% in Sierra Leone, 4-55% in Guinea, and 21% in 
Nigeria [151]. 
 
1.3.5.3 Lassa virus as a weapon 
In 1999, CDC classified the Lass virus as Category A agent because it has the 
ability to cause widespread illness and death, is easy to disseminate, and be transmitted 
from person to person transmission. Large quantities of Lass virus-based weapons were 
produced by the former Soviet Union and Russia until 1992 [14]. 
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1.4 Objective of this dissertation 
To address gaps identified in the 2001 anthrax letter attacks, the overall objective 
of this dissertation is to develop mathematical models to promote the understanding of a 
biological attack, to reduce uncertainty and variability in risk assessments of bioterrorism 
agents, and to provide information for decision-making steps to minimize the associated 
mortality and economic loss, which is explained by three sub-objectives (Figure 1-1). 
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Figure 1-1 Dissertation Analysis Plan 
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The first objective is to validate a previously published risk assessment 
framework by the author, which developed surface concentration standards for B. 
anthracis by linking surface contamination levels with estimates of risk to exposed 
individuals [85]. The objective is accomplished by applying the Bayesian Monte Carlo 
(BMC) method to the indoor particle fate and transport model developed by Sextro et al. 
[162] and used by Hong et al. [85]. Field data [199] collected from the Hart Senate Office 
Building, after a letter containing B. anthracis spores was opened, are employed to 
update distributions for model parameter values (e.g., turbulence intensity, particle 
density, setting velocity, resuspension rate, sample recovery efficiency, risk to exposed 
people, etc.). While the available field data may not be sufficient to fully identify all 
parameters using classical model calibration techniques, when used in a BMC updating 
procedure they may allow for more informative parameter distributions to be developed. 
At a minimum, the BMC procedure can ascertain if the observations conflict 
substantively with the surrogate-based parameter estimates used previously [85, 162].  
 
The second objective aims to address the question of whether the risk due to a 
microbial release can be identified based on simple aggregate concentration 
measurements, such as could reasonably be made after an actual release. The successful 
estimation of this information is valuable in predicting the subsequent dispersion and 
human health risks. In order to assess how much detail on release can realistically be 
identified from surface sampling results, a variety of alternative model formulations and 
sampling schemes are considered, whose results are tested by a 7-step evaluation 
framework. The recommended sampling schemes are further investigated by applying 
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them to concentration measurements from a large scale field test, which aims to provide 
insights between a sampling scheme's uncertainty and its required sample size. 
 
The last objective extends the framework validated in Objective 1. It synthesizes 
available information on five Category A pathogens (Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, 
Francisella tularensis, Variola major and Lassa) to develop quantitative guidelines for 
how environmental pathogen concentrations may be related to human health risk. An 
integrated model of environmental transport and human health exposure to biological 
pathogens is constructed which 1) includes the effects of environmental attenuation, 2) 
considers fomite contact exposure (ingestion or dermal risk) as well as inhalational 
exposure, and 3) includes an uncertainty analysis to identify key input uncertainties. A 
reduced form model is also derived which allows for approximate estimation of risk 
without the need to conduct matrix manipulations. The findings from this study will 
provide a framework for developing many different environmental standards that are 
needed for making risk-informed response decisions, such as when prophylactic 
antibiotics should be distributed, and whether or not a contaminated area should be 
cleaned up [190]. 
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CHAPTER 2: A BAYESIAN APPROACH TO MODEL CALIBRATION FOR B. 
ANTHRACIS RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
 
Abstract  
In this study, the Bayesian Monte Carlo (BMC) method was applied to an indoor 
pathogen fate and transport model [85]. Uncertainty distributions for model parameters 
(i.e., release quantity, risk to exposed people, the amount of spores exiting the room, 
particle density, setting velocity, resuspension rate, sample recovery efficiency, etc.) were 
updated by comparing model predictions with measurements of B. anthracis spores made 
after one of the 2001 anthrax letter attacks [199]. The results indicated that uncertainties 
associated with the total quantity of spores released, the amount exiting the room, and 
risk to occupants could be significantly reduced. However, posterior distributions for fate 
and transport parameters and sample recovery efficiency were not greatly changed from 
their prior values, indicating that literature estimates of these parameters are not 
inconsistent with the observations made by Weis et al. [199]. Posterior estimates of risk 
for people in the room when the spores were released are on the order of 4.7×10-3 to 
2.2×10-2, which supports the decision to administer prophylactic antibiotics. Risks 
associated with spores leaving the room where spores were released are more difficult to 
characterize but a recommendation to perform risk assessments even for individuals 
outside the room when the release occurred appears justified. In addition, analyses were 
conducted to assess how effective different combinations of measurements were at 
reducing uncertainty in the estimate risk. This analysis revealed that if the size 
distribution of the released particulates is known, then environmental sampling can be 
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limited to accurately characterizing floor concentrations, otherwise samples from 
multiple locations, as well as particulate and building air circulation parameters need to 
be measured.  
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2.1. Introduction 
The series of 2001 anthrax letter attacks not only caused the deaths of 5 people 
and hundreds of millions of dollars in clean up costs [163, 178], but also highlighted the 
difficulties in assessing risks associated with bioterrorism agents [85]. Risk 
characterization of a biological attack requires a practical approach to estimate the total 
release quantity, as well as ground-truthed mathematical models to evaluate the 
subsequent dispersion and human health risks [146].  
 
Many researchers have developed models describing the fate and transport of 
various particulates in the indoor environmental [120, 131, 146, 149, 152, 162, 171, 173, 
184, 183, 189]. For instance, Hong et al. [85] applied the fate and transport model of 
Sextro et al. [162] in a risk assessment framework to inform the development of surface 
concentration standards for B. anthracis. However, predictions from these models are 
dependent on the quality of their inputs, which inevitably contain significant amounts of 
uncertainties given current knowledge. In particular, the parameter estimates for these 
models are based on surrogates, typically household dust, which may not be 
representative of the behavior of weaponized B. anthracis spores. One of the few sources 
of information on the environmental fate and transport of B. anthracis spores released 
during an actual bioterrorism event is a study by Weis et al. [199] which reported field 
data on the behavior of B. anthracis spores used in the 2001 anthrax letter attacks. These 
data may provide some basis for assessing whether the model parameter estimates used 
by Sextro et al. [162] and Hong et al. [85] are appropriate for a B. anthracis bioterrorism 
incident. However, the large number of parameters in these models may allow multiple 
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sets of different parameter values to fit the data equally well. In cases such as these, 
where parameter identifiability is a concern, the use of Bayesian Monte Carlo (BMC) 
techniques may be helpful [18]. 
 
The BMC approach [18] is a robust tool for model calibration. While classical 
model calibration methods require inputs to be either parameters fit to match the 
calibration data or fixed constants, the BMC approach allows inputs to be defined by 
probability distributions that reflect prior knowledge of their likely values. Posterior 
probability distributions are then developed by comparing the model predictions with 
observed data. Informative prior distributions can be developed in this domain because 
many parameters describing the indoor environment, such as turbulence intensity and air 
exchange rates, fluctuate within bounds that can be defined to some extent by available 
technical knowledge. BMC provides an approach to employ this prior knowledge of 
plausible parameter ranges to calibrate the model [18, 69, 160]. By drawing not only on 
the data, but also prior knowledge, BMC methods may be able applied in situations 
where classical model calibration would be unable to identify parameters (i.e., cases 
where the model would be overfit to the available data). There are numerous successful 
examples of BMC approaches, including applications to water quality evaluation [49], 
environmental health risk assessment [18, 40], traffic queue modeling [69], fate and 
transport of DDT in the environment [160], and identification of contaminant source 
characteristics from sensor network observations [41, 174, 175]. In many BMC studies 
the posterior distribution is estimated by reweighting the results of a Monte Carlo 
simulation. In this study due to the high dimensionality of the model being estimated (19 
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parameters), it becomes unlikely that any combination of prior model parameters will fall 
in a region of substantial posterior density. For this reason a Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) method is used to sample the posterior distribution. While the computational 
method used here differs from many previous studies, the framework of updating prior 
model parameters distributions with data is unchanged, and hence we consider this study 
to be an application of the BMC approach.  
 
In this paper, the BMC method is applied to the indoor particle fate and transport 
model developed by Sextro et al. [162] and applied by Hong et al. [85]. Field data [199] 
collected from the Hart Senate Office Building, after a letter containing B. anthracis 
spores was opened, are employed to update distributions for model parameter values. 
While the available field data may not be sufficient to fully identify all parameters using 
classical model calibration techniques, when used in a BMC updating procedure they 
may allow for more informative parameter distributions to be developed. At a minimum, 
the BMC procedure can ascertain if the observations conflict substantively with the 
surrogate-based parameter estimates used previously [85, 162]. 
 
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Risk assessment model 
The risk assessment model of Hong et al. [85] has two components, a fate and 
transport model, predicting the distribution of released B. anthracis spores in an office, 
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and a dose-response model, estimating human health risk from inhalation of the released 
B. anthracis spores. A schematic plot of the modeled office is provided in Figure 2-1.  
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Figure 2-1 Schematic of the modeled office 
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The office includes seven compartments: air, tracked floor, untracked floor, walls, 
ceiling, heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC), and the nasal passages of 
occupants of the office. B. anthracis spores are modeled as being released 
instantaneously to the air compartment and completed mixed. Spores deposit to the 
tracked floor, untracked floor, walls, and ceilings, can be removed by the HVAC filter, 
can exit the office after passing the HVAC filter, and can be inhaled by the occupants. 
Most of the movements are irreversible, however, B. anthracis spores deposited on the 
tracked floor have the ability to reenter the air due to human-caused resuspension. The 
fate and transport of released B. anthracis particles is described by a set of ordinary 
differential equations (Equation 1), for which a detailed solution can be found in Hong 
[85]: 
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where the numbers of spores in the different compartments are denoted by Mair (air), Mtf 
(tracked floor), Mutf (untracked floor), Mw (walls), Mf (filter), Mec (external compartment) 
Mce (ceiling), and Mn (nasal passages). The total air flow rate through the HVAC system 
is denoted by Q (m3/min), p (dimensionless) is the fraction of total air flow that is 
recirculated into the building by the HVAC system, e (dimensionless) is the efficiency of 
the filter at removing particles, and V is the volume of the room (m3). Removal to the 
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occupants’ nasal passages is modeled with I (m3/ min), denoting the breathing flow rate 
and en (dimensionless) the efficiency of the nasal passages at removing particles. 
Resuspension from the tracked floor due to occupants walking and other activities is 
modeled as a first order process with rate constant µ2 (s-1). Deposition from the air 
compartment is modeled as a first-order process with rate constants (s-1) of λtf (deposition 
to tracked floor), λutf (untracked floor), λw (walls), and λce (ceiling), which can be 
expressed by parameters representing the indoor air flow conditions [103, 130, 207]: 
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where D (m2/s) is the particle diffusivity, ke (s-1) is turbulence intensity, and Vt (m/s) is 
particle settling velocity, which is given in Equation 5 as a function of the particle's 
diameter (d), the viscosity of air (µair), the density of the particle (ρp), and the density of 
air (ρair). 
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The completely mixed assumption in the fate and transport model can miss 
localize areas of high concentrations. However, it is still true that, assuming first order 
processes, the average surface concentration of the room will be proportional to the 
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integral of the average air concentration over time. Thus, updating can be performed on 
average surface concentrations, but the error in the measured concentrations needs to 
reflect the sampling variability of the mean. In addition, sampling may not be 
representative of average conditions but may focus on or accidentally omit the area in the 
immediate vicinity of the release. This contributes an addition element of uncertainty to 
the analysis that cannot be readily quantified. In most cases, we believe that sampling 
will be biased toward more highly concentrated areas, resulting in over estimates of the 
release amount and conservative (health-protective) estimates of risk. 
 
In addition to the fate and transport model described above, a risk assessment 
model is included to quantify the hazard posed by inhaling B. anthracis spores. An 
exponential dose-response model (Equation 6) is selected for particle sizes less than or 
equal to 5μM, while a beta-Possion dose-response model is used for 10μM particles 
(Equation 7) based on a study by Bartrand et al. [11]: 
( ) 1 kdoseRisk dose e−= −     (6) 
( ) 1 (1 )doseRisk dose α
β
−≈ − +     (7) 
where Risk (dose) is the probability of positive response (death) corresponding to a 
certain exposure level, k is the parameter of an exponential dose-response model, and α, β 
are parameters of a beta distribution describing variability in survival probability [71]. 
The dose is estimated by integrating the concentration of B. anthracis over the exposure 
time (Equation 8).  
2
1
 ( )
t
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dose Inh C t dt= ∫     (8) 
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The details of the fate and transport model, including the ranges of inputs (parameters to 
be updated), are provided in Table A-1 of the supporting information. 
 
2.2.2 Spore Concentration Data 
The spore concentration data used in the updating process are based on sampling 
of the Hart Senate Office Building after a letter containing B. anthracis spores was 
opened as one of the 2001 series anthrax attacks [198, 199]. Three rounds of air sampling 
were conducted including two types of sampling schemes: semiquiescent sampling and 
active sampling. In the semiquiescent sampling scheme, one person placed and adjusted 
the sampler, but no one was present in the room during the subsequent sampling period. 
While in the active sampling scheme, three people set up the sampler and simulated daily 
office activities during the sampling period. The profiles of different sampling schemes 
are summarized in Table 2-1. Air concentrations were measured in each sampling scheme, 
and the differences were attributed to levels of human-caused resuspension. Besides air 
concentrations, fabric office dividers' concentrations were sampled from vertical surfaces, 
and horizontal concentrations were sampled from the carpet, as shown in Table 2-2 [198]. 
However, it is likely that measurements reported in Table 2 vary from the true values due 
to imperfect sample recovery efficiency [21, 61, 66]. Two parameters, R_air and R_surf 
are introduced to represent the recovery efficiencies for air and surface samples, 
respectively. Prior distribution for these parameters (given in Table A-1 of Supporting 
Information) were based on a review of the literature [22, 23, 42, 56, 60, 61, 66, 80]. 
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Table 2-1 Information of different modeling stages 
Stage name 
Stage 
number 
Description 
Simulation 
duration 
Number 
of people 
simulated 
HVAC 
status 
Simulated 
parameter 
Initial release and 
quarantine period 
1 
Anthrax 
letter open 
period 
15 mins 10 on  
Vaccant 
period 
1 week 6days 
23 hours and 45 
minutes 
0 off  
Semiquiescent 
sampling period 
2 
Sampler 
setup 
10 mins 1 off  
Taking 
samples 
10 mins 0 off Cair_semi 
Interval between 
sampling period 
3  12 hours 0 off  
First round active 
sampling period 
4 
Sampler 
setup 
10 mins 3 off  
Taking 
samples 
10 mins 3 off Cair_act1 
Interval between 
sampling period 
5  12 hours 0 off  
Second round 
active sampling 
period 
6 
Sampler 
setup 
10 mins 3 off  
Taking 
samples 
10 mins 3 off 
Cair_act2 
Cfod_act2 
Ccap_act2 
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Table 2-2 Surface sample types and concentrations 
*Simulated spore concentrations on the HVAC filter of Stage 1 (CHVAC) is assumed to be log normally distributed with the mean 7.54 and standard error 0.67. 
 
Location Sampling period Symbol 
Concentration 
(CFUs/m3 ) 
Log 
concentration 
Mean 
concentration 
Mean of the log 
transformed 
concentration 
Standard error 
of the 
concentration 
Standard error of the 
log transformed 
concentration 
Air Semiquiescent Cair_semi 
14.1 2.7 
7.3 1.7 6.1 1.0 2.0 0.7 
6.0 1.8 
Air Active period 1 Cair_act1 
85.6 4.5 
35.2 2.8 44.2 1.6 16.7 2.8 
3.3 1.2 
Air Active period 2 Cair_act2 
49.1 3.9 
41.7 3.7 12.8 0.4 26.9 3.3 
49.1 3.9 
Fabric 
office 
dividers 
Active period 2 Cfod_act2 
1.0 0.0 
100.3 3.3 99.5 2.9 200.0 5.3 
100.0 4.6 
Carpet Active period 2 Ccap_act2 
1500.0 7.3 
2200.0 7.5 1571.6 0.7 
4000.0 8.3 
1100.0 7.0 
4600.0 8.4 
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2.2.3 Modeling Approach 
Based on the details obtained from Weis’ paper [199] and personal 
communications [198], the modeling period is divided into 6 stages (Figure 2-2 and Table 
2-1). The final concentration computed from each stage serves as the following stage's 
initial concentration. Human exposure occurred during the first hour of Stage 1. The 
HVAC system was shut down to prevent the dispersion of B. anthracis spores after the 
first two hours. After a nearly two-week quarantine period, a round of semi-quiescent 
sampling (Stage 2) was conducted followed by a settling period (Stage 3), a round of 
active sampling (Stage 4), another settling period (Stage 5), and a second round of active 
sampling period (Stage 6). In the active sampling period, the resuspended B. anthracis 
spores are modeled as being 1 micron in diameter, reflecting the observation of Weis et. 
al. [199] that resuspended spores were all of small diameter due to the resuspension 
process breaking the aggregated spores into small ones. Settling is allowed between the 
different sampling periods. Semiquiescent sampling is modeled by assuming 10 minutes 
of resuspension due to the activity of one person during sampler setup followed by 10 
minutes of measurement during which no further resuspension occurs. Air concentrations 
used for the updating process are the average of the modeled values during the 
measurement phase. Active sampling is modeled by assuming 10 minutes of resuspension 
due to three persons' simulated daily office activities followed by 10 minutes of 
continued resuspension-causing activity during measurement. Again air concentrations 
used for the updating process are the average of the modeled values during the 
measurement phase. 
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Figure 2-2 Time series of different model stages 
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A flow chart of the BMC updating process is shown in Figure 3. Monte Carlo 
simulation is used to develop a discrete distribution of model outputs using prior 
distributions of model parameters. Then the likelihood of each simulated output is 
evaluated by comparing to observations using Bayesian approach [128, 148]. Prior 
probability distributions are given in Table A-1. A truncated normal (log-normal) 
distribution is selected for parameters whose boundaries are available [139]. Correlations 
between inputs and the output of interest (i.e., the risk to an exposed person) are 
evaluated to identify the important uncertainties in input parameters. The absolute value 
of the input-output correlation coefficient indicates the importance of the contribution of 
the uncertainty in this input to the uncertainty in the output. The simulation results 
reported here are based on 150,000 iterations in MATLAB [114].  
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Figure 2-3 Flow chart of BMC updating 
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2.2.4 Bayesian updating 
The posterior probability media( ')P Cθ
 
 of modeled parameters is acquired by 
updating the parameters of the fate and transport model with the measured B. anthracis 
spore concentrations adjusted for recovery efficiency: 
( ' , ) ( )
( ')
( ' , ) ( ) 
overall media pred
media
overall media pred
L C C P
P C
L C C P d
θ
θ θ
θ
θ θ θ
×
=
×∫
   
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        (9) 
where P(θ

) is the joint prior probability of the model parameters, media 'C

 is the mean 
measurement adjusted for recovery which equals sampling results ( mediaC

) divided by the 
associated sample recovery efficiency (R_air or R_surf), and predC

 represents 
concentrations predicted by the fate and transport model as a function of model 
parameters θ

. ( ' , )overall media predL C Cθ
  
 is the likelihood of obtaining a set of adjusted 
concentration observations ( media 'C

) given model predictions ( predC

), which are 
conditional on model parameters θ

. The likelihood is the joint probability of acquiring 
the observed mean B. anthracis concentrations from the 5 types of samples (Table 2-2). 
Thus the likelihood can be rewritten as a function of the t-distribution: 
air_semi, air_semi,air_act1, air_act2, air_act1, air_act2,fod_act2, cap_act2 fod_act2, cap_act2
1( )
2( ' , ) ( ' , ) (1
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ν
ν
+
−
 (10) 
where subscript media indexes the types of samples: samples are taken from the carpet, 
fabric office dividers, semi-quiescent air, active air sampling period 1, and active air 
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sampling period 2. νmedia is the number of degrees of freedom of the estimated mean of a 
particular observation, Γ is the Gamma function, and tmedia is computed as: 
'
/
media
media pred
media
C
C Ct
S n
−
=     (11) 
 
Usually differences between measurements and model predictions are assumed to 
follow a normal distribution with a mean of zero [18, 148, 172], but the normal 
distribution is replaced by a student's t distribution in this study, since the true standard 
deviation of the sampled values (measurements) is unavailable and only an estimated 
standard deviation ( ,media mediaCS ) is available. Concentration values are log transformed to 
reflect the standard assumption in environmental engineering of multiple dilutions 
yielding a log normal distribution [139].  
 
2.2.5 Modeling Scenarios 
The fractions of released B. anthracis in the letter opened in 2001 were analyzed 
by Battelle Memorial Institute, and the percentages of released spores with diameter 1 
µm, 3 µm, 5 µm, and 10 µm were found to be 0.14%, 1.46%, 8.40%, and 90%, which are 
used as constants during the updating [102]. In addition to updating with the data 
available from the Weis study [199] (Scenario 1), hypothetical scenarios are created to 
explore what could be learned if different information were available (Table 2-3). 
Scenario 2 tests how the outcomes of BMC updating would be changed if 100% sample 
recovery efficiency is assumed. Thus, Scenario 2 inherits most of the prior information 
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from Scenario 1 except that two sample recovery efficiencies (R_air, R_surf) are set as 1. 
Scenario 3 evaluates how the performance of BMC updating would change if 
reaerosolization sampling is not conducted. In this scenario only concentrations sampled 
from fabric office dividers and carpet are used in the updating, and the air concentration 
information is ignored. Scenario 4 is designed to test whether or not the performance of 
the Bayesian updating approach could be enhanced if additional samples had been taken 
(it is assumed that these additional samples yielded similar results to the existing 
samples). The sample mean remains unchanged from Scenario 1, but the standard errors 
of the measurements are reduced by 50%, which roughly corresponds to the availability 
of 4 times more data. Scenario 5 examines how incorporating information from an 
additional sampling location, the HVAC system filter, affects the updating results 
(additional simulated data on the HVAC filter mean concentration and standard deviation 
are used in the updating process). 
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Table 2-3 Summary of updating scenarios 
Symbol Scenario Feature 
0 Prior Monte Carlo Simulation based on prior information. 
1 Scenario 1 BMC updating with default settings. 
2 Scenario 2 BMC updating similar to Scenario 1 except 100% sample recovery efficiency is given. 
3 Scenario 3 BMC updating without observations from reaerosolization. 
4 Scenario 4 BMC updating with 50% less standard errors of the observations. 
5 Scenario 5 BMC updating with simulated observations from HVAC. 
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2.3 Results and Discussion 
Figures 2-4, 2-5, S1, and S2 summarize the probability distributions before and 
after Bayesian updating from different scenarios for 19 parameters. Uncertainties in the 
risk to the occupants via inhalation during the first hour of the release (i.e. before the 
room was evacuated), the total release quantity (successfully aerosolized), and the 
amount of spores that exit the room are substantially reduced by updating with the 
available data (Scenario 1). While the 5th to 95th percentile range for the estimated risk 
before BMC updating extends over roughly 5 orders of magnitude (9.35×10-6 to 1), the 
posterior range is around 1 order of magnitude (4.70×10-3 to 2.15×10-2). Similarly, the 5th 
to 95th percentile range for the release quantity prior to the BMC updating extends over 
roughly 9 orders of magnitude (1.06×104 to 1.01×1012), but the posterior range is reduced 
to 1 order of magnitude (5.20×106 to 2.40×107). The estimate of the amount of spores 
exiting the room ranges over roughly an order of magnitude from 1.34×106 to 4.39×107 
(Table A-2).  
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Figure 2-4 Prior and posterior CDF for the total released quantity, risk of exposed people, and the quantity of spores exit the room.  
(The bottom and top of the box are 25th and 75th percentile, the band inside the box is the 50th percentile, and the upper and lower whiskers represent the 5th 
and 95th percentile, respectively. The number 1 to 5 represent BMC updating scenarios, while 0 represents the prior scenario.) 
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Figure 2-5 Prior and posterior CDF for the resuspension rate 
(The bottom and top of the box are 25th and 75th percentile, the band inside the box is the 50th percentile, 
and the upper and lower whiskers represent the 5th and 95th percentile, respectively. The number 1 to 5 
represent BMC updating scenarios, while 0 represents the prior scenario.) 
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Figure 2-5 shows the uncertainty bounds for resuspension rates are not greatly 
changed by the updating process. Only the resuspension rate for spores with a diameter of 
10 micron is affected, and even this parameter is changed only modestly (the prior mean 
value of 2.02×10-4 shifts to a posterior mean of 2.90×10-4). In general, uncertainties in 
other fate and transport model parameters as well as the sample recovery efficiencies are 
not substantially reduced by the updating process (see Supporting Information for details). 
While the data cannot be used to improve estimates of parameters describing the fate and 
transport of weaponized B. anthracis, the updating process does indicate that there is not 
a demonstrable conflict between the parameter estimates obtained from surrogates, such 
as house dust, and the observed behavior of B. anthracis spores.  
 
The only difference between Scenarios 1 and 2 is the sample recovery efficiency, 
where the later one assumes that all the sampled B. anthracis are correctly measured, 
indicating that samples taken from the air and surface are unbiased. As a result, 
parameters like the total release quantity, risk and the amount exiting the room from 
Scenario 2 are lower than those from other scenarios, because one believes the sampling 
results represent the true deposited quantity. Scenario 3 (without reaerosolization 
sampling) has only modestly larger credible bounds for release quantity, risk and amount 
exiting the room across all the five BMC updating scenarios. This suggests that simple 
surface concentration measurements do almost as good a job of characterizing an attack 
as a more involved procedure that involves resuspension and air sampling. Due to the 
exclusion of air sampling, posterior distributions for spore's resuspension rate and air 
sample recovery efficiency are not successfully updated. 
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Comparing to Scenario 1, Scenario 4 quadruples the number of observations, 
which greatly reduces uncertainty in the release amount (90% CI: 5.64×106 to 1.75×107) 
and in the risk estimates (90% CI: 5.50×10-3 to 1.80×10-2), although little improvement is 
obtained for the estimate of the amount of spores exiting the room. The additional data 
does not improve the estimates of resuspension rate for all particle sizes, but the 
distribution of the resuspension rate of the 10 µm particles is shifted to somewhat higher 
values and has the smallest uncertainty bound. The 10 µm particles account for the 
majority of the release on a mass basis. Hence it is easiest to identify parameters for this 
size fraction. The posterior estimates for density and settling velocity of released particles 
also decrease; the latter one is a function of the former one (Equation 5), suggesting that 
increasing the number of samples can better identify particles' aerodynamic properties. 
Obtaining concentration information on the HVAC filter (Scenario 5) did not 
substantially reduce the uncertainty in parameter estimates in comparison to Scenario 1, 
except for the fraction of recirculated air (see Figure A-1 in Supporting Information).  
 
Comparing across the default scenario and four additional scenarios, one finds 
that 1) having additional samples (N=12 from each surface in Scenario 3 rather than N=3 
from Scenario 1) can greatly improve characterization of the release; 2) assuming a 100% 
sample recovery efficiency (Scenario 2) would lead one to underestimate the extent of a 
release; 3) the characterization is not greatly improved by measuring the concentration on 
the HVAC filter; 4) the samples taken from reaerosolization do not appear to greatly aid 
characterization of the release; and 5) the updating process does not greatly improve 
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estimates of fate and transport parameters, but in general parameters based on surrogates 
such as hose dust are not in conflict with the observed behavior of B. anthracis spores. 
 
Table2-4 shows Spearman's rank correlations between parameter values and the 
output of interest, risk, via inhalation during the first hour of Stage 1. Correlations are 
shown for the prior distribution of parameter input values and the posterior values from 
different scenarios. When the updating process reduces a correlation coefficient, this 
input's uncertainty has been successfully reduced and the remaining uncertainty is less 
important. While the correlation coefficient increases, this indicates that because the 
uncertainties in other inputs have been reduced, the uncertainty in this input is now 
relatively more important [148]. In Table 2-4, a significantly increased correlation is 
found for the resuspension rate of 10 micron spores, particle density and the two sample 
recovery efficiencies (except Scenario 2 with 100% sample recovery), while the 
correlation for mass released decreases from its prior value. The mass of released spores 
constitutes the major prior uncertainty, but this uncertainty can be updated with 
considerable success (resulting in a lower posterior correlation coefficient). In fact, if a 
larger sample size were available (Scenario 4), the mass released would no longer be the 
dominant source of uncertainty. As more information is obtained on mass released 
(Scenario 4), learning more about fate and transport parameters, such as the 
reaerosolization rates, and particle settling velocity, becomes relatively more important. 
Unfortunately, these parameters were not readily updated through this process. 
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Table 2-4 Spearman's rank correlation between risk and inputs 
Parameter Meaning Diameter (µm) Prior 
Posterior 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 
µ2 Resuspension rate 
1 5.70×10-3 1.10×10-3 4.30×10-3 -1.03×10-2 1.01×10-2 2.01×10-2 
3 -7.60×10-3 1.75×10-2 -1.19×10-4 -8.30×10-3 1.38×10-2 6.10×10-3 
5 -2.80×10-3 -2.80×10-3 -2.10×10-3 -1.48×10-2 1.31×10-2 2.04×10-2 
10 -6.40×10-3 -6.38×10-1 -8.16×10-1 6.34×10-2 -6.55×10-1 -6.86×10-1 
P The fraction of recirculated air  -6.03×10-4 3.30×10-2 3.52×10-2 4.09×10-2 5.53×10-2 1.33×10-2 
Vt (ρp) 
Particle settling velocity 
(Density)  -1.99×10
-2 -3.50×10-1 -1.63×10-1 -2.75×10-1 -4.35×10-1 -3.56×10-1 
Ke Turbulence intensity of the exposure stage  -5.03×10
-4 4.15×10-2 2.93×10-2 2.20×10-2 4.42×10-2 1.53×10-2 
ACH Air change rate  -2.94×10-2 -9.52×10-2 -5.27×10-2 -3.28×10-2 -1.04×10-1 -5.24×10-2 
R_air Air sample recovery efficiency  1.60×10
-3 -2.69×10-1 NA NA -3.70×10-1 -2.80×10-1 
R_surf Surface sample recovery efficiency  1.60×10
-3 -4.56×10-1 NA -6.00×10-1 -7.18×10-1 -4.10×10-1 
Mass_t Total release quantity  9.99×10-1 8.93×10-1 9.37×10-1 9.54×10-1 8.27×10-1 9.07×10-1 
Moderate and strong correlation coefficients (value greater than 0.5) are present in bold, while weak ones (between 0.1 and 0.5) are shown in Italic.
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Correlations from Table 2-4 are only based on a bivariate analysis. Complex 
multivariate relationships may exist in which the value of knowing one parameter is 
dependent on the amount of uncertainty in other variables. For example, in Scenario 5 
information on the HVAC filter concentration was observed to provide little reduction in 
uncertainty. However, an exploratory analysis revealed that when the HVAC filter 
concentration was known, the fraction of recirculated air became closely correlated with 
risk. Thus, HVAC filter concentration was of little use on its own, but when coupled with 
knowledge of the air circulated through the filter, it became valuable in characterizing the 
release. To identity these types of multivariate relationships, regression analyses were 
conducted in which risk estimated by the model was regressed on model input values for 
the amount of spores measured from three different surfaces (i.e., carpet, fabric office 
dividers, and the HVAC filter), and 3 particulate fate and transport parameters (i.e., the 
HVAC air change rate, the HVAC air recirculation rate, and the density of weaponized B. 
anthracis). 
 
Table 2-5 presents the regression models with the highest coefficient of 
determinations (R2) for different number of regressors when the particulate size fractions 
of released B. anthracis are fixed at values observed in the 2001 attacks [102]. Results 
indicate that the amount of spores measured from the untracked floor provides the most 
information on the risk, if only one parameter can be measured. The second, third, and 
fourth parameters to enter the regression are not spore concentrations but rather are 
particulate and building air circulation parameters: particle density, air exchange rate, and 
the HVAC air recirculation rate. Note that in Regression 4, HVAC filter replaces 
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untracked floor as the most informative sampling location. This supports the observation 
during the exploratory analysis that HVAC filter becomes more informative as air 
circulation parameters are better specified. The amount of spores measured on the wall is 
the last parameter entering the regression. Table 2-6 shows the best regression models 
when the fractions of released spores are treated as random variables, reflecting a 
situation in which the size fractions of released B. anthracis spores are not known. This 
reflects the situation when a sample of the released agent cannot be recovered in 
sufficient quantity to allow its size distribution to be identified. In this case spores 
concentrations on the HVAC filter enter the regression first, indicating it is a good 
sample location. The remaining variables to enter are air recirculation fraction, air change 
rate, particle density, untracked floor, and walls. As with the previous case, 
characterizing the particulate and air circulation may be as important as charactering 
spore concentrations.  
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Table 2-5 Models with highest coefficient of determinations (R2) for different numbers of 
regressores and size fractions based on pre-BMC data 
Model 
Number Function Parameter Coefficients Std. Error 
Residual 
Standard 
Deviation 
R2 
1 Risk~f(Untracked floor)+Const. 
Untracked floor 1.70×10-3 1.15×10-5 
1.53×10-5 7.54×10-1 
Const. -1.89×10-2 1.46×10-4 
2 Risk~f(Untracked floor, Particle density)+Const. 
Untracked floor 1.70×10-3 1.12×10-5 
1.48×10-5 7.69×10-1 Particle density -1.30×10-3 5.86×10-5 
Const. -9.60×10-3 4.51×10-4 
3 
Risk~f(Untracked floor, 
Air change rate, Particle 
density)+Const. 
Untracked floor 1.70×10-3 1.12×10-5 
1.48×10-5 7.70×10-1 
Air change rate -1.03×10-4 2.49×10-5 
Particle density -1.30×10-3 5.86×10-5 
Const. -9.60×10-3 4.51×10-4 
4 
Risk~f(HVAC filter, Air 
change rate, Air 
recirculation fraction, 
Particle density)+Const. 
HVAC filter 1.70×10-3 1.12×10-5 
1.48×10-5 7.71×10-1 
Air change rate -1.80×10-3 2.73×10-5 
Air recirculation fraction -1.70×10-3 2.29×10-5 
Particle density 3.72×10-4 5.83×10-5 
Const. -2.16×10-2 4.72×10-4 
5 
Risk~f(HVAC filter, 
Untracked floor, Air 
change rate, Air 
recirculation fraction, 
Particle density)+Const. 
HVAC filter 9.50×10-3 1.09×10-3 
1.47×10-5 7.72×10-1 
Untracked floor -7.80×10-3 1.10×10-3 
Air change rate -9.40×10-3 1.07×10-3 
Air recirculation fraction -9.50×10-3 1.10×10-3 
Particle density 7.80×10-3 1.04×10-3 
Const. -7.55×10-2 7.60×10-3 
6 
Risk~f(HVAC filter, 
Untracked floor, Walls, 
Air change rate, Air 
recirculation fraction, 
Particle density)+Const. 
HVAC filter 9.90×10-3 1.30×10-3 
1.47×10-5 7.72×10-1 
Untracked floor -8.20×10-3 1.40×10-3 
Walls 3.04×10-5 6.15×10-5 
Air change rate -9.80×10-3 1.30×10-3 
Air recirculation fraction -9.90×10-3 1.33×10-3 
Particle density 8.10×10-3 1.28×10-3 
Const. -7.80×10-2 9.10×10-3 
a. All the values are log-transformed before linear regression. 
b. Parameters HVAC filter, Untracked floor, and Walls refer the amount of B. anthracis measured from those surfaces 
c. Mean  prediction is -6.76 
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Table 2-6 Models with highest coefficient of determinations (R2) for different numbers of 
regressors and unknown size fractions based on pre-BMC data 
Model 
Number Function Parameter Coefficients Std. Error 
Residual 
Standard 
Deviation 
R2 
7 Risk~f(HVAC filter)+Const. 
HVAC filter 8.70×10-4 5.13×10-5 
9.26×10-5 3.05×10-1 
Const. -6.00×10-3 6.09×10-4 
8 
Risk~f(HVAC filter, Air 
recirculation 
fraction)+Const. 
HVAC filter 1.10×10-3 5.56×10-5 
8.78×10-5 3.77×10-1 Air recirculation fraction -1.10×10-3 1.29×10-4 
Const. -9.70×10-3 7.21×10-4 
9 
Risk~f(HVAC filter, Air 
change rate, Air 
recirculation 
fraction)+Const. 
HVAC filter 1.30×10-3 5.78×10-5 
8.50×10-5 4.19×10-1 
Air change rate -1.10×10-3 1.62×10-4 
Air recirculation fraction -1.20×10-3 1.25×10-4 
Const. -1.11×10-2 7.26×10-4 
10 
Risk~f(HVAC filter, Air 
change rate, Air 
recirculation fraction, 
Particle density)+Const. 
HVAC filter 1.30×10-3 5.76×10-5 
8.50×10-5 4.22×10-1 
Air change rate -1.10×10-3 1.62×10-4 
Air recirculation fraction -1.20×10-3 1.25×10-4 
Particle density 5.96×10-4 3.28×10-4 
Const. -1.57×10-2 2.60×10-3 
11 
Risk~f(HVAC filter, 
Untracked floor, Air 
change rate, Air 
recirculation fraction, 
Particle density)+Const. 
HVAC filter 1.30×10-3 5.79×10-5 
8.50×10-5 4.22×10-1 
Untracked floor -5.57×10-6 8.81×10-6 
Air change rate -1.10×10-3 1.62×10-4 
Air recirculation fraction -1.20×10-3 1.25×10-4 
Particle density 4.85×10-4 3.71×10-4 
Const. -1.47×10-2 3.00×10-3 
12 
Risk~f(HVAC filter, 
Untracked floor, Walls, 
Air change rate, Air 
recirculation fraction, 
Particle density)+Const. 
HVAC filter 1.30×10-3 5.79×10-5 
8.50×10-5 4.23×10-1 
Untracked floor -2.69×10-4 3.13×10-4 
Walls -2.64×10-4 3.14×10-4 
Air change rate -1.10×10-3 1.62×10-4 
Air recirculation fraction -1.20×10-3 1.25×10-4 
Particle density 7.36×10-4 4.76×10-4 
Const. -1.61×10-2 3.40×10-3 
a. All the values are log-transformed before linear regression. 
b. Parameters HVAC filter, Untracked floor, and Walls refer the amount of B. anthracis measured from those surfaces 
c. Mean  prediction is -5.74. 
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It is notable that when the size fractions of released spores are provided (Table 2-
5), the regression model can generate more reliable risk prediction (lower residual 
standard deviation) than the situation where size fraction is unknown (Table 2-6). In fact, 
when the size distribution is known, accurate knowledge of average concentrations on 
even a single surface provides sufficient information such that further characterization of 
the transport parameters of the room reduces the residual standard deviation only a little 
(from 1.53×10-5 in Regression 1 to 1.47×10-5 in Regression 6). In contrast, when the size 
distribution is not known, having more information becomes more important in 
characterizing the human risk (R2 from 9.26×10-5 in Regression 7 to 8.50×10-5 in 
Regression 12). Even when all 6 parameters are measured accurately there is still more 
uncertainty than when only floor concentration is measured and the size distribution is 
known (i.e., the residual standard deviation is higher for Regression 12 than for 
Regression 1). 
 
Based on the posterior risk estimates calculated here for the people in the building, 
the decision to provide prophylactic antibiotic treatment in the 2001 anthrax letter attacks 
is justified [36, 121]. The best estimate for risk to occupants of the room where the spores 
were released is roughly 1 in 100 (based on Scenario 1). Costs and side effects of 
antibiotic treatment are modest and may be justified for exposures much lower than this. 
For example the analysis of Mitchell-Blackwood et al. suggests that benefits would 
exceed costs for risk levels exceeding 1 in 6,547 [121]. 
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The model also provides an estimate of the number of spores leaving the room. It 
is complex and difficult to predict the fate and transport of B. anthracis spores in the 
outdoor environment since a significant amount of uncertainties can be found from many 
factors, such as the weather, surrounding topography, etc. To roughly assess the scale of 
possible impacts, extrapolations are conducted based on a previous assessment carried 
out by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1970, and a recent investigation carried 
by Wein and Craft on the human health adverse impacts from an outdoor release of B. 
anthracis spores [94, 197]. The WHO's report estimated that the number of casualties 
would be around 25, 000, if 50 kg of B. anthracis spores were released by aircraft over an 
area with a population of 5 million, corresponding to an expected mortality of 5×10-12 per 
spore released [94]. This rate is then computed as the ratio between the number deaths 
divided by the amount of total released spores. Wein et. al. indicated that if the released 
amount of B. anthracis spores were reduced to 1 kg with 50% dissemination efficiency 
over a large U.S. city with 1.39 million people, the most conservative mortality is linked 
to the people who only receive post- attack antibiotic, which could as much as 146,269, 
corresponding to mortality rate of 1.5×10-9 per spore released [197]. In our study, around 
107 spores (10-8 kg) are estimate as exiting the release location. If such amount of spores 
were dispersed in the settings of WHO's study, the expected mortality would be around 
the level of 10-5, while if such a release happed in the scenarios of Wein's study, a 
mortality of  1.5×10-2 would be expected. The previous two extrapolations are made 
under ideal situations, and these results should be further analyzed in the future. The 
WHO-based figure would suggest expected mortality was minimal. The figure based on the study 
of Wein and Craft would suggest that there was a non-negligible risk of infection outside the 
room. Since much of the risk would be contained within the building this supports the decision to 
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widely administer prophylactic antibiotics to occupants of the building even if they were not in 
the room where the release occurred. Whether risk outside the building could reach actionable 
thresholds is not clear from this analysis, but it does suggest that in the event of a future release, 
site-specific modeling would be justified to identify any potentially problematic exposures 
outside the building. 
 
This paper presents an application of the BMC method in updating uncertainty for 
an integrated fate, transport, and risk assessment model. While substantive reductions in 
the uncertainties of model fate and transport parameters were not achieved by the BMC 
updating process, neither did the data exclude the parameter estimates obtained from 
literature information on surrogates for B. anthracis. Four hypothetical scenarios were 
included to test the performance of the BMC updating given different types of data. 
Results suggest that a larger sample size would help to reduce input uncertainties, that 
assuming a perfect sample recovery would cause risk underestimation, and that 
measurements from the HVAC filter and air after resuspension activities did not greatly 
improve model posterior estimates, unless a variety of other parameters can also be 
measured. In addition, multivariate regressions based on different types of data indicate 
that measurements of different surface concentrations and particulate and air circulation 
parameters are necessary when the particulate size distribution is unknown. When the 
size distribution is known then measuring a single surface provides most of the 
information on the release quantity. This study provides a general framework for 
applying the Bayesian Monte Carlo approach to characterize a biological attack. In the 
future, the Bayesian approach can be applied to other phases of the response management 
framework, such as guidance on remediation of contaminated buildings [111]. To make 
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the approach more readily applicable, the MATLAB code developed here could be 
programmed into a software package to perform the updating which would enable the 
approach to be employed after an incident by individuals without specialized computer 
knowledge. In addition, the speed of BMC updating could be improved by conducting 
most of the computations using a parallel computing approach, such as using a GPU 
instead of a CPU [137]. 
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2.4 Appendix A 
Table A-1. Model Inputs  
Parameter Unit Meaning Diameter Distribution Mean Standard deviation Boundary 
Mass_t spores Total release quantity  
Truncated 
log-normal 8 2.41 [3.0-1.3×10
1] 
R_air  Air sample recovery efficiency  
Truncated 
normal 
0.22 0.05 [0.0-1.0] 
R_surf  Surface sample recovery efficiency  0.05 0.02 [0.0-1.0] 
ρp g/cm3 Particle density  1000 607 [1.0×103-3.0×103] 
ACH  Air change rate  1.55 0.88 [1.0×10-1-3.0] 
P  The fraction of recirculated air  0.50 0.3 [0.0-1.0] 
Ke  Turbulence intensity of exposure stage  
Truncated 
normal 
0.23 0.14 [1.0×10-5-4.5×10-1] 
Ke1  
Turbulence intensity 
of stage i 
 0.34 
0.07 
[2.3×10-1-4.5×10-1] 
Ke2   0.12 [1.0×10-5-2.3×10-1] 
Ke3,5   0.12 [1.0×10-5-2.3×10-1] 
Ke4,6   0.34 [2.3×10-1-4.5×10-1] 
µ2 m/min Resuspension rate 
1 
Truncated 
log-normal 
-11.90 1.71 [-1.5×101- -9.0] 
3 -6.25 0.70 [-7.4- -5.1] 
5 -4.98 0.33 [-5.5- -4.4] 
10 -4.57 0.72 [-5.8- -3.4] 
en  
Efficiency of the 
nasal passages at 
removing particles 
1 
Truncated 
normal 
0.14 0.07 [2.0×10-2-2.5×10-1] 
3 0.45 0.14 [2.2×10-1-6.8×10-1] 
5 0.62 0.12 [4.2×10-1-8.1×10-1] 
10 0.77 0.09 [6.2×10-1-9.1×10-1] 
Mass_f  Size fraction of released spores 
1 
Constant 
0.14% 
NA NA 
3 1.46% 
5 8.40% 
10 90% 
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Table A-2 Prior and posterior distributions for model inputs 
Parameter Meaning Prior Mean Mean (90% CI) 
Posterior Mean (90% CI) 
Scenario 1 
Mean (90% CI) 
Scenario 2 
Mean (90% CI) 
Scenario 3 
Mean (90% CI) 
Scenario 4 
Mean (90% CI) 
Scenario 5 
Mean (90% CI) 
Risk Inhalational risk 3.85×10
-1  
(9.35×10-6-1) 
1.05×10-2  
(4.70×10-3-2.15×10-2) 
2.10×10-3  
(6.40×10-4-4.90×10-3) 
1.34×10-2  
(2.70×10-3-3.42×10-2) 
1.00×10-2  
(5.50×10-3-1.80×10-2) 
1.19×10-2  
(5.00×10-3-2.53×10-2) 
Mass_t Total release quantity 
2.12×1011  
(1.06×104-1.01×1012) 
1.16×107  
(5.20×106-2.40×107) 
2.28×106  
(7.02×105-5.87×106) 
2.03×107  
(3.15×106-3.77×107) 
1.02×107  
(5.64×106-1.75×107) 
1.29×107  
(5.53×106-2.69×107) 
R_air Air sample recovery efficiency 
2.20×10-1 
(1.39×10-1-3.02×10-1) 
2.26×10-1 
(1.48×10-1-3.04×10-1) NA 
2.19×10-1 
(1.37×10-1-3.02×10-1) 
2.19×10-1 
(1.43×10-1-2.95×10-1) 
2.22×10-1 
(1.43×10-1-3.00×10-1) 
R_surf Surface sample recovery efficiency 
5.03×10-2 
(1.82×10-2-8.26×10-2) 
4.64×10-2 
(1.97×10-2-7.68×10-2) NA 
5.00×10-2 
(1.85×10-2-8.28×10-2) 
4.53×10-2 
(2.15×10-2-7.07×10-2) 
4.63×10-2 
(2.11×10-2-7.51×10-2) 
ρp Particle density 
2.00×103  
(1.20×103- 2.79×103) 
1.87×103  
(1.12×103-2.69×103) 
1.86×103  
(1.14×103-2.70×103) 
1.94×103  
(1.15×103-2.77×103) 
1.58×103  
(1.04×103-2.44×103) 
1.84×103  
(1.11×103-2.72×103) 
ACH Air change rate 1.55  (3.94×10-1- 2.70) 
1.55  
(4.32×10-1-2.71) 
1.57 
(4.25×10-1-2.71) 
1.54  
(3.69×10-1-2.70) 
1.54  
(3.76×10-1-2.65) 
1.51  
(3.81×10-1-2.68) 
P The fraction of recirculated air 
5.03×10-1 
(1.05×10-1-8.99×10-1) 
5.06×10-1  
(1.14×10-1-8.99×10-1) 
5.01×10-1  
(9.35×10-2-9.00×10-1) 
5.10×10-1  
(1.13×10-2-8.88×10-1) 
5.21×10-1  
(1.03×10-1-9.14×10-1) 
5.49×10-1  
(1.65×10-1-9.12×10-1) 
Ke 
Turbulence 
intensity of 
exposure stage 
2.28×10-1  
(4.61×10-2-4.10×10-1) 
2.42×10-1  
(5.99×10-2-4.10×10-1) 
2.39×10-1  
(5.56×10-2-4.15×10-1) 
2.42×10-1  
(6.11×10-2-4.14×10-1) 
2.66×10-1  
(8.40×10-2-4.20×10-1) 
2.39×10-1  
(5.61×10-2-4.14×10-1) 
Ke1 
Turbulence 
intensity of stage i 
3.40×10-1  
(2.51×10-1-4.29×10-1) 
3.41×10-1  
(2.50×10-1-4.30×10-1) 
3.40×10-1  
(2.52×10-1-4.29×10-1) 
3.42×10-1  
(2.51×10-1-4.30×10-1) 
3.39×10-1  
(2.51×10-1-4.26×10-1) 
3.41×10-1  
(2.51×10-1-4.30×10-1) 
Ke2 1.18×10
-1  
(2.60×10-2-2.08×10-1) 
1.18×10-1  
(2.55×10-2-2.10×10-1) 
1.19×10-1  
(2.42×10-2-2.09×10-1) 
1.17×10-1  
(2.53×10-2-2.09×10-1) 
1.18×10-1  
(2.24×10-2-2.09×10-1) 
1.19×10-1  
(2.63×10-2-4.28×10-1) 
Ke3,5 1.18×10
-1  
(2.49×10-2-2.08×10-1) 
1.24×10-1  
(3.25×10-2-2.11×10-1) 
1.22×10-1  
(3.04×10-2-2.11×10-1) 
1.22×10-1  
(2.99×10-2-2.10×10-1) 
1.36×10-1  
(4.58×10-2-2.16×10-1) 
1.24×10-1  
(3.23×10-2-2.10×10-1) 
Ke4,6 3.41×10
-1  
(2.52×10-1-4.30×10-1) 
3.39×10-1  
(2.52×10-1-4.30×10-1) 
3.40×10-1  
(2.52×10-1-4.28×10-1) 
3.39×10-1  
(2.51×10-1-4.27×10-1) 
3.40×10-1  
(2.52×10-1-4.30×10-1) 
3.40×10-1  
(2.53×10-1-4.29×10-1) 
Vt 
(m/s) 
Particle settling 
velocity 
6.00×10-5  
(3.59×10-5-8.39×10-5) 
5.62×10-5  
(3.36×10-5-8.10×10-5) 
5.60×10-5  
(3.43×10-5-8.11×10-5) 
5.82×10-5  
(3.47×10-5-8.32×10-5) 
4.76×10-5  
(3.12×10-5-7.33×10-5) 
5.53×10-5  
(3.33×10-5-8.18×10-5) 
5.40×10-4  
(3.23×10-4-7.55×10-4) 
5.06×10-4  
(3.03×10-4-7.29×10-4) 
5.04×10-4  
(3.09×10-4-7.30×10-4) 
5.24×10-4  
(3.12×10-4-7.49×10-4) 
4.28×10-4  
(2.81×10-4-6.59×10-4) 
4.97×10-4  
(3.00×10-4-7.37×10-4) 
1.50×10-3  
(8.98×10-4-2.10×10-3) 
1.40×10-3  
(8.41×10-4-2.00×10-3) 
1.40×10-3  
(8.58×10-4-2.00×10-3) 
1.50×10-3  
(8.67×10-4-2.10×10-3) 
1.20×10-3  
(7.81×10-4-1.80×10-3) 
1.40×10-3  
(8.32×10-4-2.00×10-3) 
6.00×10-3  
(3.60×10-3-8.40×10-3) 
5.60×10-3  
(3.40×10-3-8.10×10-3) 
5.60×10-3  
(3.40×10-3-8.10×10-3) 
5.80×10-3  
(3.50×10-3-8.30×10-3) 
4.80×10-3  
(3.10×10-3-7.30×10-3) 
5.50×10-3  
(3.30×10-3-8.20×10-3) 
a. 0-Semiquiescent sampling period first stage place the sampler  1-Semiquiescent sampling period second stage sample 2,4-Period between Semiquiescent and Active Period 3,5-Active Sampling period 
b. The number 1 to 4 represent BMC updating scenario, while 0 represents the prior scenario.  
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Table A-2 Prior and posterior distributions for model inputs (continued) 
Parameter Meaning Diameter Prior Mean Mean (90% CI) 
Posterior Mean (90% CI)  
Scenario 1 
Mean (90% CI) 
Scenario 2 
Mean (90% CI) 
Scenario 3 
Mean (90% CI) 
Scenario 4 
Mean (90% CI) 
Scenario 5 
Mean (90% CI) 
µ2 
(m/min) 
Resuspension 
rate 
1 2.63×10
-7  
(1.22×10-8-1.09×10-6) 
2.63×10-7  
(1.23×10-8-1.08×10-6) 
2.69×10-7  
(1.24×10-8-1.11×10-6) 
2.60×10-7  
(1.25×10-8-1.07×10-6) 
2.61×10-7  
(1.19×10-8-1.10×10-6) 
2.56×10-7  
(1.26×10-8-1.05×10-6) 
3 3.74×10
-5  
(1.29×10-5-8.09×10-5) 
3.71×10-5  
(1.27×10-5-8.16×10-5) 
3.72×10-5  
(1.28×10-5-8.12×10-5) 
3.73×10-5  
(1.27×10-5-8.18×10-5) 
3.71×10-5  
(1.29×10-5-8.18×10-5) 
3.69×10-5  
(1.26×10-5-7.95×10-5) 
5 8.62×10
-5  
(6.92×10-5-1.00×10-4) 
8.60×10-5  
(6.93×10-5-1.00×10-4) 
8.62×10-5  
(6.95×10-5-1.00×10-4) 
8.66×10-5  
(6.95×10-5-1.00×10-4) 
8.63×10-5  
(6.96×10-5-1.00×10-4) 
8.64×10-5  
(6.94×10-5-1.00×10-4) 
10 2.02×10
-4  
(6.76×10-5-4.42×10-4) 
2.90×10-4  
(1.10×10-4-5.04×10-4) 
3.09×10-4  
(9.48×10-5-5.36×10-4) 
2.29×10-4  
(7.05×10-5-4.84×10-4) 
3.51×10-4  
(1.64×10-4-5.37×10-4) 
2.69×10-4  
(9.51×10-5-4.91×10-4) 
en 
Efficiency of 
the nasal 
passages at 
removing 
particles 
1 1.38×10
-1  
(4.57×10-2-2.28×10-1) 
1.38×10-1  
(4.83×10-2-2.29×10-1) 
1.38×10-1  
(4.39×10-2-2.32×10-1) 
1.37×10-1  
(4.41×10-2-2.29×10-1) 
1.37×10-1  
(4.52×10-2-2.29×10-1) 
1.38×10-1  
(4.59×10-2-2.29×10-1) 
3 4.50×10
-1  
(2.68×10-1-6.33×10-1) 
4.51×10-1  
(2.66×10-1-6.33×10-1) 
4.52×10-1  
(2.66×10-1-6.34×10-1) 
4.46×10-1  
(2.62×10-1-6.30×10-1) 
4.51×10-1  
(2.64×10-1-6.35×10-1) 
4.54×10-1  
(2.64×10-1-6.38×10-1) 
5 6.18×10
-1  
(4.61×10-1-7.72×10-1) 
6.22×10-1  
(4.64×10-1-7.74×10-1) 
6.21×10-1  
(4.61×10-1-7.74×10-1) 
6.19×10-1  
(4.63×10-1-7.73×10-1) 
6.22×10-1  
(4.60×10-1-7.75×10-1) 
6.18×10-1  
(4.63×10-1-7.71×10-1) 
10 7.67×10
-1  
(6.51×10-1-8.83×10-1) 
7.66×10-1  
(6.52×10-1-8.78×10-1) 
7.68×10-1  
(6.52×10-1-8.83×10-1) 
7.66×10-1  
(6.48×10-1-8.77×10-1) 
7.63×10-1  
(6.48×10-1-8.83×10-1) 
7.67×10-1  
(6.49×10-1-8.82×10-1) 
Dose/ Mass_t 
Fraction of 
inhaled spores 
and total 
released 
1 1.60×10
-3  
(1.00×10-3-2.10×10-3) 
1.60×10-3  
(1.00×10-3-2.00×10-3) 
1.60×10-3  
(1.00×10-3-2.00×10-3) 
1.60×10-3  
(1.00×10-3-2.10×10-3) 
1.60×10-3  
(1.00×10-3-2.10×10-3) 
1.60×10-3  
(1.10×10-3-2.10×10-3) 
3 1.20×10
-3  
(8.15×10-4-1.60×10-3) 
1.20×10-3  
(8.17×10-4-1.60×10-3) 
1.20×10-3  
(8.18×10-4-1.60×10-3) 
1.20×10-3  
(8.24×10-4-1.60×10-3) 
1.20×10-3  
(8.46×10-4-1.70×10-3) 
1.20×10-3  
(8.40×10-4-1.60×10-3) 
5 8.30×10
-4 
(5.95×10-4-1.20×10-3) 
8.51×10-4  
(6.09×10-4-1.20×10-3) 
8.53×10-4  
(6.09×10-4-1.20×10-3) 
8.44×10-4  
(6.05×10-4-1.20×10-3) 
9.05×10-4  
(6.42×10-4-1.30×10-3) 
8.70×10-4  
(6.14×10-4-1.20×10-3) 
10 3.79×10
-4 
(2.75×10-4-5.38×10-4) 
4.05×10-4  
(2.90×10-4-5.72×10-4) 
4.08×10-4  
(2.89×10-4-5.78×10-4) 
3.90×10-4  
(2.81×10-4-5.51×10-4) 
4.59×10-4  
(3.18×10-4-6.32×10-4) 
4.12×10-4  
(2.91×10-4-5.90×10-4) 
Total 4.30×10
-4 
(3.15×10-4-6.00×10-4) 
4.55×10-4  
(3.30×10-4-6.34×10-4) 
4.58×10-4  
(3.29×10-4-6.41×10-4) 
4.42×10-4  
(3.21×10-4-6.15×10-4) 
5.09×10-4  
(3.61×10-4-6.98×10-4) 
4.34×10-4  
(3.32×10-4-6.54×10-4) 
Mass_ex 
Total 
pathogen exit 
the release 
room 
1 1.32×10
11  
(5.60×103-5.71×1011) 
7.30×106  
(1.24×106-1.75×107) 
1.45×106  
(2.00×105-3.97×106) 
1.35×107  
(8.07×105-2.51×107) 
6.23×106  
(1.00×106-1.29×107) 
7.60×106  
(1.05×106-1.90×107) 
3 8.74×10
10  
(3.46×103-3.71×1011) 
4.92×106  
(6.74×105-1.26×107) 
9.76×105  
(1.14×105-2.74×106) 
8.85×106 
(4.58×105-1.66×107) 
4.30×106 
(5.80×105-9.72×106) 
5.02×106 
(5.85×105-1.34×107) 
5 5.84×10
10  
(2.18×103-2.40×1011) 
3.36×106  
(3.90×105-9.16×106) 
6.65×105  
(6.59×104-1.93×106) 
6.00×106 
(2.64×105-1.14×107) 
3.02×106 
(3.47×105-7.23×106) 
3.40×106 
(3.34×105-9.65×106) 
10 2.65×10
10  
(9.14×102-1.04×1011) 
1.62×106  
(1.55×105-4.66×106) 
3.18×105  
(2.70×104-9.33×105) 
2.91×106 
(9.78×104-5.67×106) 
1.56×106 
(1.48×105-4.13×106) 
1.62×106 
(1.32×105-4.81×106) 
61 
 
 
Figure A-1 Prior and posterior CDF for particle transport parameters 
(The bottom and top of the box are 25th and 75th percentile, the band inside the box is the 50th percentile, 
and the upper and lower whiskers represent the 5th and 95th percentile, respectively. The number 1 to 4 
represent BMC updating scenarios, while 0 represents the prior scenario.) 
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Figure A-2 Prior and posterior CDF for the settling velocities 
(The bottom and top of the box are 25th and 75th percentile, the band inside the box is the 50th percentile, 
and the upper and lower whiskers represent the 5th and 95th percentile, respectively. The number 1 to 4 
represent BMC updating scenarios, while 0 represents the prior scenario.) 
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CHAPTER 3: CHARACTERIZING BIOAEROSOL RISK FROM 
ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING 
 
 
Abstract  
In the aftermath of a release of microbiological agents, environmental sampling 
must be conducted to characterize the release sufficiently so that mathematical models 
can then be used to predict the subsequent dispersion and human health risks. Because 
both the dose-response and environmental transport of aerosolized microbiological agents 
are functions of the effective aerodynamic diameter of the particles, environmental 
assessments should consider not only the total amount of agent but also the size 
distributions of the aerosolized particles. This chapter evaluates different approaches to 
estimating risk from measurements of microorganisms deposited on surfaces after an 
aerosol release. For a various combinations of sampling surfaces, size fractions, HVAC 
operating conditions, size distributions of release spores, and uncertainties in surface 
measurements, the accuracy of model predictions are tested in order to assess how much 
detail can realistically be identified from surface sampling results. The recommended 
modeling and sampling scheme is one choosing 3, 5 and 10µm diameter particles as 
identification targets and taking samples from untracked floor, wall and the HVAC filter. 
This scheme provides reasonably accurate, but somewhat conservative, estimates of risk 
across a range of different scenarios. Performance of the recommended sampling scheme 
is tested by using data from a large scale field test as a case study. Sample sizes of 10-25 
are sufficient to develop order of magnitude estimates of risk. Larger sample sizes have 
little benefit unless uncertainties in sample recoveries can be reduced. 
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3.1 Introduction 
After the 2001 anthrax attacks, many researchers have focused on how to 
effectively estimate human health risk during a bio-terrorist attack, so that appropriate 
response actions can be taken [16, 17, 19, 20, 37, 46, 52, 55, 88, 93, 94, 121, 146, 158, 
196, 199]. Thus, many models have been developed, including pathogen dose-response 
models [11, 90] and environmental transport models [152, 162, 174, 175, 189]. These 
previous modeling efforts have recognized that the size distribution of the particulates has 
a substantial impact on the risk. For example, a previous study [85] estimated that a B. 
anthracis spore concentration of 100/m2 on a floor would correspond to a risk of one in a 
thousand if the spores were finely aerosolized, 1μm diameter particles, but one in a 
million if the spores were present as 10μm diameter clumps. Smaller particles settle more 
slowly and are less readily removed by HVAC system filters [162]. These properties 
allow them to disperse over larger areas and persist longer in the air than larger particles. 
In addition, fine particulates are more respirable, and thus present greater risks when 
inhaled than larger particles [11]. 
 
Previous modeling efforts have generally accounted for these aerosol size effects 
by modeling a number of discrete particle sizes [11, 85, 149, 162]. However, little 
previous research has examined how to conduct sampling in order to effectively 
parameterize these models. While some aerosol samplers can provide information on 
particulate sizes, aerosol concentrations decline rapidly after a release making it unlikely 
that response will be rapid enough to characterize a release based on aerosol 
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concentrations. The material used in the attack may not be recovered in sufficient 
quantity for a size distribution analysis to be conducted. Surface sampling techniques 
generally provide information on only the total number of organisms or gene copies 
present, not the size fractions of particulates that organisms are associated with. Because 
different size particles partition into various environmental compartments at different 
rates, the concentrations found in different environmental compartments may allow the 
size distribution of the release to be identified.  
 
This study addresses the question of how much can be learned from simple 
aggregate concentration measurements, such as could reasonably be made after an actual 
release. In order to assess how size distributions can realistically be identified from 
surface sampling results, a variety of alternative model formulations and sampling 
schemes are evaluated following a 7-step framework. The recommended modeling and 
sampling scheme is then applied to a case study using parameter estimates from a large 
scale field test, which aims to provide insights between a sampling scheme's reliability 
and its required sample size. 
 
3.2 Methodology  
The method has two components. First, forward modeling is conducted, in which 
characteristics of a release are assumed and a fate and transport model is used to estimate 
spore concentrations in different environmental compartments. The B. anthracis spore 
concentrations predicted by the fate and transport model then serve as inputs for different 
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inverse modeling approaches, which are evaluated on their ability to match the forward 
modeling results. The overall goal of this analysis is to identify sampling and modeling 
schemes, specifically as a combination of sampling locations and modeled particle sizes, 
which allow the release quantities for different spore sizes, their associated risks, and the 
amount exiting the release room to be characterized with the least error. 
 
3.2.1 Fate and transport model (forward modeling) 
The general fate and transport model for a simple office with a HVAC system is 
expressed as: 
( ) ( )d M t T M t
dt
=


      
where ( )M t

 is the quantity of spores in different compartments, and T

 is a matrix of 
transfer coefficients. Based on Figure 3-1, the modeled office is divide into 7 internal 
compartments: air, tracked floor, untracked floor, walls, ceiling, HVAC, and the nasal 
passages of an occupant of the office, and an eighth compartment that consists of all areas 
external to the room.  
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Figure 3-1 Schematic of single room office suite 
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Thus the general fate and transport model can be written as: 
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where Mair(t) is the number of spores in the air compartment, Mtf(t) is the number of 
spores on the tracked surface of the floor, Mutf(t) is the number of spores on the untracked 
surface of the floor, Mw(t) is the number of spores on the walls, Mf(t) is the number of 
spores on the filter, Mec(t) is the number of spores in the external compartment, Mce(t) is 
the number of spores on the ceiling, Mn(t) is the number of spores in the occupant’s nasal 
passages. Mair, Mtf, Mutf, Mw, Mf, Mec, Mce and Mn are all given in units of spores 
(number of organisms). Next we define the following parameters: Q is the discharge from 
the air compartment (units of m3/s), µ2 is the resuspension rate from the tracked surface 
into the air compartment (units of s-1), p is the fraction of air recirculated into the building 
by the HVAC system, e is the efficiency of the filter at removing particles, en is the 
efficiency of the nasal passages at removing particles, I is the inhalation rate of the 
occupant (units of m3/s), and V is the volume of the room (units of m3). λtf, λutf, λw and λce 
are the deposition rates for aerosolized pathogens onto the tracked surface, the untracked 
surface and the floors, walls, and ceiling respectively (units of s-1), which can be 
expressed by parameters representing the indoor air flow conditions: 
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( )
( )
21 e
tf utf
tf utf v
Dk
A v
Vol
e
πλ
−
= ×
−
    (2) 
2w
w e
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Vol
λ
π
= ×
    (3) 
2 1e
c
c v
Dk
A v
Vol
e
πλ = ×
−
    (4) 
where D (m2/s) is the particle diffusivity, ke (s-1) is turbulence intensity, and v (m/s) is 
particle settling velocity, which is given in Equation 5 as a function of the particle's 
diameter (d, units of m), the viscosity of air (µair, units of kg/(m×s)), the density of the 
particle (ρp, units of kg/m3), and the density of air (ρair, units of kg/m3).  
2 ( )
18
p air
t
air
gd
V
ρ ρ
µ
−
=
    (5) 
For the details of the solution to Equation 1, please refer to Hong et. al. [85]. Parameter 
values are provided as Supplementary Information.  
 
Such compartment modeling approaches are widely used, although their 
limitations must be acknowledged. This modeling approach assumes that each 
compartment is completely mixed, which is not accurate at the immediate time of a 
release but becomes much more accurate as the release disperses over time. Thus, the 
methodology presented here is intended for use in areas somewhat removed from the 
initial release such that concentrations on different surfaces (walls, untracked floor, and 
HVAC filter) can be considered reflective of more or less the same time-averaged air 
concentration. The model used here is based on literature studies of how particulates 
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behave in the indoor environmental [129, 131, 146, 162, 171, 173, 184, 183]. In the case 
of B.anthracis spores, a verification of the above mentioned fate and transport model has 
been undertaken [87] by comparing the results of a completely mixed compartment 
model with observations of B.anthracis spore concentrations from the Hart Senate Office 
Building reported by Weis et. al. [199]. The observed behavior of the spores was 
generally consistent with model predictions, allowing the model to be used to generate 
order of magnitude estimates of risk [87]. This verification analysis used a Bayesian 
Monte Carlo approach to identify release parameters. While the Bayesian Monte Carlo 
approach has promise, it does require the identification of prior distributions for 
parameters and thousands of model runs to characterize posterior distributions, which is 
complicated and computationally intensive. In the following section, the potential of a 
more straightforward and rapid classical approach to identifying release characteristics is 
evaluated. 
 
3.2.2 Particle identification (inverse modeling) 
Because all of the processes in Equation 1 are first order, the release quantity 
(Mr)�������⃗  can be expressed as the product of a matrix, commonly termed the inverse transfer 
matrix (T−1 ��������⃗ ) and the mass of deposited B. anthracis spores in each environmental 
compartment (Ms�����⃗ ) [148]:   Mr�����⃗ = T−1 ��������⃗ Ms�����⃗      (6) 
 
The inverse transfer matrix (T−1 ��������⃗ ) in Equation 6 is a function of time, as specified 
by the transfer matrix (T
 ) of the fate and transport model. This matrix goes through an 
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initial period of rapid change, when deposition from the air compartment is the dominant 
process. Then resuspension, a much slower process, becomes the rate controlling process. 
This is illustrated in Figure 3-2 which shows the mass in different compartments over 
time for the four different particle sizes considered. The mass in each compartment varies 
in the first few minutes and then stabilizes within several hours of the release. This 
stabilization is not a true steady state, as eventually resuspension will deplete 
concentrations on tracked surfaces (and in fact a gradual decline in tracked floor 
concentration can be seen over several hours for the 10µm fraction, as this fraction is 
most readily resuspended). However, this period after the initial deposition phase is 
termed "quasi-steady state" because surface concentrations are roughly stable over the 
time period during which initial release characterization would be expected to occur 
(days). The T−1 ��������⃗  matrix can be considered roughly constant in this period. 
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Figure 3-2 Number of spores in different environmental compartments over time for a 
single room model. 
The approximate transition from the phase of initial deposition of the aerosol to a quasi-steady state (see 
text) is indicated by a vertical line in each plot. 
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At quasi-steady state, if the diameter of spores are divided into four groups: 1μm, 
3μm, 5μm, and 10μm [88], Equation 6 can be expanded to give: 
 �
Mr1Mr3Mr5Mr10�  = ⎣⎢⎢
⎡
KsurfA_1 KsurfA_3 KsurfA_5 KsurfA_10KsurfB_1 KsurfB_3 KsurfB_5 KsurfB_10KsurfC_1 KsurfC_3 KsurfC_5 KsurfC_10KsurfD_1 KsurfD_3 KsurfD_5 KsurfD_10⎦⎥⎥
⎤
−1  
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡
Ms_surfAMs_surfBMs_surfCMs_surfD⎦⎥⎥
⎤
 (7) 
Where Ksurfi_j  is the distribution coefficient for spores with diameter of j on surface i, Ms_sur�i is the unbiased mass measurements of the total spores on surface i, and Mrj is the 
initial release quantity for spores whose diameters are j µm. It is the Mrjvalues which 
need to be identified from sampling so that the impacts of the release can be modeled. 
 
Because of the difficulties associated with recovering samples from surfaces [21, 
61, 66], leading to potential errors in the sampling and analysis steps, measurements from 
the surfaces vary from their true values. Thus, it is necessary to evaluate the impacts of 
such errors in measurements of Ms�����⃗  on the characterized release quantity, Mr�����⃗ . Simulated 
measurement errors are constructed by Hadamard multiplying (element by element 
product, symbol ○) Ms�����⃗ , the environmental compartment concentration values from the 
fate and transport model, by a coefficient (Z�⃗ ), whose elements are assumed to be 
normally distributed with mean of 1 and standard deviation of 0.3. Thus equation (8) 
links the estimated release quantity Mr�����⃗ , with measured values subject to random errors: Mr�����⃗ = T−1 ��������⃗ �Ms�����⃗ ○ Z�⃗ �     (8) 
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3.2.3 Modeled scenarios 
Three sets of size distributions of released B. anthracis spores are employed to 
test the robustness of candidate modeling and sampling schemes. The nominal size 
distribution is based on the lab analysis of the 2001 anthrax letter attack: the fractions of 
1, 3, 5, and 10µm are 0.14%, 1.46%, 8.40%, and 90%, respectively [102]. The second set 
doubles the quantity of spores with diameters of 1, 3, and 5µm, and reduces the amount 
of 10µm; thus the new fractions are 0.28%, 2.92%, 16.80%, and 80%, respectively. This 
size fraction represents the situation where more fine particles are released, which is 
termed "light". While the third size fraction, termed "heavy", has half the number of 1, 3, 
and 5µm spores (size fractions are 0.07%, 0.73%, 4.20%, and 95%) as compared to the 
nominal situation. Since different HVAC operation situations might change the fate and 
transport properties of released spores and impact human exposure, three HVAC 
operating conditions are considered, representing low, medium, and high air recirculation 
rates (p=0.5, 0.75, 0.95) for each set of size distributions considered. In addition, surface 
concentration measurements with errors (model predictions multiplied by a matrix Z) and 
without errors are considered. Since the impacts of measurement error are modeled by a 
matrix Z�⃗  whose elements are random numbers, it is necessary to propagate this 
uncertainty. Thus medians and 90% confidence intervals from Monte Carlo simulations 
with 1000 iterations are included. In total each candidate scheme is evaluated under 18 
conditions (3 HVAC operational conditions × 3 size fraction distributions × with and 
without measurement errors). 
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3.2.4 Evaluation framework 
Only 3 out of 8 modeled locations (wall, untracked floor, and HVAC filter) are 
considered feasible for sampling in this study. The indoor air, external air, ceiling, and 
human nasal passage compartments in the fate and transport model (Equation 1) are 
excluded due to the relatively low concentration values that would be expected in these 
compartments several hours after a release, which could not be measured accurately. The 
tracked floor is excluded because it provides essentially the same information as the 
untracked floor but with less reliability as it is less stable over time. This indicates that no 
more than three size fractions can be identified from the release quantity, while the full 
model includes four size fractions.  
 
The steps of the model evaluation framework used in this study are illustrated in 
Figure 3-3: 1) the full model, consisting of all 4 size fractions is run and concentrations in 
the different environmental compartments at quasi-steady state are simulated, as well as 
the risk to the occupants of the room and the amount of spores exiting the room; 2) a set 
of compartments is chosen for measuring B. anthracis spore concentrations; 3) particle 
sizes are selected to be modeled; given that only 3 environmental compartments are 
considered suitable for measurement and that the full model has 4 particle sizes, the 
number of size fractions to be modeled based on available measurements must be 
reduced from the number in the full model, hence this is termed the reduced model; 4) the 
inverse transfer matrix at quasi-steady for the reduced model is computed, and the matrix 
(Z�⃗ ), representing measurement error, is generated; 5) Monte Carlo simulations are 
conducted, and the release quantities are calculated with Equation 6. When simulated 
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measurement errors are included in the environmental concentrations, then Equation 8 is 
used. When measurement errors are present, it is possible to obtain negative estimates of 
mass. Zeros are substituted for any negative estimates; 6) using the release quantities 
estimated from the reduced model, the risk to occupants of the room and the number of 
spores exiting this room are calculated; and 7) the ratios of the reduced model and full 
model are determined for the risk to occupants and amount of spores exiting the room. 
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Figure 3-3 Evaluation framework used in this study
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For an identification approach to be effective, the ratios of quantities such as 
human risk and the amount of spores exiting the room between the reduced form and the 
full model (based on four size fractions) should be close to one but should not have much 
risk of falling substantially below one. Ratios greater than one represent conservative 
models, meaning that a model that overestimates risk to the occupants of the room, which 
in most cases would be preferred to an approach that underestimates risk. Likewise an 
approach that overestimates the number of spores leaving the room (which would inform 
estimates of risk to those downwind of the release) would generally be preferred over an 
approach that underestimates the number of spores leaving the room. However, in order 
to provide a reasonable prediction, these ratios should not be too far away from one.  
 
3.3 Results 
The first modeling and sampling schemes considered are those ones with three 
different size fractions. The fraction of spores with the diameter of 10µm is always 
identified because it constitutes the vast majority of the release, while the other two 
identification targets are selected from the remaining three candidate particle sizes. Table 
3-1 presents results for identification approaches for three particle sizes. If the surface 
sampling results are perfect (no errors), ratios for the occupants' risk, and the amount of 
spores exiting the room are very close to 1, indicating that these approaches closely 
match the full model. However, once sampling inefficiency and potential errors are 
considered. The median ratios from some sampling schemes overestimate risk by a factor 
of 2 or 3. This indicates that predictions for the release quantity and ratios are sensitive to 
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measurement errors. Across the different size fraction identification schemes, the ones 
using 3, 5 and 10µms as the identification targets outperform others, because the 5th 
percentiles for the ratios of human health risk and the amount of spores exiting the room 
are closer to 1, which means adopting this sampling schemes reduces the potential extent 
of underestimation due to sampling error. 
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Table 3-1 Results for approaches to identify three size fractions 
Selected 
compartments 
Size fractions to 
be identified (µm) 
Set of size 
distribution 
HVAC 
operation 
condition 
Ratio of occupants' risk Ratio of spores exiting the room 
No measurement 
error 
Measurement error No measurement 
error 
Measurement error 
50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 
Untracked floor 
Walls 
HVAC filter 
1,3,10 
Nominal 
0.50 1.15 1.83 0.68 5.02 1.06 1.34 0.88 2.12 
0.75 1.14 1.92 0.73 4.90 1.06 1.38 0.90 2.14 
0.95 1.11 1.68 0.69 4.61 1.05 1.31 0.89 2.10 
Light 
0.50 1.20 1.37 0.59 3.48 1.12 1.26 0.85 1.99 
0.75 1.18 1.31 0.57 3.38 1.11 1.25 0.86 1.94 
0.95 1.14 1.27 0.55 3.18 1.09 1.21 0.85 1.91 
Heavy 
0.50 1.11 2.47 0.88 6.56 1.03 1.41 0.91 2.32 
0.75 1.10 2.56 0.88 6.63 1.03 1.45 0.94 2.35 
0.95 1.08 2.32 0.89 6.45 1.03 1.42 0.91 2.30 
Overall    0.57 6.63   0.85 2.35 
1,5,10 
Nominal 
0.50 1.00 1.40 0.61 3.70 1.00 1.19 0.85 1.70 
0.75 1.00 1.44 0.65 3.58 1.00 1.20 0.87 1.70 
0.95 1.00 1.31 0.63 3.35 1.00 1.16 0.86 1.68 
Light 
0.50 1.00 1.12 0.55 2.53 0.99 1.10 0.81 1.53 
0.75 1.00 1.08 0.53 2.47 0.99 1.10 0.83 1.51 
0.95 1.00 1.07 0.54 2.33 0.99 1.07 0.82 1.46 
Heavy 
0.50 1.00 1.82 0.80 4.76 1.00 1.24 0.87 1.91 
0.75 1.00 1.88 0.81 4.80 1.00 1.28 0.89 1.91 
0.95 1.00 1.77 0.77 4.69 1.00 1.25 0.86 1.88 
Overall    0.53 4.80   0.81 1.91 
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Table 3-1. Results for approaches to identify three size fractions (continued) 
Selected 
compartments 
Size fractions to 
be identified (µm) 
Set of size 
distribution 
HVAC 
operation 
condition 
Ratio of occupants' risk Ratio of spores exiting the room 
No measurement 
error 
Measurement error No measurement 
error 
Measurement error 
50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 
Untracked floor 
Walls 
HVAC filter 
3,5,10 
Nominal 
0.50 1.00 2.53 0.79 6.05 1.00 1.52 0.96 2.69 
0.75 1.00 2.58 0.89 6.05 1.00 1.54 0.95 2.71 
0.95 1.00 2.35 0.92 5.61 1.01 1.48 0.96 2.66 
Light 
0.50 1.00 1.80 0.75 3.99 1.00 1.36 0.92 2.39 
0.75 1.00 1.71 0.78 3.75 1.01 1.35 0.91 2.37 
0.95 1.00 1.57 0.77 3.53 1.01 1.28 0.90 2.25 
Heavy 
0.50 1.00 3.43 1.03 8.13 1.00 1.61 0.97 2.98 
0.75 1.00 3.48 1.02 8.47 1.00 1.65 1.00 3.02 
0.95 1.00 3.21 1.00 8.24 1.00 1.60 0.97 2.93 
Overall    0.75 8.47   0.90 3.02 
a.The size fractions of 1, 3, 5, and 10µm for the nominal scenario are 0.14%, 1.46%, 8.40%. and 90%, The size fractions of 1, 3, 5, and 10µm for the light scenario for the light 
scenario are 0.28%, 2.92%, 16.80%, and 80%. The size fractions of 1, 3, 5, and 10µm for the heavy scenario and 0.07%, 0.73%, 4.20%, and 95%. 
b. If a negative release quantity is identified, it will be assumed 0. 
c. Bold shows the qualified surface particle size combination. 
d. Values in the 'Overall' row come from the lowest 5% and the highest 95% ratios. 
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If two size fractions are to be estimated, again the 10µm size fraction is always 
included in the model because it accounts for the majority of spores. The other 
identification target is selected from the 1, 3, and 5µm diameter size fractions, while two 
sampling surfaces are selected from untracked floor, wall, and the HVAC filter. Table 3-2 
provides the results for the identification approaches based on two sampling surfaces. If 
measurement error is not considered, three candidate sampling schemes satisfy the 
evaluation criteria: 1) identifying 5 and 10µm particle sizes by sampling from the 
untracked floor, and the walls; 2) identifying 5 and 10µm particle sizes by sampling from 
the walls and the HVAC filter; and 3) identifying 3 and 10µm particle sizes by sampling 
the untracked floor and the HVAC filter. However, if the effect of measurement error is 
considered, the 5th percentile ratios for the human risk are less than 0.5 for the selected 
combinations, indicating serious underestimations of risk are possible due to sampling 
error. As a result, none of the two particle size approaches are recommended. 
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Table 3-2 Results for approaches to identify two size fractions 
Selected compartments 
Size fractions to 
be identified 
(µm) 
Set of size 
distribution 
HVAC 
operation 
condition 
Ratio of occupants' risk Ratio of spores exiting the room 
No measurement 
error 
Measurement error No measurement 
error 
Measurement error 
50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 
Untracked floor 
Walls 
1,10 
Nominal 
0.50 0.68 0.69 0.45 1.12 0.93 0.93 0.60 1.28 
0.75 0.68 0.69 0.43 1.06 0.92 0.92 0.63 1.26 
0.95 0.68 0.68 0.42 1.08 0.92 0.92 0.62 1.23 
Light 
0.50 0.58 0.59 0.35 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.62 1.14 
0.75 0.58 0.58 0.34 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.61 1.12 
0.95 0.60 0.59 0.36 0.82 0.86 0.86 0.61 1.09 
Heavy 
0.50 0.78 0.85 0.55 1.35 0.96 0.98 0.64 1.36 
0.75 0.78 0.83 0.54 1.34 0.96 0.99 0.62 1.38 
0.95 0.77 0.82 0.54 1.32 0.96 0.97 0.63 1.34 
Overall    0.34 1.35   0.60 1.38 
3,10 
Nominal 
0.50 0.88 0.90 0.47 1.75 0.98 1.01 0.69 1.33 
0.75 0.90 0.91 0.45 1.68 0.99 0.99 0.72 1.32 
0.95 0.92 0.92 0.44 1.70 0.99 1.00 0.73 1.31 
Light 
0.50 0.85 0.87 0.37 1.38 0.97 0.98 0.73 1.23 
0.75 0.87 0.86 0.37 1.37 0.97 0.97 0.73 1.22 
0.95 0.90 0.88 0.41 1.36 0.99 0.99 0.74 1.21 
Heavy 
0.50 0.92 0.98 0.58 2.12 0.99 1.04 0.72 1.40 
0.75 0.93 0.94 0.57 2.08 0.99 1.04 0.71 1.40 
0.95 0.95 0.95 0.56 2.13 1.00 1.04 0.71 1.37 
Overall    0.37 2.13   0.69 1.40 
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Table 3-2 Results for approaches to identify two size fractions (continued) 
Selected compartments 
Size fractions to 
be identified 
(µm) 
Set of size 
distribution 
HVAC 
operation 
condition 
Ratio of occupants' risk Ratio of spores exiting the room 
No measurement 
error 
Measurement error No measurement 
error 
Measurement error 
50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 
Untracked floor 
Walls 5,10 
Nominal 
0.50 1.08 1.11 0.49 2.39 1.02 1.05 0.74 1.39 
0.75 1.10 1.11 0.46 2.30 1.02 1.05 0.76 1.37 
0.95 1.15 1.14 0.45 2.30 1.03 1.05 0.77 1.36 
Light 
0.50 1.11 1.14 0.39 1.90 1.03 1.04 0.77 1.30 
0.75 1.13 1.13 0.39 1.89 1.04 1.03 0.78 1.30 
0.95 1.19 1.16 0.46 1.86 1.06 1.06 0.80 1.30 
Heavy 
0.50 1.06 1.10 0.59 2.88 1.01 1.08 0.75 1.48 
0.75 1.07 1.03 0.59 2.79 1.01 1.08 0.74 1.46 
0.95 1.11 1.10 0.58 2.89 1.02 1.09 0.75 1.42 
Overall    0.39 2.89   0.74 1.48 
Untracked floor 
HVAC 1,10 
Nominal 
0.50 3.67 3.74 0.42 21.23 1.88 1.89 0.81 7.46 
0.75 3.71 3.68 0.40 21.04 1.92 1.92 0.79 7.67 
0.95 3.69 3.75 0.37 18.44 1.94 1.94 0.76 6.92 
Light 
0.50 4.45 4.47 0.29 14.56 2.60 2.60 0.76 7.14 
0.75 4.46 4.59 0.29 14.02 2.64 2.63 0.80 6.91 
0.95 4.37 4.08 0.25 13.26 2.66 2.50 0.74 6.83 
Heavy 
0.50 2.83 1.94 0.53 25.86 1.46 1.48 0.79 7.01 
0.75 2.88 2.03 0.54 25.25 1.49 1.51 0.82 6.99 
0.95 2.90 2.77 0.53 25.27 1.50 1.54 0.82 7.22 
Overall    0.25 25.86   0.74 7.67 
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Table 3-2 Results for approaches to identify two size fractions (continued)  
Selected 
compartments 
Size fractions to 
be identified 
(µm) 
Set of size 
distribution 
HVAC 
operation 
condition 
Ratio of occupants' risk Ratio of spores exiting the room 
No measurement 
error 
Measurement error No measurement 
error 
Measurement error 
50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 
Untracked floor 
HVAC 
3,10 
Nominal 
0.50 1.12 1.13 0.42 4.83 1.05 1.18 0.79 1.96 
0.75 1.11 1.12 0.40 4.83 1.05 1.19 0.75 1.99 
0.95 1.09 1.09 0.37 4.20 1.05 1.16 0.76 1.87 
Light 
0.50 1.16 1.16 0.29 3.32 1.10 1.13 0.72 1.87 
0.75 1.15 1.14 0.29 3.15 1.10 1.12 0.74 1.81 
0.95 1.11 1.04 0.26 2.98 1.08 1.08 0.71 1.75 
Heavy 
0.50 1.08 1.04 0.54 5.91 1.03 1.25 0.77 1.98 
0.75 1.08 1.04 0.55 5.75 1.03 1.23 0.78 1.95 
0.95 1.06 1.05 0.53 5.78 1.02 1.23 0.77 2.00 
Overall    0.29 5.91   0.71 2.00 
5,10 
Nominal 
0.50 0.96 0.96 0.43 3.74 0.98 1.12 0.77 1.59 
0.75 0.94 0.95 0.41 3.73 0.98 1.12 0.75 1.56 
0.95 0.92 0.92 0.38 3.24 0.97 1.08 0.74 1.53 
Light 
0.50 0.94 0.94 0.29 2.57 0.97 1.02 0.68 1.44 
0.75 0.93 0.92 0.29 2.41 0.96 1.01 0.70 1.42 
0.95 0.90 0.84 0.26 2.28 0.94 0.98 0.70 1.36 
Heavy 
0.50 0.97 1.07 0.55 4.57 0.99 1.19 0.77 1.68 
0.75 0.96 1.07 0.56 4.45 0.99 1.18 0.76 1.70 
0.95 0.94 1.03 0.54 4.46 0.98 1.18 0.76 1.67 
Overall    0.29 4.57   0.68 1.70 
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Table 3-2 Results for approaches to identify two size fractions (continued)  
Selected 
compartments 
Size fractions to 
be identified (µm) 
Set of size 
distribution 
HVAC 
operation 
condition 
Ratio of occupants' risk Ratio of spores exiting the room 
No measurement 
error 
Measurement error No measurement 
error 
Biased 
50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 
Wall 
HVAC 
1,10 
Nominal 
0.50 0.64 0.68 0.45 1.08 1.00 1.00 0.68 1.38 
0.75 0.63 0.67 0.45 1.04 1.00 1.01 0.69 1.36 
0.95 0.64 0.66 0.44 1.03 1.00 1.00 0.68 1.34 
Light 
0.50 0.53 0.54 0.35 0.81 0.99 1.00 0.72 1.29 
0.75 0.53 0.53 0.35 0.79 0.99 0.99 0.73 1.25 
0.95 0.54 0.54 0.34 0.77 0.99 0.99 0.74 1.24 
Heavy 
0.50 0.75 0.85 0.58 1.33 1.00 1.03 0.65 1.43 
0.75 0.75 0.84 0.57 1.30 1.00 1.02 0.65 1.42 
0.95 0.74 0.83 0.55 1.29 1.00 1.01 0.67 1.45 
Overall    0.34 1.33   0.65 1.45 
3,10 
Nominal 
0.50 0.83 0.85 0.48 1.98 1.01 1.04 0.73 1.50 
0.75 0.84 0.87 0.50 1.87 1.01 1.04 0.73 1.48 
0.95 0.88 0.90 0.48 1.92 1.01 1.03 0.72 1.45 
Light 
0.50 0.77 0.78 0.38 1.51 1.01 1.03 0.76 1.36 
0.75 0.80 0.80 0.38 1.45 1.01 1.02 0.77 1.31 
0.95 0.85 0.85 0.37 1.42 1.02 1.02 0.77 1.27 
Heavy 
0.50 0.88 1.03 0.63 2.41 1.00 1.07 0.69 1.57 
0.75 0.89 1.02 0.61 2.36 1.00 1.06 0.68 1.59 
0.95 0.92 0.99 0.59 2.37 1.01 1.04 0.70 1.58 
Overall    0.37 2.41   0.68 1.59 
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Table 3-2 Results for approaches to identify two size fractions (continued)  
Selected 
compartments 
Size fractions to 
be identified (µm) 
Set of size 
distribution 
HVAC 
operation 
condition 
Ratio of occupants' risk Ratio of spores exiting the room 
No measurement 
error 
Measurement error No measurement 
error 
Biased 
50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 
Wall 
HVAC 5,10 
Nominal 
0.50 1.18 1.19 0.53 3.91 1.00 1.09 0.78 1.92 
0.75 1.23 1.28 0.55 3.69 1.00 1.10 0.76 1.91 
0.95 1.34 1.35 0.52 3.75 1.00 1.09 0.77 1.82 
Light 
0.50 1.24 1.27 0.41 3.05 0.99 1.07 0.80 1.63 
0.75 1.30 1.32 0.42 2.86 0.99 1.06 0.79 1.58 
0.95 1.43 1.43 0.41 2.89 0.99 1.06 0.80 1.52 
Heavy 
0.50 1.13 1.41 0.70 4.88 1.00 1.15 0.74 2.11 
0.75 1.16 1.38 0.67 4.59 1.00 1.13 0.73 2.07 
0.95 1.24 1.37 0.65 4.72 1.00 1.11 0.75 2.06 
Overall    0.41 4.88   0.73 2.11 
a.The size fractions of 1, 3, 5, and 10µm for the nominal scenario are 0.14%, 1.46%, 8.40%. and 90%, The size fractions of 1, 3, 5, and 10µm for the light scenario for the light 
scenario are 0.28%, 2.92%, 16.80%, and 80%. The size fractions of 1, 3, 5, and 10µm for the heavy scenario and 0.07%, 0.73%, 4.20%, and 95%. 
b. If a negative release quantity is identified, it will be assumed 0. 
c. Bold shows the qualified surface particle size combination. 
d. Values in the 'Overall' row come from the lowest 5% and the highest 95% ratios. 
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Table 3-3 includes the results when a single size fraction, the 1µm size fraction, is 
selected for identification. When samples are taken from either the untracked floor or the 
HVAC filter, the ratios for the human risk and the amount of spores leaving the room are 
greatly overestimated, indicating these identification strategies are not accurate. 
However, if samples are collected from walls, the ratios for human risk are close to one, 
but the ratios of quantity of spores leaving the room are far below one. This phenomenon 
arises because 1µm deposit to the walls in greater proportion than other size fractions 
(Figure 3-4). Thus assuming all spores are 1µm results in an underestimation of total 
release quantity. Since the estimated release quantity is lower than its actual value, the 
approach also underestimates the number of spores leaving the room. However, the 
estimate of risk is close to the full model because all the spores are assumed to be from 
the most dangerous size fraction, 1µm [11]. Table 3-4 includes the results for approaches 
to identify 10µm size fraction. In contrast to the 1µm scenarios, release quantities are 
underestimated. When samples are taken from untracked floor and the HVAC filter, the 
ratios of human risk and the amount of spores exiting the room are less than one. 
However if samples are taken from walls, the release quantity is overestimated due to its 
low rate at which 10µm spores deposit to walls compared to other size fractions. This 
results in an overestimation of the number of spores leaving the room (see Figure 3-4). 
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Figure 3-4 The distribution of Bacillus anthracis with different diameters after 8 hours. 
The percentages in the table are distributions of B. anthracis spores among different compartments, while the heights of different colors in one bar denote the 
distribution of spore sizes in that compartment. 
  
Air compartment Floor Wall HVAC filter Outside Nasal Passage 
1 μm 0.49% 12.95% 0.62% 55.74% 29.93% 0.27% 
3 μm 0.01% 27.13% 0.08% 65.53% 7.04% 0.21% 
5 μm 0.02% 41.19% 0.03% 54.71% 3.89% 0.16% 
10 μm 0.13% 66.89% 0.01% 31.02% 1.86% 0.09% 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
  
90 
Table 3-3 Results for approaches to identify 1 micron size fraction 
Selected 
compartments 
Set of size 
distribution 
HVAC 
operation 
condition 
Ratio of occupants' risk Ratio of spores exiting the room 
No measurement 
error 
Measurement error No measurement 
error 
Measurement error 
50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 
Untracked floor 
Nominal 
0.50 183.54 184.80 119.86 230.24 84.83 85.72 47.44 123.82 
0.75 175.64 176.12 111.43 220.65 83.78 84.12 45.01 123.21 
0.95 165.41 165.92 107.83 205.04 82.25 82.64 45.59 118.42 
Light 
0.50 114.72 114.18 73.57 145.08 72.48 71.97 40.02 105.94 
0.75 108.57 110.13 69.70 138.18 70.91 72.45 39.07 105.43 
0.95 100.74 99.65 64.65 124.95 68.68 67.56 37.69 97.80 
Heavy 
0.50 255.79 251.93 156.45 320.39 92.01 89.89 47.17 134.83 
0.75 248.06 249.84 153.65 314.43 91.39 92.41 47.42 137.76 
0.95 237.74 236.79 148.31 298.00 90.49 89.92 47.22 133.99 
Overall    64.65 320.39   37.69 137.76 
Wall 
Nominal 
0.50 1.02 1.02 0.64 1.38 0.33 0.33 0.20 0.44 
0.75 1.01 1.02 0.65 1.39 0.33 0.33 0.21 0.46 
0.95 1.00 1.01 0.67 1.33 0.34 0.34 0.23 0.45 
Light 
0.50 0.79 0.79 0.54 1.03 0.35 0.35 0.24 0.46 
0.75 0.79 0.79 0.54 1.04 0.36 0.36 0.25 0.48 
0.95 0.79 0.79 0.56 1.02 0.37 0.37 0.27 0.48 
Heavy 
0.50 1.26 1.26 0.74 1.78 0.31 0.31 0.18 0.44 
0.75 1.25 1.25 0.74 1.80 0.31 0.31 0.19 0.45 
0.95 1.24 1.24 0.72 1.75 0.32 0.32 0.18 0.45 
Overall    0.54 1.80   0.18 0.48 
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Table 3-3 Results for approaches to identify 1 micron size fraction (continued) 
Selected 
compartments 
Set of size 
distribution 
HVAC 
operation 
condition 
Ratio of occupants' risk Ratio of spores exiting the room 
No measurement 
error 
Measurement error No measurement 
error 
Measurement error 
50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 
HVAC filter 
Nominal 
0.50 25.70 25.49 14.96 35.66 8.57 8.49 4.90 12.08 
0.75 24.90 25.01 14.17 34.88 8.51 8.55 4.76 12.13 
0.95 23.72 23.37 13.97 32.68 8.41 8.28 4.87 11.78 
Light 
0.50 17.67 17.53 10.97 24.00 8.23 8.16 5.03 11.36 
0.75 17.01 16.91 11.21 22.73 8.15 8.09 5.29 11.05 
0.95 16.06 16.11 10.23 21.23 7.98 8.01 5.00 10.71 
Heavy 
0.50 34.15 34.31 18.87 47.85 8.76 8.80 4.76 12.48 
0.75 33.43 33.77 17.36 47.63 8.73 8.82 4.45 12.66 
0.95 32.31 32.19 17.86 46.61 8.68 8.64 4.71 12.75 
Overall    10.97 47.85   4.45 12.75 
a.The size fractions of 1, 3, 5, and 10µm for the nominal scenario are 0.14%, 1.46%, 8.40%. and 90%, The size fractions of 1, 3, 5, and 10µm for the light scenario for the light 
scenario are 0.28%, 2.92%, 16.80%, and 80%. The size fractions of 1, 3, 5, and 10µm for the heavy scenario and 0.07%, 0.73%, 4.20%, and 95%. 
b. If a negative release quantity is identified, it will be assumed 0. 
c. Bold shows the qualified surface particle size combination. 
d. Values in the 'Overall' row come from the lowest 5% and the highest 95% ratios. 
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Table 3-4 Results for approaches to identify 10 micron size fraction 
Selected 
compartments 
Set of size 
distribution 
HVAC operation 
condition 
Ratio of occupants' risk Ratio of spores exiting the room 
No measurement 
error 
Measurement error No measurement 
error 
Measurement error 
50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 
Untracked floor 
Nominal 
0.50 0.44 0.44 0.21 0.64 0.85 0.85 0.41 1.25 
0.75 0.42 0.42 0.22 0.60 0.84 0.83 0.45 1.21 
0.95 0.39 0.40 0.21 0.58 0.82 0.83 0.44 1.21 
Light 
0.50 0.27 0.27 0.16 0.39 0.72 0.73 0.42 1.06 
0.75 0.25 0.26 0.15 0.37 0.71 0.73 0.42 1.04 
0.95 0.24 0.23 0.13 0.33 0.69 0.68 0.38 0.96 
Heavy 
0.50 0.61 0.61 0.31 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.47 1.39 
0.75 0.60 0.60 0.31 0.88 0.91 0.92 0.47 1.35 
0.95 0.57 0.57 0.30 0.84 0.90 0.89 0.47 1.33 
Overall    0.13 0.93   0.38 1.39 
Wall 
Nominal 
0.50 0.57 0.57 0.36 0.77 1.11 1.11 0.70 1.49 
0.75 0.56 0.56 0.36 0.76 1.12 1.12 0.72 1.53 
0.95 0.55 0.55 0.35 0.74 1.15 1.15 0.74 1.54 
Light 
0.50 0.44 0.44 0.30 0.59 1.20 1.19 0.82 1.59 
0.75 0.44 0.44 0.30 0.58 1.22 1.22 0.85 1.62 
0.95 0.43 0.44 0.31 0.57 1.27 1.28 0.89 1.67 
Heavy 
0.50 0.71 0.71 0.41 0.99 1.06 1.06 0.61 1.49 
0.75 0.70 0.70 0.42 1.00 1.07 1.08 0.64 1.54 
0.95 0.68 0.69 0.40 0.95 1.08 1.10 0.63 1.51 
Overall    0.30 1.00   0.61 1.67 
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Table 3-4 Results for approaches to identify 10 micron size fraction (continued) 
Selected 
compartments 
Set of size 
distribution 
HVAC operation 
condition 
Ratio of occupants' risk Ratio of spores exiting the room 
No measurement 
error 
Measurement error No measurement 
error 
Measurement error 
50% 5% 95% 50% 5% 95% 
HVAC filter 
Nominal 
0.50 0.49 0.49 0.28 0.69 0.95 0.95 0.53 1.34 
0.75 0.47 0.47 0.26 0.67 0.95 0.94 0.52 1.35 
0.95 0.45 0.45 0.24 0.64 0.94 0.94 0.51 1.33 
Light 
0.50 0.34 0.34 0.21 0.46 0.92 0.92 0.58 1.24 
0.75 0.32 0.32 0.21 0.44 0.91 0.90 0.58 1.23 
0.95 0.30 0.30 0.19 0.42 0.89 0.89 0.55 1.21 
Heavy 
0.50 0.65 0.66 0.36 0.95 0.98 0.99 0.53 1.43 
0.75 0.63 0.63 0.33 0.92 0.97 0.96 0.50 1.41 
0.95 0.61 0.60 0.33 0.88 0.97 0.96 0.53 1.40 
Overall    0.19 0.95   0.51 1.43 
a.The size fractions of 1, 3, 5, and 10µm for the nominal scenario are 0.14%, 1.46%, 8.40%. and 90%, The size fractions of 1, 3, 5, and 10µm for the light scenario for the 
light scenario are 0.28%, 2.92%, 16.80%, and 80%. The size fractions of 1, 3, 5, and 10µm for the heavy scenario and 0.07%, 0.73%, 4.20%, and 95%. 
b. If a negative release quantity is identified, it will be assumed 0. 
c. Bold shows the qualified surface particle size combination. 
d. Values in the 'Overall' row come from the lowest 5% and the highest 95% ratios. 
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3.4 Application of the sampling scheme 
Based on the above results, identifying 3, 5, and 10µm particle size fractions 
based on samples from the untracked floor, walls, and the HVAC filter is recommended 
as a modeling and sampling scheme. To examine how such an approach might be 
applied, and what degree of uncertainty would be present in results, concentration 
measurements from a large scale field test are analyzed below. 
 
In September 2008, Battelle Energy Alliance conducted five release events of 
Bacillus atrophaeus, a surrogate for Bacillus anthracis, at Idaho National Laboratory 
(INL) in a typical two-story commercial building (Building PBF632) in order to support 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), and the Joint Program Executive Office Chemical and Biological Defense's 
(JPEOCBD) Sample Collection Operation Test Plan. Among the five tested release 
events, Events 1, 2, and 4 were performed on the first floor of the building, while Events 
3 and 5 were performed on the second floor. For each release event, Bacillus atrophaeus 
spores were aerosolized through a battery powered generator, and surface concentrations 
were measured using collection methods: vacuum, wipe, and swab. Between release 
events, the building was decontaminated and the effectiveness of decontamination was 
verified by clearance samples. For details of this field test, please refer to the official 
report [4].  
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To create the matrix Z�⃗ , it is necessary to estimate sample recovery variability and 
uncertainty associated with different collection methods. This was done using settling 
plate samples as a reference by a multivariate regression model. Recovery efficiencies (γj) 
are estimated as: 
, , , , , ,
1 1
Y =
ji nn
i j k i i k j j k i j k
i j
I Jβ γ ε
= =
+ +∑ ∑     (13) 
where the dependent variable is the log transformed surface concentration Yi,j,k, i indexes 
the combination of room and sampling event where the sample was taken (thus rooms are 
indexed separately for each of the sampling events), j indexes collection method, and k 
indexes the measurements within each room-event and sampling method combination. 
The model has two classes of parameters: 1) βi the nuisance parameters, which account 
for the effects of Ii,k, the indicator of location-event combination (Ii,k is 1 when the kth 
sample is from the ith location-event combination and 0 otherwise), and 2) γj the 
collection method recovery fractions, which account for the effects of Jj,k, the collection 
method indicator (Jj,k is 1 when the kth sample is sampled by the jth collection method and 
0 otherwise). The error terms of this regression (εi,j,k) are collection method specific, 
following a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of σj (εi,j,k 
~N(o,σj)). Parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) using data 
from the 3 release events with more than 55% detectable concentrations (Events 1, 4, and 
5) for a total of 550 observations, which consist of 146 swabs samples, 76 Vacuum 
samples, 227 wipes samples, and 101 settling plate samples. The inverse of the 
information matrix is used to estimate standard errors of model parameters. The standard 
error of γj, denoted by σj, is of particular interest since this is the uncertainty in mean 
recovery (relative to the settling plate data that were used as a reference). The normality 
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of the residual errors from the best fitted model has been verified, and values of σj and σγ, 
are present in Table 3-5 by sample collection method.   
97 
 
Table 3-5 The standard deviation and its uncertainty for the error term 
Collection method 
Parameter value (log scale) Sample quantity (log scale) 
σγ σj n=1 n=4 n=25 
Swab 0.32 0.94 0.99 0.57 0.38 
Vacuum 0.18 0.67 0.69 0.38 0.22 
Wipe 0.25 0.97 1.00 0.54 0.31 
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For samples taken from an unknown surface, the overall uncertainty has two 
sources, uncertainty in mean recovery (σγ) and variability in the recovery from sample to 
sample (σj). The sampling variability can be reduced by increasing sample size. However, 
unless a reference method is available, increasing the sample size will not reduce 
uncertainty in the recovery fraction. While a reference method (i.e., settling plate data) 
was available for this field study, it would not be available in the aftermath of an actual 
biological attack. Thus for a given collection method j, its residual error, (i.e., the 
elements of matrix Z�⃗ ), is generated by the following distribution: 
2
2ln ~  (0, )jj N nγ
σ
ε σ +
    (14)
 
where n is the sample size. 
 
Based on errors calculated in this manner and shown in Table 3-5, nine different Z�⃗  
matrices are developed, one for each of three sample collection methods (swabs, vacuum, 
and wipes) and three sample sizes (1, 9, and 25). These Z matrices estimated from the 
field data are tested on the previously recommended sampling and modeling scheme, 
taking samples from untracked floor, wall, and the HVAC filter to identify 3, 5 and 10µm. 
A Monte Carlo simulation of 1000 iterations is used for each sampling scheme, and the 
ratios of human risk and amount of spores exiting the room are computed. The impacts of 
imperfect sample recovery and sample size are investigated by checking the quotients 
between the 95th percentile and 5th percentile of these two ratios, which represents the 
uncertainty of the results. The closer this quotient is to 1, the less uncertainty in the 
sampling scheme. Figure 3-5 illustrates this quotient as a function of sample size for nine 
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sampling schemes. Uncertainties in number of spores exiting the room are smaller than 
those in health risks to occupants of the release room. Thus health risk to occupants of the 
room drives the sample size requirement. Based on these inputs, it is suggested to take at 
least 25 samples, which results in roughly one order of magnitude difference between the 
95th percentile and 5th percentile estimations for risk estimates in the release room. 
Sample sizes larger than 25 provide little benefit as the remaining uncertainty is due to 
uncertainty in mean recovery (σγ) rather than sampling variability (σj). Given that a 
reference method (i.e., settling plates) would not be available in a real release, additional 
samples will not reduce uncertainty in recovery rates. Accordingly once the sample size 
is sufficient to reduce the effect of σj on overall uncertainty then there is little benefit to 
further sampling. One potential option to reduce σγ would be to conduct positive control 
studies. While this option is not explored further here, the expected reduction in σγ could 
be used with the approach described here to estimate the benefit of such positive control 
studies. Among the three sample collection methods, samples taken by wipes have the 
most sampling variability and hence are the most sensitive to sample size, followed by 
swab and vacuum. One should beware that conclusions might change under different 
settings, such as the type of released agents, release location (indoor vs. outdoor), the 
sample extraction method used, the material used for sampling, etc. 
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Figure 3-5 The relationship between a sample scheme's reliability and its sample size 
(Identification targets are 3, 5 and 10µm, and samples are taken from untracked floor, wall and the HVAC filter) 
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3.5 Discussion 
This analysis provides a framework for determining how much detail can feasibly 
be included in models and provides guidance on appropriate sampling schemes. This 
analysis suggests that 1) a 3 size fraction model (3, 5, and 10µm), which can be estimated 
based on aggregate surface sampling of the untracked floor, wall, and the HVAC filter, 
provides reasonable and conservative estimates of risk and number of spores leaving the 
release room; and 2) in an example application, a sample size of about 25 provided order 
of magnitude estimates of risk, but unless a reference is available to enable uncertainties 
in recovery to be reduced, there is little benefit to taking more than 25 samples. 
 
Calculations involved in this paper depends on the complete mixing assumption, 
which is generally true for fine particles as deposition rates are slow relative to mixing 
rates. However, the immediate vicinity of a release may contain large amounts of coarse 
particles due to rapid deposition of these particles before mixing can occur. More detailed 
work, such as computational fluid dynamics modeling could provide guidance as to how 
to interpret surface concentration in the immediate vicinity of a release. The approach 
described here is applicable only to areas removed from the initial release. Whether this 
framework is applicable can be readily ascertained from sampling data. Areas of a room 
showing spatial variability in sampling results would be areas for which the complete 
mixing assumption is not valid. Results from areas with consistent and uniform 
concentrations would be appropriate for use with this method.  
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3.6 Appendix B 
Table B-1. Inputs and their values used in Equation 1 and 6 
Parameter 
Symbol Meaning Unit 
Best 
Estimate Source 
V Volume of model the office m3 78.4 Author decision 
Q Discharge from the air compartment m3/s 0.087 [59] 
p Fraction of air recirculated into the building by the HVAC system  0.8 [8] 
ρp Particle density kg/m3 1000 
Author 
decision 
ACH Air change rate times/hour 4 Author decision 
Inh Occupants' inhalation rate m3/hour 1.02 [101] 
e The efficiency of the filter at removing particles 
1µm 0.098 
[162] 
3µm 0.49 
5µm 0.74 
10µm 0.88 
en 
The efficiency of the nasal passages at 
removing particles 
1µm 0.14 
[104, 
161] 
3µm 0.45 
5µm 0.62 
10µm 0.77 
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Table B-1. Inputs and their values used in Equation 1 and 6 (continued) 
Parameter 
Symbol Meaning Unit Best Estimate Source 
λw(ce) 
Deposition rates onto the walls 
(ceilings) hour
-1 
1µm 0.1 
[162] 
3µm 0.4 
5µm 0.8 
10µm 0.9 
λtf(utf) 
Deposition rates onto the tracked 
(untracked) surface hour
-1 
1µm 0.1 
[162] 
3µm 0.6 
5µm 2.0 
10µm 8.1 
µ2 
Resuspension rate from the untracked 
surface into the air compartment hour
-1 
1µm 1.2×10-4 
[162] 
3µm 1.9×10-3 
5µm 3.8×10-3 
10µm 3.4×10-2 
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CHAPTER 4: PRIORITIZING RISKS AND UNCERTAINTIES FROM 
INTENTIONAL RELEASE OF SELECTED CATEGORY A PATHOGENS 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper synthesizes available information on five Category A pathogens 
(Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Francisella tularensis, Variola major and Lassa) to 
develop quantitative guidelines for how environmental pathogen concentrations may be 
related to human health risk in an indoor environment. An integrated model of 
environmental transport and human health exposure to biological pathogens is 
constructed which 1) includes the effects of environmental attenuation, 2) considers 
fomite contact exposure (ingestion or dermal risk) as well as inhalational exposure, and 3) 
includes an uncertainty analysis to identify key input uncertainties, which may inform 
future research directions. A reduced form model is also derived which allows for 
approximate estimation of risk without the need to conduct matrix manipulations. The 
findings from this study provide a framework for developing the many different 
environmental standards that are needed for making risk-informed response decisions, 
such as when prophylactic antibiotics should be distributed, and whether or not a 
contaminated area should be cleaned up. The approach is based on the assumption of 
uniform mixing in environmental compartments and is thus applicable to areas 
sufficiently removed in time and space from the initial release that mixing has produced 
relatively uniform concentration. Results indicate that when pathogens are released into 
the air, risk from inhalation is the main component of the overall risk, while risk from 
ingestion (dermal contact for B. anthracis) is the main component of the overall risk 
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when pathogens are present on surfaces. Concentrations sampled from untracked floor, 
walls and the filter of heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system are 
proposed as indicators of previous exposure risk, while samples taken from touched 
surfaces are proposed as indicators of future risk if the building is reoccupied. A Monte 
Carlo uncertainty analysis is conducted and input-output correlations used to identify 
important parameter uncertainties. An approach is proposed for integrating these 
quantitative assessments of parameter uncertainty with broader, qualitative considerations 
to identify future research priorities.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Biological weapons, also known as “the poor man’s atom bomb”, have been 
included in terrorists’ arsenal because of their capability of producing mass causalities 
combined with natural access to the pathogens, manageable technical challenges and 
relatively low costs to launch an attack [144, 190, 192]. Prior to the 2001 anthrax letter 
attacks, identified bioterrorism attacks included the release of Salmonella typhimurium to 
eleven restaurant salad bars in the city of Portland in 1984 to influence an election, which 
caused the infection of 750 people, and the release of B. anthracis spores in Tokyo by the 
religious group Aum Shinrikyo between 1990 and 1995, which failed to infect any people 
[13, 157]. The 2001 anthrax letter attacks infected 22 people (11 inhalational cases and 
11 cutaneous cases [108]), caused the deaths of 5 people, and cost hundreds of millions 
of dollars in clean up costs [163]. The attacks revealed that the U.S. lacked the guidelines 
for a quick response to such attacks, as well as decontamination standards for 
bioterrorism agents [86]. 
 
As a result, research has been undertaken to better understand the risks resulting 
from a bioterrorist attack. Sextro et al. modeled the spread of B. anthracis spores in a 
hypothetical office suite, estimated occupants' exposure, and found that activity-related 
resuspension was an important source of human exposure [162]. This model did not 
consider environmental decay of the pathogen. While B. anthracis is a persistent 
pathogen whose environmental decay rate can be treated as zero for a short time 
simulation [166], Sextro et al.'s model would need to be modified to include 
environmental attenuation in order to be used to estimate the fate and transport of non-
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persistent biological agents. Price et al. [11] created a framework to link the degree of 
contamination in a building to the risk to the occupants, which could also be used to 
establish a decontamination standard if an acceptable risk level is provided. In addition, 
Price et al. linked the number of negative samples to the level of statistical confidence in 
the determination that the building had been effectively decontaminated [146]. However, 
this study did not provide a mechanistic model to describe the long term fate and 
transport and overall mass balance of the released pathogens, instead using a 
proportionality relationship to link the short term surface concentration of deposited 
pathogens to the short term concentration of aerosolized ones. Hong et al. [12] modeled 
the distribution of both air and surface-released B. anthracis spores in an office, and used 
concentrations found in different environmental media (i.e., surface, wall, ventilation 
filter, etc.) to infer future or past aerosol exposure. At the same time, they applied 
probability sampling theory in determining the minimum sampling area corresponding to 
certain levels of confidence in meeting allowable residual risk targets. The variability 
during sampling recovery and the potential for clumping of B. anthracis were taken into 
account. Besides not including pathogen decay, the above-mentioned studies quantify 
only inhalational risk, and omit threats from ingestion and dermal contact. 
 
While models for B. anthracis have focused on a single pathway, inhalation 
exposure, mathematical models have been developed for influenza that take multiple 
disease transmission routes, such as inhalation and ingestion, into account [9, 182, 195]. 
Nicas and Gang introduced a Markov chain model to quantify multiple-pathway exposure 
to influenza for a health-care worker who had close contact with a patient. Three 
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exposure routes were concerned, hand-mucous membranes, inhalation, and direct 
projection of pathogen-containing droplets onto mucous membranes. In a subsequent 
study, Nicas et al. applied their model to quantify the relative importance of different 
influenza virus exposure pathways, and pointed out that model uncertainties had 
significant impacts on the conclusion as to which pathway is dominant [132, 133]. 
Atkinson and Wein constructed a four-person household transmission model to quantify 
the dominant transmission route for pandemic influenza [9, 195]. Both of the studies 
performed analysis on the recognized major transmission pathways: droplet, airborne, 
and contacts [2, 193]. However, the above-mentioned studies adopted fixed parameter 
values in the computations instead of distributions across possible values, which does not 
account for variability and uncertainty. There is evidence that including uncertainty and 
variability is important. Smieszek compared predictions from a mechanistic exposure 
model and empirical data from a contact diary study to analyze the impacts of different 
contact intensities and durations. Results showed that treating all the contacts equally 
overestimated the expected number of infected individuals [170]. A study by Julian et al. 
used Monte Carlo simulation to analyze variability and uncertainty in the risk due to 
nondietary ingestion of rotavirus relying on a micro-level activity time series, which may 
inspire future high-resolution microbial risk assessment [63, 96].  
 
These multiple pathway models have been applied to common transmissible 
pathogens but have not addressed Category A agents. They have generally sought to 
identify which pathways are of concern, rather than informing the development of 
quantitative standards for response actions. To address the need for such quantitative 
109 
 
standards this paper synthesizes available information on five Category A pathogens to 
develop a framework for relating environmental pathogen concentrations to human health 
risk. The five pathogens considered are: B. anthracis, Y. Pestis, F. tularensis, Variola 
major, and Lassa. Properties of each of these pathogens are described below. 
 
B. anthracis is a Gram-positive, facultative anaerobic, rod-shaped bacterium of 
the genus Bacillus. It is the causative agent of anthrax, an acute disease in humans and 
animals, which is highly lethal in some forms. B. anthracis is one of only a few bacteria 
that can form long-lived spores. Y. pestis, the causative agent of plague, is a Gram-
negative facultative anaerobic bipolar-staining bacillus bacterium belonging to the family 
Enterobacteriaceae. Plague may be manifested in one of three forms: bubonic, 
pneumonic, and septicemic plague [106]. Francisella tularensis is a pathogenic species 
of Gram-negative bacteria that causes the zoonotic disease tularemia. F. tularensis is 
reported to be one of most infectious organisms known. It is an intracellular pathogen, 
replicating mainly in macrophages, and has also been reported in amoebae [186]. Variola 
major is the causative agent of smallpox. There has been no effective treatment 
developed for this disease, which has an average 30% mortality rate. Lassa virus, the 
causative agent of one type of hemorrhagic fever, infects more than 200,000 people per 
year causing more than 3,000 deaths with a mortality rate of about 15% among the 
hospitalized cases [51]. The selected Category A pathogens represent a range of 
environmental persistencies from a pathogen with a very low decay rate (B.anthracis), to 
several with high decay rates (Y.Pestis, F. tularensis, and Lassa), as well as one with a 
moderate decay rate (Variola major). 
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The objective of this study is to expand the framework that Hong et al. [85] 
developed for linking environmental concentrations of B. anthracis with human health 
risk by 1) including the effects of environmental attenuation, 2) considering a variety of 
different pathogens instead of a single one (B. anthracis), 3) taking account of contact 
exposure (ingestion or dermal risk) as well as inhalational exposure, and 4) conducting an 
uncertainty analysis and identifying key input uncertainties. Both detailed and reduced 
form solutions to the equations linking risk to environmental concentrations are 
developed, which could benefit in making risk-informed response decisions, such as 
determining when prophylactic antibiotics should be distributed, and whether or not a 
contaminated area should be cleaned up. Monte Carlo methods are used to assess 
uncertainty in the results and identify important uncertainties in input parameters so that 
future research may be directed towards reducing them. 
 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Fate and transport model 
In this study, an occupant is modeled as continuously present in a one-room office 
with a heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system (Figure 4-1). This 
person has the chance of inhaling aerosolized pathogens and ingesting pathogens 
deposited on the touched surfaces through the surface-hand-mouth transmission route. 
For B. anthracis, the ingestion risk is replaced by cutaneous risk since this was a more 
important exposure route than ingestion in the 2001 anthrax letter attacks [108]. A system 
of first-order differential equations is established to describe the fate and transport of 
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released pathogens (Equation 1). Pathogens are modeled as transitioning among 10 states: 
air, touched surfaces (horizontal surfaces from which spores may be re-suspended by 
human activities), tracked floor (horizontal surfaces from which spores may be re-
suspended by walking or other activities), untracked floor (horizontal surfaces from 
which there is no re-suspension), walls, HVAC filter, the nasal passages, hands of an 
occupant of the office, all areas external to the room, and inactivated pathogens. 
Mathematically this is represented by: 
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 (Eq. 1) 
 
The numbers of spores in the compartments are denoted by Mair (air), Mts, 
(touched surfaces), Mtf, (tracked floor), Mutf, (untracked floor), Mw (walls), Mf (filter), 
Mec (external compartment), Mce (ceiling), Mn (nasal passages), Mh (hands), and Md 
(decay). Deposition from the air compartment is modeled as a first-order process with 
rate constants of λts (deposition to touched surfaces), λtf (deposition to tracked floor), λutf 
(untracked floor), λw (walls), and λce (ceiling). A second source of removal is by the 
HVAC system. The total air flow rate through the HVAC system is denoted by Q (units 
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of m3/s), p (dimensionless) is the fraction of total air flow that is recirculated into the 
building by the HVAC system, e (dimensionless) is the efficiency of the filter at 
removing particles, and Vol is the volume of the room (m3). Removal to the occupants’ 
nasal passages is also modeled with Inh (m3/s), denoting the breathing flow rate, and en 
(dimensionless), the efficiency of the nasal passages at removing particles. Removal by 
losing viability is modeled as a first order rate with separate decay rates for air and other 
surfaces, denoted by the subscripts γair, and γf. Resuspension from the tracked floor due to 
occupants walking and other activities is also modeled as a first order process with rate 
constant µ2 (units of s-1). The interactions between human and fomites are represented by 
hand-surface (rhs) and surface- hand (rsh) contact rates, as well as mass transfer fractions 
between hand to surface (fhs), surface to hand (fsh), and hand to mouth (fhm). 
 
The deposition rates can be expressed in terms of parameters representing the 
indoor air flow conditions [103, 131, 207]: 
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where D is the particle's diffusivity, Ke is turbulence intensity, and Vt is particle settling 
velocity, which is given in Equation 5 as a function of the particle's diameter (D), the 
viscosity of air (µair), the density of the particle (ρp), and the density of air (ρair). 
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Figure 4-1 Schematic of model 
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4.2.2 Release scenarios 
Two pathogen release scenarios are considered. In the first scenario, pathogens 
are released to the air compartment. The occupant directly inhales aerosolized pathogens 
and ingests the deposited ones via surface-hand-mouth contacts. Environmental 
concentrations measured at the end of the exposure period are used to characterize the 
risk from the past aerosol release, and as such it is termed the retrospective scenario. In 
the second scenario, pathogens are initially present on the touched surfaces, where they 
may be ingested by surface-hand-mouth contacts. In addition, human-caused 
resuspension introduces the pathogens into the air where they can be inhaled by the 
occupant. Environmental concentrations at the beginning of the exposure period are used 
to predict the future risk and as such the scenario is termed the prospective scenario. This 
scenario addresses the residual risk present after aerosolized particles have had the 
opportunity to deposit onto surfaces, a key issue in establishing a decontamination 
standard. 
 
Solving Equation 1 yields the concentration of released pathogens in each 
compartment over time. The total exposure dose (doset) is composed of two sources: 
inhalation and ingestion. Based on Equation 6, the inhalation dose is obtained by 
integrating the inhalation rate (Inh) and the pathogen’s air concentration (Cair) over the 
total exposure duration (t2-t1), while the ingestion dose equals the integral of the hand-
mouth contact rate (rhm), mass transfer fraction from hand to month during each contact 
(fhm), the involved area of a human hand (Ah), and the pathogen’s concentration on the 
hand (Ch) over the same exposure period: 
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For dermal contact, ingestion dose is replaced by the total amount of pathogen 
transferred to the hand from touched surfaces: 
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This equation is applied for B. anthracis instead of Equation 6, where Cts is 
pathogen's concentration on the touched surface. However, separate dose-response 
coefficients are used for the different exposure pathways for anthrax. The dermal dose-
response parameter is tuned so as to produce equal numbers of dermal and inhalation 
cases for the aerosol release scenario, as was observed in the 2001 attacks. 
 
4.2.3 Dose-response functions 
The exponential (Equation 7) and beta-Poisson (Equation 8) dose-response 
models, which have been widely used in microbial risk assessment [71], are used in this 
study: 
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In Equations 7 and 8, P (doset) is the probability of positive response (infection, 
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illness, or death) for a population average dose, which allows for Poisson variability in 
individual exposure [71]. R is the parameter of the exponential dose-response model, N50 
and α are the parameters of the beta-Poisson model. When the risk is relatively small, a 
first-order Taylor series can be used to approximate Equations 7 and 8 as [85]: 
( )t tP dose Rdose≈     (Eq. 7a) 
50
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(Eq. 8a) 
 
This transformation can simplify the low dose risk estimation, which is where this 
approach is intended for use (i.e., for areas removed from the initial release where 
concentrations will be relatively uniform over spatial scales of interest. When the 
exposure dose is high, the full model (Equations 7 and 8) should be used. 
 
4.2.4 Linking pathogen concentrations to risk 
4.2.4.1 Retrospective scenario 
Given that it is rarely possible to have real-time pathogen air concentrations 
during a biological attack, the objective in the retrospective scenario is to use surface 
samples to infer what exposure and risk resulted from the release. Thus, the following 
discussion develops relationships between pathogen concentrations on surfaces and 
average dose.  
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After an aerosol release, the amount of pathogens in the air (Mair), on the touched 
surfaces (Mts), and on occupants' hands (Mh) can be acquired by solving Equation 9, 
which is obtained by separating out the compartments which exchange microbes from 
Equation 1, with the resuspension process omitted because of its minimal impact over the 
short time period required for the aerosol release to disperse (hours) [85]: 
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The number of pathogens in the air, on the touched surface, and on hands are 
provided by Equation 10 to 12 as solutions to Equation 9.  
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where sinh and cosh are hyperbolic trigonometric functions. Symbols Θ and Ω stand for 
the common terms 2( ) 4C F Ee− +  and 2Ee A AC AF CF− + + −  in Equations 11 
and 12, respectively. The coefficients represented by A to F are listed below: 
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Combining Equations 10, 12 with Equation 6, the total exposure dose from time t1 
to t2 can be written in terms of the amount of pathogens released (Equation 13).  
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where the coefficients represented by G and H are listed below: 
G=
Inh
Vol
      
H= hm hmr f       
 
The overall risk is composed of inhalation risk and ingestion risk. In this study, it 
is assumed that these two types of risk are independent of each other; in this case the 
overall risk is expressed in Equation 14: 
1- (1- )(1- )overall inh ingRisk Risk Risk=   (Eq. 14) 
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In reality there is little evidence to assess the joint effects of inhalation and ingestion 
exposures, but this assumption is probably most defensible at low risk levels when the 
probability of successful colonization by both routes is low. 
 
Equations 13 and 14 solve the forward problem of estimating risk from a known 
release amount. The inverse problem is to estimate the release amount from measured 
environmental concentrations. The amount of released pathogens (Mair0), can be 
estimated by Equation 11, if the number of pathogens deposited on the touched surfaces 
(Mts) can be acquired from surface sampling and the time after release (t) is known. 
However, the mass on touched surface is influenced by many parameters such as touch 
rate and transfer rate, which are generally highly uncertain. The mass on the untracked 
floor is most suitable for estimating the release quantity as it provides an integration of 
air concentration values over time without human interference. This can be obtained by 
taking the expression from the fourth row of Equation 1: 
At
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and integrating it to give the release quantity, where t stands for the elapsed time when 
measurements are taken: 
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Once the release quantity (Mair0) is known, Equation 13 can be used to estimate 
risk. Concentrations in the compartments omitted from Equation 9 (i.e., the 
compartments that do not transfer microbes to other compartments, namely HVAC filters, 
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walls, nasal passages, and the external compartments) can be obtained by integrating the 
produce of the air concentration and the transfer rates from the air over time. 
 
4.2.4.2 Prospective scenario 
The prospective scenario considers a case where the initial aerosol release has 
dissipated. However, the time scale for attenuation of microbes can be much longer on 
surfaces than in the air (i.e., pathogens on surfaces are not subject to attenuation by 
deposition or by air exchange with the exterior of the building). Thus, much of the 
longer-term risk to occupants will come from microbes on surfaces as surface can serve 
as a reservoir both for re-suspension into the air compartment and for exposure via fomite 
contact. In such cases surfaces could be sampled to assess whether a building is suitable 
for re-occupancy. Thus, the prospective scenario can be thought of as a re-occupancy 
assessment. The initial conditions are that Category A pathogens are present on the 
touched surfaces in a quantity equal to the area of the touched surfaces (Asurf) multiplied 
by the corresponding concentration (Csurf), which would be estimated from surface 
sampling (Equation 17). Thus the initial conditions can be expressed as: 
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Due to the longer time scale associated with the prospective scenario, human-
caused resuspension cannot be omitted. Thus, the tracked floor compartment is included 
in the system of equations to be solved:
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Since taking the resuspension into account increases the solutions' complexity, it 
is less cumbersome to express the solution (Equations 20 to 21) in terms of the 
eigenvalues ( D

) and eigenvectors (ν

) of the following matrix [153]: 
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where C

 is a vector of the coefficients determined by the ratio of the vector of initial 
conditions ( Init

) and eigenvectors (ν

) of Equation 19a (Equation 24): 
1
C v Init
−
=
  
   (Eq. 24) 
 
Equations 20 to 23 provide the concentrations of the pathogen on different 
surfaces over time. The total exposure dose can be calculated via integration. To 
conservatively estimate exposure dosage, one may use the maximum exposure duration 
which is achieved if t1=0 and t2=∞. 
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The equations derived in this section provide the exposure input for dose-response 
models (Equations 7 and 8) and thereby link the surface concentration of a pathogen with 
an occupant's future risk. Solving for prospective risk requires working out the 
eigenvectors for Equation 19 and then inverting the resulting matrix to obtain the solution 
(Equation 24). Solving for retrospective risk involves essentially the same procedure, 
although in our presentation these operations have been shown without matrix notation. 
In order to simplify the solution procedure, one may seek to further decouple portions of 
the system of equations to develop approximate solutions that do not require matrix 
operations. This procedure is shown in Appendix I, and Equations 26 and 27 (a is for 
ingestion risk, b is for dermal contact risk) are the resulting approximate solutions.  
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(Eq. 27b) 
where rhmfhm is set to 1 for dermal contact, and ϕretro, ϕpros, and ϕhand are given by: 
[1 (1 ) ]nretro ts tf utf w air
Inhe Qe p
Vol Vol
φ λ λ λ λ γ= + + + + + + − −   (Eq. 28) 
2   pros fomite sh shr fφ µ γ= + +    (Eq. 29) 
_ + + hand ing hm hm fomite hs hsr f r fφ γ=   (Eq. 30a) 
_ + hand dermal fomite hs hsr fφ γ=    (Eq. 30b) 
 
For the beta-Poisson model these equations would hold at low dose, except that R 
would be replaced by α/β. At higher doses (where the Taylor series linearization does not 
hold) one would compute the exposure dose using Equations K and N from the Appendix 
C, and then input this dose into the appropriate dose response model. 
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4.2.5 Model Inputs 
Environmental decay rates, best fit dose-response models, and dose response 
parameters for different pathogens are listed in Tables 4-1 and 4-2, while other 
parameters such as the dimensions of the room, the operational parameters of the HVAC 
system, the deposition velocities of released pathogens, etc. are included in Table 4-3. 
Since the particle size of a pathogen affects its deposition velocity, resuspension rate, 
filter removal, and even dose-response coefficient [11], this study considers four different 
aerodynamic diameters: 1 µM, 3 µM, 5 µM, and 10 µM.  
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Table 4-1 Category A Pathogen’s Environmental Persistency 
a. Uniform distribution is assumed between the maximum and minimum values. 
b. Due to the lack of information on Lassa, the average of the decay rates of Bunyaviridae hantavirus, Sicilian virus Sabin, and Crimean-Congp on fomites are used for 
Lassa. 
 
Pathogen 
Averaged 
decay rate 
in the air 
(γair) (hr-1) 
Range of decay rate 
in the air (γair) (hr-1)a 
Condition Source 
Averaged decay 
rate on fomite 
(γf) (hr-1) 
Range of decay rate on 
the fomite (γf) (hr-1)a 
Condition Source 
B. anthracis 8.16×10-5 (1.11×10
-5
, 1.97×10
-4
) NA [26, 124] 3.36×10-5 (1.92×10
-5
, 4.64×10
-5
) NA 
[26, 68, 134, 
179] 
Y. pestis 2.75 (2.10, 3.49) T=26°C, rH=20-87% [205] 4.55×10
-1 (0.04, 1.24) 
T=11-22°C, rH=30-
55% metal, steel, 
glass, paper, and 
Polyethylene 
[154, 204] 
F. tularensis 3.27 (0.55, 9.20) T=20-40°C, rH=85% [38, 39, 58] 2.39×10
-1 (0.01, 0.46) T=25-37°C, rH=10-100% on metal [204] 
Variola major 4.55×10-2 (1.00×10
-2
, 1.30×10
-1
) 
T=10-34°C, 
rH=20-80% [73, 74] 6.89×10
-3 (5.45×10
-3
, 9.95×10
-3
) 
T=25-37°C, rH=3-
96% on glass [112] 
Lassa 2.6 (0.78, 4.14) T=24-28°C, rH=30-80% [177] 7.67×10
-1b (0.68, 0.92) T=20°C, rH=NA on aluminum [72] 
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Table 4-2 Best Fit Dose-Response Model 
a. In exponential dose-response model, k is used as virulence coefficient, while in beta-Poisson dose-response model, the ratio of α/β is used as virulence coefficient.  
b. The intestinal risk is replaced by cutaneous risk since the fractions of inhalational anthrax and cutaneous anthrax were the same in the 2001 anthrax letters attacks 
[108] 
c. The data for 2.1 µm particles are used. 
d. The data for 4.5 µm or less in diameter are used. 
e. The data for the age group of 5 days and above are used. 
Pathogen Strain information Exposed animal and route 
Dose-response 
function type 
Best-fit 
Virulence 
coefficienta 
Ranges of virulence 
coefficients (95% 
Confidence Interval) 
Distributions of virulence 
coefficients Source 
B. anthracisb ATCC 6605 
Female Hartley guinea 
pigs (250 to 300 g), 
intranasal 
Exponential 7.15×10-6 (6.26×10-6, 7.43×10-6) Normal distribution (6.93×10-6, 3.98×10-7) [3] 
Y. pestis CO92 C57BL/6 mice, intranasal Exponential 1.02×10
-3 (9.87×10-4, 1.05×10-3) Normal distribution (1.02×10-3, 1.91×10-5) [106] 
F. tularensis SCHU S-4 
Monkey (4000-5000g), 
aerosol Exponential 5.32×10
-2 (5.28×10-2, 5.36×10-2) Normal distribution (5.32×10-2, 2.22×10-4) [43]
c 
Variola 
major Yamada
 
Swiss Webster albino 
mice (age from 2 hr to 6 
days), intraperitoneal
 
Beta-Poisson 2.31×10-6 (8.19×10-7, 4.80×10-6) Normal distribution (2.65×10-6, 1.21×10-6) [113]d 
Lassa NA 
Out-bred Hartley guinea 
pigs (180 to 300g), 
aerosol
 
Beta-Poisson 3.58×10-2 (4.16×10-4, 5.59×10-1) Log-Normal distribution (-1.69, 0.80) [177]e 
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Table 4-3 Model Inputs 
Symbol Meaning Units Value Source 
V Room dimensions m3 5.6×5.6×2.5 Assumed a typical office [59, 162] 
Ats Area-touchable surfaces m2 5.6×5.6×0.75×0.25  
Atf Area-tracked floor m2 5.6×5.6×0.75×0.75  
Autf Area-untracked floor m2 5.6×5.6×0.25  
Ace Area- ceiling m2 5.6×5.6  
Aw Area- wall m2 5.6×2.5×4  
Af Filter area m2 
3.8×10-2  
(2.8×10-2-5.6×10-2)  Q/A = 137m/min (91-183 m/min) 
An Area of nasal passages m2 0.8 [104] 
Ah 
Area of hand touched 
surface m
2 2.0×10-3 Authors' assumption 
ACH Air changes per hour hr-1 4 [8] 
Q Discharge m3/s 0.087 Q = V×ACH/3600 (in seconds) 
f Proportion tracked  0.75 [8] 
Init Amount of released pathogens Count 1.0×10
4 Authors' assumption 
D Particle diffusivity m2/s D=1μM 2.8×10-11 Estimated from [130] 
   D=3μM 8.5×10-12  
   D=5μM 5.0×10-12  
   D=10μM 2.5×10-12  
e Filter efficiency  D=1μM 0.098 [162] 
   D=3μM 0.49  
   D=5μM 0.74  
   D=10μM 0.88  
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Table 4-3 Model Inputs (Continued) 
Symbol Meaning Diameter Unit 
Value scale 
Lower 
bound 
Source 
Upper 
bound 
Source Input value Source 
en 
Nasal passages 
particle remove 
efficiency 
1μM  0.02 [104] 0.25 [161] 0.14 
Midpoint of 
range 
3μM  0.22  0.68  0.45  
5μM  0.42  0.81  0.62  
10μM  0.62  0.91  0.77  
µ2 Resuspension rate 
1μM s
-1 1.2×10-10 [162, 185] 3.3×10-8 [162, 185] 3.3×10-8 [162, 185] 
3μM  1.7×10
-7  1.7×10-6  5.3×10-7  
5μM  1.1×10
-6  3.3×10-6  2.2×10-7  
10μM  8.8×10
-7  9.4×10-6  1.1×10-6  
Inh Breathing rate  m3/hr 0.8 [101] 2.0 [101] 1.02 [101] 
p Recirculation fraction   0 [8] 1 [8] 0.75 [162] 
ρ Density of particle  g/cm3 1.0 Authors' assumption 3.0 
Authors' 
assumption 1.0 
Authors' 
assumption 
Ke Turbulence intensity  s-1 2.60×10-2 [207] 4.50×10-1 [207] 2.40×10-1 
Midpoint of 
range 
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Table 4-3 Model Inputs (Continued) 
Symbol Meaning (Unit) Upper bound Source 
Lower 
bound Source 
Best 
estimate Source 
fh-s 
Mass transfer fraction 
from hand to surface 
during each contact 
0.338 [5] 0.010 [6] 0.174 Middle point 
fs-h 
Mass transfer fraction 
from surface to hand 
during each contact 
0.658 [141] 0.008 [6] 0.333 Middle point 
fh-m 
Mass transfer fraction 
from hand to mouth 
during each contact 
0.410 [141] 0.330 [141] 0.350 [132] 
rh-m 
Hand-mouth contacting 
rate (hr-1) 8 Authors' assumption 5 Authors' assumption 8 [132] 
rh-s 
Hand-surface 
contacting rate (hr-1) 6 Authors' assumption 3 Authors' assumption 6 Authors' assumption 
 
  
131 
 
4.3 Results 
Figure 4-2 presents the inhalation, ingestion and overall risks associated with the 
aerosol release (i.e., the retrospective scenario) of 1 micron Category A pathogens. The 
overall risk matches the inhalation risk, indicating that risk from inhalation is the main 
component of overall risk. Particle deposition drives the time required for this risk to 
reach steady state. Hence, the time to reach this asymptote is the same for different 
pathogens of the same size.  
 
Figure 4-3 presents different types of risks associated with the presence of 1 
micron Category A pathogens on surfaces (i.e., the prospective scenario), which indicates 
that risk from ingestion (dermal contact for B. anthracis) is the main component of 
overall risk. In Figure 4-3, the time scale over which each pathogen's overall risk reaches 
its asymptote varies over 4 orders of magnitude, which can be explained by the huge 
variability among pathogen attenuation rates. 
 
To summarize which exposure routes dominate under which conditions, Figure 4-
4 presents the ratio of accumulated inhalation and ingestion exposure. If pathogens are 
aerosolized (retrospective scenario), the dominant exposure route is inhalation (see also 
Figure 4-2), because inhalation is more significant for small particle sizes, which remain 
in the air longer before settling. If pathogens are initially present on a surface 
(prospective scenario), the dominant exposure route is ingestion (see also Figure 4-3), 
and this trend is most significant for small particle sizes as they are least prone to 
resuspension. 
  
132 
 
 
Figure 4-2 Different types of risks associated with aerosol release of 1 micron Category A pathogens. 
(Release quantity is 1000 unclumped pathogens. For B. anthracis, the ingestion risk is replaced by cutaneous risk since the fractions of 
inhalational anthrax and cutaneous anthrax were the same in the 2001 anthrax letters attacks[108]) 
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Figure 4-3 Different types of risks associated with surface release of 1 micron Category A pathogens. 
(Release quantity is 1000 unclumped pathogens. For B. anthracis, the ingestion risk is replaced by cutaneous risk since the fractions of 
inhalational anthrax and cutaneous anthrax were the same in the 2001 anthrax letters attacks [108]) 
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Figure 4-4 The ratio of accumulative inhalation and ingestion exposure. 
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4.3.1 Linking pathogen concentrations to risk 
Another application of the model is to link measured pathogen concentrations on 
the surfaces with health risk. In the case of a persistent pathogen, a surface concentration 
reflects a fraction of the integral of the air concentration (provided there has been no 
resuspension from the surface). In contrast, for a pathogen subject to environmental 
decay, surface concentrations reflect both the integrated air concentrations and surface 
decay over time. The relationship between surface concentration and accumulated 
(retrospective) dose changes as pathogen concentrations attenuate on the surface over 
time. As deposited microbes decay, each surviving microbe becomes indicative of a 
larger number having been present previously. Figure 4-5, which depicts the retrospective 
risk for a concentration of 10 pathogens per m2 on an HVAC filter, illustrates this. If one 
finds the concentration of Lassa virus particles is 10 pathogens per m2 with a diameter of 
1 µm on an HVAC system filter 1 hour after a release, this implies that occupants were 
subject to a risk of 1.0×10-3 due to the past 1 hour of exposure. The same concentration 
found 4 hours after the release would imply a risk close to 1.0×10-2, as fewer of the 
deposited virus remain viable after 4 hours. In reality it may not be realistic to detect 
pathogens in the environment on anything approaching the time scale of several hours, 
but this serves as an example of how great a challenge it is to use environmental samples 
to characterize risks associated with a pathogen that attenuates in the environment. In 
contrast risks associated a given concentration of B. anthracis (a persistent microbe) are 
relatively constant over time.  
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Figure 4-5 Relationship between risks to the exposed people and pathogen concentration identified from the HVAC filter. 
(A concentration of 10 organisms/m2 was found at HVAC filter at different time after an aerosol release.) 
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The results of this modeling can be summarized in a series of charts that link 
surface concentration to previous exposure risk for different time periods (Figures 4-6 to 
4-10). The slope of each figure is proportional to the pathogen's dose-response coefficient. 
The difference between curves for the same pathogen for different time periods reflects 
the environmental persistence of the pathogen. A rapidly decaying pathogen will have 
widely separated curves to reflect that the same concentration of pathogens remaining 
after a longer time period implies a higher exposure risk (i.e., each pathogen remaining 
indicates that a greater number were present during the earlier part of the exposure 
period), while a persistent pathogen will have closely spaced curves as the risk to 
concentration relationship is relatively constant over time. 
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Figure 4-6. Retrospective risks associated with B. anthracis HVAC concentrations after an aerosol release. 
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Figure 4-7. Cumulative retrospective risks associated with Y. pestis HVAC concentrations after an aerosol release. 
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Figure 4-8 Cumulative retrospective risks associated with F. tularensis HVAC concentrations after an aerosol release. 
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Figure 4-9 Cumulative retrospective risks associated with Variola major HVAC concentrations after an aerosol release. 
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Figure 4-10 Cumulative retrospective risks associated with Lassa HVAC concentrations after an aerosol release. 
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There are essentially two options for addressing prospective (re-occupancy) risk, 
restrict access to the contaminated site until pathogen concentrations decline to 
acceptable levels through natural attenuation or actively decontaminate the site. The 
selection of a strategy depends on the survival capability of the pathogens. If the passive 
decontamination approach is chosen, the time required depends on the initial 
concentration to reach a given residual risk target, but one can get a rough idea of the 
relative feasibility of this approach by comparing the time to achieve a significant 
concentration reduction across different pathogens. The time scale for a 6-log risk 
reduction due to natural attenuation for different pathogens is shown in Table 4-4. Values 
in Table 4-4 vary by more than 4 orders of magnitude. B. anthracis has a best estimate of 
17,100 days or over 46 years. It is probably more appropriate to compare the upper bound 
as pathogens will reside in a wide variety of different microenvironments and decay rates 
would be expected to vary among microenvironments. Decontamination would only be 
achieved once even the pathogens in the more protected microenvironments have 
decayed. For B. anthracis this upper bound would be over 82 years. In contrast, a greater 
than 6 order of magnitude decay of Lassa would occur in less than a day. These estimates 
are very sensitive to the assumption of log linear decay. Deviations from log linear decay 
are widely reported. However in many cases a biphasic approach could be adopted in 
which a rapid log-linear decay rate is used for the first several days and a second, lower 
log-linear decay rate is used subsequently. While parameters for such biphasic 
attenuation models are not yet available for these pathogens, the approach presented here 
can be readily adapted to biphasic decay. The relevant equations would be unchanged, 
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but the mass distribution in each compartment at the end of the first phase would 
constitute the initial conditions for the second phase. 
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Table 4-4 Time scale for a 6-log risk reduction due to natural attenuation 
Pathogen 
Time (days) 
Min Max Best estimate 
B. anthracis 1.24×104 3.00×104 1.71×104 
Y. pestis 4.63×10-1 1.44×101 1.27 
F. tularensis 1.25 5.75×101 2.41 
Variola major 5.79×101 1.05×102 8.38×101 
Lassa 6.25×10-1 8.46×10-1 7.50×10-1 
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Table 4-5 presents the concentrations of pathogens associated with a 1 in 1000 
risk. Concentrations corresponding to different risk levels can be found by multiplying 
these values by the desired risk level/10-3, provided that the risk is low enough to be 
approximately a linear function of exposure (which is roughly accurate for risks <10-2). In 
the retrospective scenarios (the first two columns), the concentrations become lower 
(standards would become more stringent) as the time after the release increases. Values 
for B. anthracis presented here are substantially lower than reported previously [85], as 
the previous study considered only inhalation risk, while this study considers dermal risk 
as well as inhalation risk for B. anthracis. Even if sampling could be conducted within 24 
hours (which is an extremely optimistic assumption), it would be difficult to characterize 
risk at the 1 in 1,000 level for any of the pathogens, as this would require quantifying 
pathogens at levels ranging from 5-7 pathogens/m2 for Variola major to 10-11/m2 for 
Lassa. 
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Table 4-5 Concentrations of pathogens on horizontal surfaces associated with risk of 10-3 
(Prospective exposure duration =1 year) 
Pathogen Diameter 
Concentrations (organisms/m2) 
Retrospective sampling 8 
hours after release 
Retrospective sampling 24 
hours after release 
Prospective for immediate 
occupancy 
Prospective after 24 
hours access restriction 
Prospective after 48 
hours access restriction 
B. anthracis 
1μM 1.6 2×10-1 3.0×101 3.0×101 2.9×101 
3μM 4.2 4×10-1 6.4×102 6.7×102 7.0×102 
5μM 7.0 7×10-1 1.9×103 2.0×103 2.2×103 
10μM 1.6×101 1.0 7.6×103 1.2×104 2.1×104 
Y. pestis 
1μM 2×10-3 1×10-6 1.8×102 9.0×106 4.9×1011 
3μM 9×10-3 2×10-6 1.8×102 9.3×106 5.3×1011 
5μM 1×10-2 2×10-6 1.8×102 9.5×106 5.8×1011 
10μM 1×10-2 1×10-6 1.8×102 1.8×107 2.0×1012 
F. tularensis 
1μM 2×10-4 2×10-6 1.7 5.1×10
2 1.6×105 
3μM 7×10-4 4×10-6 1.0 5.3×102 1.7×105 
5μM 9×10-4 4×10-6 1.0 5.3×102 1.8×105 
10μM 8×10-4 2×10-6 1.0 1.1×103 7.0×105 
Variola major 
1μM 3.1×101 7.0 1.1×103 1.4×103 1.6×103 
3μM 7.3×101 7.0 1.3×103 1.8×103 2.1×103 
5μM 8.0×101 7.0 1.6×103 2.2×103 2.7×103 
10μM 7.4×101 5.0 4.7×103 1.2×104 2.5×103 
Lassa 
1μM 6×10-6 1×10-11 8.0 7.4×108 7.3×1016 
3μM 2×10-5 4×10-11 8.0 7.9×108 8.0×1016 
5μM 3×10-5 4×10-11 9.0 8.3×108 8.8×1016 
10μM 4×10-5 3×10-11 8.0 1.5×109 3.0×1017 
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For the prospective case (columns 3-5), if a pathogen decays rapidly, most of the 
risk will attenuate relatively rapidly. In such cases a much less stringent concentration 
standard can be set if access to the building is restricted for a period after the sampling is 
conducted. The differences in values for different Category A pathogens are driven by 
virulence and environmental persistency, which are both pathogen dependent. B. 
anthracis has relatively high concentrations despite being very persistent, because it has a 
relatively low infectivity (proportional to parameter k from dose-response functions). The 
strictest concentration values are for F. tularensis despite its low persistence because of 
its high infectivity.  
 
The concentrations associated with immediate re-occupancy are in many cases 
well below applicable limits of detection. For example a negative sampling result for 
Lassa, used to estimate the prospective risk for immediate occupancy, would not provide 
much confidence because the applicable standard of 9 organisms per m2 is well below 
feasible detection levels. However, a negative result coupled with a 24-hour restriction on 
access would provide some level of confidence as the standard for this case of 7.36×108 
organisms per m2 is readily detectable. In this latter case, demonstrating achievement of a 
risk target of 1 in a million (a concentration of 7.36×105 organisms per m2 or 73.6 
organisms per cm2) would likely be feasible as well. If one assumes that a 0.09 m2 
surface is sampled with a recovery of 0.38 [85, 110], and a detection limit of 10 
organisms, then the resulting minimum detectable pathogen concentration is 292 
organisms per m2. Table 4-6 compares risks associated with this concentration across 
different organisms.  
149 
 
Table 4-6 Equipment detection limit associated risk 
Pathogen Diameter Risk (95% confidence interval) 
B. anthracis 
1μM 2.30×10-2 (5.81×10-4, 4.33×10-1) 
3μM 6.80×10-4 (2.25×10-5, 6.54×10-3) 
5μM 1.92×10-4 (1.00×10-5, 1.16×10-3) 
10μM 1.17×10-5 (3.18×10-6, 2.84×10-4) 
Y. pestis 
1μM 2.86×10-3 (9.63×10-5, 1.63×10-2) 
3μM 2.85×10-3 (1.01×10-4, 1.58×10-2) 
5μM 2.84×10-3 (1.04×10-4, 1.51×10-2) 
10μM 2.69×10-3 (1.04×10-4, 1.37×10-2) 
F. tularensis 
1μM 2.57×10-1 (1.54×10-2, 9.17×10-1) 
3μM 2.55×10-1 (1.58×10-2, 8.96×10-1) 
5μM 2.54×10-1 (1.60×10-2, 8.65×10-1) 
10μM 2.31×10-1 (1.56×10-2, 8.06×10-1) 
Variola major 
1μM 2.79×10-4 (9.72×10-6, 6.10×10-4) 
3μM 2.43×10-4 (7.84×10-6, 5.06×10-4) 
5μM 2.14×10-4 (5.93×10-6, 4.06×10-4) 
10μM 7.35×10-5 (3.42×10-6, 3.32×10-4) 
Lassa 
1μM 5.43×10-2 (1.04×10-2, 7.00×10-1) 
3μM 5.43×10-2 (1.09×10-2, 7.00×10-1) 
5μM 5.42×10-2 (1.12×10-2, 6.99×10-1) 
10μM 5.26×10-2 (1.12×10-2, 6.95×10-1) 
It is assumed that the detection limit is 10 organisms which comes from sampling a 0.09 m2 surface 
with the pathogen concentration 292 organisms per m2 and the recovery rate is 0.38 [85]. 
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4.3.2 Parameter uncertainties 
Another objective of this study is to compare risk and uncertainties across 
different pathogens. Using the input distributions listed in Table 4-1 and Table 4-2, 
Equations 26 and 27 are evaluated in a Monte Carlo analysis to estimate risks for 
different pathogens, and results from retrospective and prospective scenarios are 
presented in the form of box plots (Figure 4-11). The relative risk presented by different 
pathogens in an air release are largely determined by their dose-response parameters, 
because the exposure duration in air is limited by the particle deposition rate (which is the 
same across different pathogens) rather than the decay rate. However, air decay rate does 
have an impact, when decay is rapid enough to occur over the time scale during which 
particulates are typically suspended (minutes to hours depending on the diameter of the 
particles) which is the case for Y. pestis, F. tularensis, and Lassa. The relative risks for 
different pathogens in a surface release are affected by both fomite decay rates and dose-
response parameters. In general the risk from releasing the same amount of pathogens can 
be ranked as Lassa, F. tularensis, Y. Pestis, B. anthracis, and Variola major (in 
decreasing order). This analysis does not include secondary transmission risks (which 
may be particularly important for all but B. anthracis and F. tularensis [30]) and as such 
does not capture a critical component of risk for pathogens, such as Variola major, which 
are subject to secondary transmission. Instead it addresses the question as to which 
pathogens are subject to the greatest uncertainty in setting surface concentration 
standards for primary exposure. Uncertainties presented by Lassa are highest across most 
of the cases, indicating that this organism may be a priority for further study (pending 
consideration of factors such as its likely use in an attack). 
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Figure 4-11 Risk and uncertainty for different pathogens 
Medians shown in red, 1st and 3rd quartiles in blue. (1. B. anthracis, 2. Y. pestis, 3. F. tularensis, 4. Variola major, and 5. Lassa) 
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Correlations between the input parameter values and the model output (risk) are 
used to assess the importance of uncertainties in different parameters. These correlations 
were computed separately for each pathogen, for ingestion and inhalation risk for both 
the retrospective and prospective scenarios for all four particle sizes considered. Table 4-
7 summarizes the 3 most important uncertain inputs by exposure pathway and scenario 
for each pathogen (with the range of values across the four particle sizes shown in 
brackets). Detailed results are included in Appendix II (Tables S2-S6). Uncertainties in 
mass transfer fraction from surface to hand (fsh) have major impacts on ingestion dose, 
and uncertainty in the breathing rate (Inh) plays an important role in determining the 
inhalation dose in the retrospective scenario. In the prospective scenario, the ingestion 
dose is most closely related to the mass transfer fraction from surface to hand (fsh), while 
the inhalation dose is most closely related to the pathogen resuspension rate (µ2). 
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Table 4-7 Parameter uncertainties with most influence on risk 
Pathogen 
Retrospective scenario Prospective scenario 
Ingestion risk Inhalation risk Ingestion risk Inhalation risk 
B. anthracis 
Dose-response coefficient (r) 
(0.66-0.76) 
Air change rate (ACH) (0.31-
0.72) 
Dose-response coefficient (r) 
(0.63-0.87) 
Air change rate (ACH) (0.44-
0.75) 
Mass transfer fraction from 
surface to hand (fsh) (0.21-
0.36) 
Breathing rate (Inh) (0.27-
0.65) 
Mass transfer fraction from 
surface to hand (fsh) (0.16-
0.32) 
Breathing rate (Inh) (0.14-
0.53) 
Air change rate (ACH) 
(0.081-0.21) 
Density of the particle (ρp) 
(0.052-0.61) 
Resuspension rate (µ2) 
(0.047, 0.29) 
Resuspension rate (µ2) 
(0.022-0.32) 
Y. pestis 
Decay rate on fomite (γf) 
(0.56-0.61) 
Breathing rate (Inh) (0.73-
0.78) 
Decay rate on fomite (γf) 
(0.53-0.56) 
Decay rate on fomite (γf) 
(0.51-0.63) 
Mass transfer fraction from 
surface to hand (fsh) (0.47-
0.51) 
Air change rate (ACH) (0.28-
0.52) 
Mass transfer fraction from 
surface to hand (fsh) (0.34-
0.38) 
Resuspension rate (µ2) (0.21-
0.35) 
Density of the particle (ρp) 
(0.12-0.24) 
Density of the particle (ρp) 
(0.026-0.54) 
Hand-surface contacting rate 
(rhs) (0.071-0.079) 
Breathing rate (Inh) (0.15-
0.18) 
F. tularensis 
Mass transfer fraction from 
surface to hand (fsh) (0.44-
0.67) 
Decay rate in the air (γair) 
(0.46-0.75) 
Decay rate on fomite (γf) 
(0.64-0.65) 
Decay rate on fomite (γf) 
(0.42-0.59) 
Decay rate in the air (γair) 
(0.23-0.43) 
Breathing rate (Inh) (0.35-
0.69) 
Mass transfer fraction from 
surface to hand (fsh) (0.41-
0.47) 
Resuspension rate (µ2) (0.18-
0.33) 
Decay rate on fomite (γf) 
(0.33-0.49) 
Decay rate on fomite (γf) 
(0.18-0.42) 
Hand-surface contacting rate 
(rhs) (0.12-0.13) 
Decay rate in the air (γair) 
(0.14-0.26) 
Variola 
major 
Mass transfer fraction from 
surface to hand (fsh) (0.45-
0.67) 
Dose-response coefficient (r) 
(0.44-0.73) 
Mass transfer fraction from 
surface to hand (fsh) (0.60-
0.67) 
Dose-response coefficient (r) 
(0.30-0.61) 
Dose-response coefficient (r) 
(0.38-0.54) 
Air change rate (ACH) (0.19-
0.54) 
Dose-response coefficient (r) 
(0.51-0.57) 
Air change rate (ACH) (0.25-
0.45) 
Air change rate (ACH) (0.11-
0.37) 
Breathing rate (Inh) (0.25-
0.40) 
Resuspension rate (µ2) (0.15-
0.46) 
Resuspension rate (µ2) (0.25-
0.39) 
Lassa 
Dose-response coefficient (r) 
(0.60-0.70) 
Dose-response coefficient (r) 
(0.69-0.87) 
Dose-response coefficient (r) 
(0.72) 
Dose-response coefficient (r) 
(0.61-0.80) 
Mass transfer fraction from 
surface to hand (fsh) (0.40-
0.47) 
Breathing rate (Inh) (0.26-
0.28) 
Mass transfer fraction from 
surface to hand (fsh) (0.51) 
Breathing rate (Inh) (0.17-
0.23) 
Decay rate in the air (γair) 
(0.057-0.21) 
Decay rate in the air (γair) 
(0.082-0.31) 
Resuspension rate (µ2) (0.26-
0.40) 
Decay rate in the air (γair) 
(0.089-0.24) 
Values of coefficients between selected parameters and risks to the exposed people are listed in parenthesis.  
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As noted above this analysis captures only one aspect of uncertainty, that of 
uncertainty in primary exposure. This may be the appropriate framework for pathogens 
that are not subject to secondary transmission as well as for decisions where one seeks to 
cut off environmental transmission of a pathogen after a widespread environmental 
contamination event. Additional risk and uncertainty would be applicable for decisions 
where secondary transmission is a concern.  
 
4.4. Discussion 
This study presents an integrated fate and transport, dose-response model to 
estimate the inhalation and ingestion risks associated with environmental pathogens. 
Scenarios to estimate the past risk and to predict future risk are introduced. A reduced 
form model is developed and used to compare risks and uncertainties for different 
pathogens.  
 
In addition, this study also identified important parameter uncertainties in risk 
assessment models. Specifically, the input-output correlations presented in Table 4-7 
indicate which parameter uncertainties have the greatest effect on risk estimates. 
However, several other factors must be considered in settling research priorities. Whether 
the high correlation is due to variability or epistemic uncertainty is one such factor. 
Parameters such as inhalation rate and air exchange rate will vary considerably from 
person to person and from building to building, respectively. However, they are not 
subject to great epistemic uncertainty. The ranges within these parameters vary have 
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already been well characterized. Additional research would not reduce the inherent 
variability in such parameters but only serve to further characterize an already well-
characterized variability distribution. 
 
Another factor to consider is whether a particular parameter is common across 
pathogens such that a study of a single surrogate organism might be helpful in improving 
risk assessments for multiple pathogens. Strictly speaking, any parameter can be 
considered pathogen specific. However, some distinctions can perhaps be made between 
dose-response parameters and environmental decay rates, both of which are observed to 
vary over orders of magnitude and depend on very complex pathogen-host and pathogen-
environment interactions, and general physical transfer rates, such as surface-hand and 
hand-surface transfer fractions and re-aerosolization rates, which might vary less from 
pathogen to pathogen. 
 
A third consideration is the extent to which an uncertainty is reducible by further 
research. Dose-response is an example of an uncertainty that is difficult to reduce through 
research. In part this is due to cost, as such research generally requires vertebrate animals 
and extensive biosafety precautions. There are other more fundamental challenges as well. 
Laboratory experiments 1) must be conducted at high doses with limited numbers of 
animals, leaving great uncertainty as to the effects of lower doses; 2) generally do not 
consider the effects of previous exposures, which might greatly affect the dose response 
coefficients; and 3) must be conducted with animal models that may not accurately 
represent human dose response. Despite these limitations, further animal studies would at 
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least reduce the confidence intervals for the dose-response parameters used here. These 
dose-response model parameter uncertainties are the uncertainties reflected in the 
correlations summarized in Table 4-7 (i.e., applicability of the animal model to humans 
and validity of extrapolation from high to low dose were not addressed by this analysis), 
which means that further animal dosing studies would effectively reduce the uncertainty 
considered here. Thus, dose-response uncertainty is considered by the authors to be 
researchable, although the difficulties and expense of working with vertebrate animals 
with extensive biosafety precautious are significant. 
 
As an example of how one might integrate these different factors, Table 4-8 
summarizes the authors' view of future research priorities based on these different factors. 
In Table 4-8, The percentages in the right hand columns indicate the frequency with 
which the parameter was one of the top three sources of risk for different pathogens (the 
retrospective scenario percentages are based on inhalation risk, and the prospective 
scenario percentages are based on ingestion risk). A low research priority for research is 
assigned to all three parameters subject to variability rather than epistemic uncertainty: 
breathing rate, density, and air exchange rate. The remaining 6 parameters all were 
judged to be subject to epistemic uncertainty. The degree of "Generality" (divided into 3 
categories in order of priority: common across pathogens, similarities expected, pathogen 
specific) was an important factor in distinguishing among high and medium priority 
parameters, with both of the medium priority parameters (decay on fomites and decay in 
the air) considered to be pathogen specific. Three of the high priority parameters 
(resuspension rate, hand surface contact rate, and mass transfer fraction for surface to 
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hand) were ranked highly partly because similarities across organisms would be expected 
making surrogate research more generally relevant and partly because the input-output 
correlations indicated they were important parameters. Dose-response parameters were 
given high priority for research despite being judged both pathogen-specific and difficult 
to research, because these parameters were relatively frequently among the parameters 
responsible for the greatest uncertainty in risk (13% of retrospective cases and 20% of 
prospective cases). 
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Table 4-8 Properties of parameters uncertainty 
Authors' 
priority Parameter Symbol 
Uncertainty 
vs. 
Variability 
Generality Researchable 
Percentage in the top 3 
uncertainty parameters 
among retrospective 
scenario (%) 
Percentage in the top 3 
uncertainty parameters 
among prospective 
scenario (%) 
High 
Mass transfer 
fraction from 
surface to hand 
fsh Both 
Similarities 
expected Yes 0 33 
High Dose-response coefficients k Both Pathogen specific Difficult 13 20 
High Resuspension rate µ2 Both 
Similarities 
expected Yes 0 20 
High Hand-surface contacting rate rhs Both 
Similarities 
expected Yes 0 13 
Moderate Decay rate on fomite γf Both Pathogen specific Yes 7 13 
Moderate Decay rate in the air γair Both Pathogen specific Yes 13 0 
Low Breathing rate Inh Variability Common across pathogen Yes 33 0 
Low Air change rate ACH Variability Common across pathogen Yes 20 0 
Low Density of the particle ρp Variability 
Common across 
pathogen Yes
* 13 0 
* Density can readily be measured but it is not clear that laboratory values could reflect density in an actual release 
+ The percentages in the retrospective scenario is based on inhalation risk in the retrospective scenario, while the percentages in the prospective scenario is based 
   on ingestion risk in the prospective scenario of Table 4-7. 
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Judgments listed in Table 4-8 are all based on the authors' understanding and 
previous experience. The intent is to provide an example framework for integrating the 
computational results provided by the model with broader considerations that influence 
the costs and benefits expected from future research. The sources of input into this 
ranking process should be broadened by scientifically collecting opinions from experts in 
the future [127].  
 
The fate and transport model is based on the assumption that pathogens are instantly 
uniformly mixed in a compartment. This fails to capture the short-term dynamics 
associated with the immediate vicinity of a release. For example, surface samples might 
not be reflective of the localized high concentrations associated with opening a letter 
containing pathogens and might underestimate risk in this case. A more detailed approach, 
such as computational fluid dynamics, would be a useful extension to this study. The 
study also considers risk from a release of only one pathogen. Little information is 
available on the effects of mixtures of pathogens. This approach would be most valid at 
low risk levels when interactions among pathogens, such as successful colonization by 
more than one pathogen would be unlikely. 
 
Another assumption is that pathogen attenuation rate outside the host is log linear 
over time. In reality microorganisms often exhibit “tailing” in which a small, highly 
resistant subpopulation attenuates at a very low rate. Thus the assumption of log-linear 
decay may not be health protective. Accordingly the values calculated here are not 
intended as suggested environmental standards. These calculations are provided to 
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illustrate the suggested approach and to allow a comparison of uncertainties so that future 
research can be prioritized. 
 
This study modeled environmental fate and transport using a small number of 
homogeneous compartments when in reality surfaces may vary in characteristics, such as 
the frequency with which they are touched, the rate at which pathogens attenuate 
(influenced in turn by relative humidity, intensity of ultraviolet light, etc. [166]), and the 
ease with which pathogens are re-aerosolized or transferred to hands from them. 
Modeling these heterogeneities may improve our understanding of pathogen fate and 
transport in the environment but would require detailed parameter inputs beyond what are 
currently available in the literature. Such heterogeneities might provide protected 
microenvironments that could allow pathogens to persist longer and present greater 
health risks than estimated here, which makes this a priority for future research. 
 
The framework developed here may help inform whether active decontamination 
is required after a release. If a pathogen with a slow environmental attenuation rate is 
released (i.e., B. anthracis), then environmental decontamination may be required. In 
contrast, if a pathogen with fast environmental attenuation rate is released (eg., Lassa), 
the decision maker may opt to restrict access to the contaminated site until the residual 
risk declines to a level judged acceptable for re-occupancy. The choice between active 
decontamination and passive attenuation involves comparing the costs of remediation and 
opportunity costs of restricting access to the building. While previous research has 
addressed policy options for bioterrorism, this research has not considered the 
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opportunity costs of removing buildings from service [91, 123]. Thus, further study is 
needed to inform the choice between active remediation and passive attenuation. 
 
This analysis considered viable organisms. However, the environmental 
concentrations which would be used as inputs to the risk models developed here would 
likely be measured by quantitative PCR (qPCR), which has been proven effective in 
quantifying biological warfare agents (i.e., B. antracis, and Y. pestis) due to its rapid, 
early, and accurate results [200]. Despite the advantages of qPCR analysis, several 
knowledge gaps need to be addressed The first is that the qPCR does not distinguish 
between living or dead pathogens. While researchers have identified assays to 
discriminate between viable and dead fecal bacteroidales bacteria, similar methods have 
not been applied to Category A pathogens [10, 53]. Second there is little information on 
the decay of the qPCR signal over time, which would be an essential parameter for the 
retrospective assessment of risk after a release. Thus, studies are needed to quantify 
parameters such as, the efficiency of DNA extraction, the degradation of nucleic acids 
overtime, and the reactivity of primer and probe [24, 110, 156].  
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4.5 Appendix C 
This appendix describes how the system of equations given by Equation 1 in the 
main body of the paper can be simplified to allow reduced form solutions to be developed. 
 
Retrospective scenario 
In the retrospective scenario,  resuspension makes a negligible contribution to 
dose, due to the relatively short exposure period compared the rates of resuspension (in 
this case the exposure period is assumed to be is 8 hours, the duration of a working day). 
Neglecting re-suspension separates the air compartment from the effects of other 
compartments so that air concentration follows a simple first order decay model. The 
inhaled dose can be calculated as:  
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The ingested pathogens (doseing_retro) are the organisms which deposit on the 
touched surface (Mts) from the initial release in the air (Mair0) (Equation B):  
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remain alive until being transferred to the hand (Mhand) (Equation C): 
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and are ingested (doseing_retro) during surface-hand-mouth contact in the exposure period 
(Equation D): 
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where 
2   pros fomite sh shr fφ µ γ= + +     (Eq. 32) 
+ + hand hm hm fomite hs hsr f r fφ γ=     (Eq. 33) 
 
To simplify the calculation, three assumptions are made during the derivation of 
Equation D: 1) pathogen resuspension and back transfer from hands to the surface are 
omitted due to their relatively low rates resulting in small fractions being back transferred, 
which is also health conservative; 2) all integration steps are from t=0 to t=a which 
provides an upper bound on the amount of pathogen transferred to the next step; 3) the 
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pathogens will not be transferred to hands until depositing on the touched surface, and the 
pathogens will not be ingested until they are transferred to hands.  
 
Prospective scenario 
In the prospective scenario, the majority of the inhaled dose (doseinh_pros) comes 
from two sources (Figure C-1). The first source consists of organisms that are inhaled 
right after being resuspended (doseinh1_pros) (Equation E).  
1 2
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The second are those organisms which experienced a certain number of "surface-
hand-surface" travels before being resuspended and inhaled doseinh2_pros (Equation F).  
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where Θ is the total fraction of resuspended pathogens surviving a number of n "surface-
hand-surface" cycles: 
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Θ is composed as a summation of a geometric series with element of Θn, where n 
indexes the number of "surface-hand-surface" cycle. In the nth cycle, pathogens survived 
from the n-1th cycle (Θn-1Mtso) are first transferred to hands (Equation H), and then back 
transferred to the surface (Equation I). 
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For both sources, pathogen resuspension happens before inhalation. The 
maximum inhalation dose is reached when the exposure duration goes to infinity 
(Equation K): 
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Similarly, the prospective ingestion dose (doseing_pros) comes from two sources 
(Figure C-2). The first source is direct ingestion of the pathogens released on the touched 
surface (doseing1_pros) (Equation L):  
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where 10 1
0
pros
a
t
sh sh tsr f M e dt
φ−
∫  is the mass transferred to victims hand.  
 
The second source is those organisms which experience a certain number of 
"surface-hand-surface" travels before being ingested (doseing2_pros) (Equation M), which 
contains the common factor Θ as described above. The maximum ingestion dose is 
reached when exposure goes to infinity (Equation N).  
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Table C-1 compares the exposure dose approximated by the above-mentioned 
equations with the exact results from solving Equation 18. The overall risk is acquired by 
inputting inhalation and ingestion doses into Equation 14 separately for the retrospective 
(Equation 26) and the prospective scenario (Equation 27). 
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Figure C-1. Pathogen flow for estimating the inhalation dose in the prospective scenario. 
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Figure C-2. Pathogen flow for estimating the ingestion dose in the prospective scenario. 
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Table C-1. Comparison Exposure Dose between Approximated Analytical Equation and 
Simulated Results (1 µm) 
Pathogen 
Release 
scenario 
Inhalation dose Ingestion dose 
Approximated 
analytical equation 
Full numerical 
simulation 
Approximated 
analytical equation 
Full numerical 
simulation 
B. anthracis 
Retrospective* 1.12×104 1.12×104 2.75×101 2.37×101 
Prospective* 2.07×103 2.10×103 7.62×105 7.64×105 
Y. pestis 
Retrospective* 3.32×103 3.42×103 1.98 1.96 
Prospective* 8.83×10-1 8.83×10-1 9.84×102 9.83×102 
F. tularensis 
Retrospective* 3.13×103 3.23×103 3.22 3.15 
Prospective* 1.56 1.56 1.94×103 1.94×103 
Variola major 
Retrospective* 1.08×104 1.08×104 2.57×101 2.23×101 
Prospective* 1.65×102 1.65×102 6.33×104 6.32×104 
Lassa 
Retrospective* 3.48×103 3.58×103 1.14 1.14 
Prospective* 5.34×10-1 5.30×10-1 5.28×102 5.27×102 
*Total release quantity is 1 million spores for both retrospective and prospective scenario. The simulation period 
in retrospective scenario is 8 hours, while it is one year in prospective scenario.  
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Table C-2. Correlation coefficients for B. anthracis 
  Retrospective scenario Prospective scenario 
  Ingestion risk Inhalation dose Ingestion dose Inhalation dose 
Hand-mouth 
contacting rate 
(rh-m) 
1 µm 0.0034 -0.013 -0.019 -0.0093 
3 µm 0.0055 -0.018 0.0027 -0.0012 
5 µm -0.0064 -0.019 0.0011 0.0037 
10 µm 0.011 -0.021 0.0011 0.0062 
Hand-surface 
contacting rate 
(rh-s) 
1 µm 0.071 0.0018 0.066 -0.054 
3 µm 0.094 -0.0010 0.086 -0.020 
5 µm 0.12 -0.0038 0.011 -0.013 
10 µm 0.12 -0.0096 0.092 -0.011 
Mass transfer 
fraction from 
hand to mouth 
during each 
contact (fh-m) 
1 µm -0.0084 -0.018 0.00050 -0.0093 
3 µm -0.00055 -0.016 -0.013 -0.0012 
5 µm -0.0037 -0.012 -0.0058 0.0037 
10 µm -0.0075 -0.0063 0.010 0.0062 
Mass transfer 
fraction from 
hand to surface 
during each 
contact (fh-s) 
1 µm -0.0042 0.00070 0.055 0.047 
3 µm 0.0048 0.0050 0.021 0.020 
5 µm -0.0050 0.0075 0.0003 0.015 
10 µm 0.0060 0.0096 0.0085 0.012 
Mass transfer 
fraction from 
surface to hand 
during each 
contact (fs-h) 
1 µm 0.21 0.0077 0.16 -0.25 
3 µm 0.30 0.010 0.26 -0.082 
5 µm 0.34 0.012 0.32 -0.046 
10 µm 0.36 0.015 0.28 -0.043 
Decay rate in 
this air (γair) 
1 µm 0.00030 0.0055 0.0013 -0.0020 
3 µm 0.00080 0.0089 0.0013 -0.0053 
5 µm 0.0075 0.0078 0.0049 -0.0009 
10 µm 0.0023 0.0026 -0.0021 0.0053 
Decay rate on 
fomite (γf) 
1 µm -0.012 -0.017 -0.0097 -0.013 
3 µm 0.011 -0.018 -0.0005 -0.00080 
5 µm 0.0022 -0.018 0.0002 0.0022 
10 µm -0.00090 -0.018 -0.0070 0.0031 
Dose-response 
coefficient 
1 µm 0.66 0.058 0.87 0.027 
3 µm 0.72 0.088 0.73 0.053 
5 µm 0.76 0.11 0.77 0.075 
10 µm 0.76 0.14 0.63 0.012 
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Table C-2. Correlation coefficients for B. anthracis (continued) 
  Retrospective scenario Prospective scenario 
  Ingestion dose Inhalation dose Ingestion dose Inhalation dose 
Breathing rate 
(Inh) 
1 µm 0.0065 0.27 0.021 0.14 
3 µm -0.0065 0.40 0.017 0.25 
5 µm -0.00040 0.53 0.0067 0.34 
10 µm 0.0021 0.65 -0.0026 0.53 
Nasal passages 
particle remove 
efficiency (en) 
1 µm -0.0030 -0.0093 -0.0064 -0.0038 
3 µm 0.0028 0.0020 0.0099 -0.012 
5 µm 0.0036 -0.017 0.00070 -0.0010 
10 µm 0.0029 0.0083 -0.00090 0.0078 
Air change rate 
(ACH) 
1 µm -0.18 -0.68 -0.0038 -0.44 
3 µm -0.21 -0.72 -0.029 -0.70 
5 µm -0.16 -0.62 -0.052 -0.75 
10 µm -0.081 -0.31 -0.052 -0.63 
Resuspension rate 
(µ2) 
1 µm -0.0040 0.00060 -0.047 0.32 
3 µm 0.0070 -0.0012 -0.26 0.088 
5 µm -0.012 0.0052 -0.18 0.022 
10 µm -0.0068 0.089 -0.29 0.058 
Turbulence 
intensity (ke) 
1 µm 0.013 0.0084 -0.0024 -0.0040 
3 µm 0.0023 0.012 -0.013 0.00050 
5 µm 0.011 0.012 -0.0059 0.0031 
10 µm 0.0077 0.0067 -0.0067 0.0043 
Density of the 
particle (ρp) 
1 µm 0.10 -0.052 -0.0049 -0.035 
3 µm 0.080 -0.24 0.018 -0.096 
5 µm 0.075 -0.40 0.014 -0.17 
10 µm 0.030 -0.61 0.011 -0.40 
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Table C-3. Correlation coefficients for Y. pestis 
  Retrospective scenario Prospective scenario 
  Ingestion dose Inhalation dose Ingestion dose Inhalation dose 
Hand-mouth 
contacting rate 
(rh-m) 
1 µm 0.032 0.0033 0.0071 -0.011 
3 µm 0.035 0.0087 0.0079 -0.015 
5 µm 0.038 0.012 0.0085 -0.0069 
10 µm 0.042 0.015 0.010 -0.013 
Hand-surface 
contacting rate 
(rh-s) 
1 µm 0.13 -0.012 0.071 -0.014 
3 µm 0.14 -0.014 0.074 -0.017 
5 µm 0.14 -0.017 0.076 -0.011 
10 µm 0.14 -0.022 0.079 -0.0067 
Mass transfer 
fraction from 
hand to mouth 
during each 
contact (fh-m) 
1 µm 0.029 -0.034 0.037 0.026 
3 µm 0.028 -0.035 0.036 0.036 
5 µm 0.029 -0.034 0.038 0.025 
10 µm 0.030 -0.029 0.036 0.026 
Mass transfer 
fraction from 
hand to surface 
during each 
contact (fh-s) 
1 µm -0.11 -0.0019 -0.059 0.027 
3 µm -0.12 -0.0024 -0.060 0.0053 
5 µm -0.12 -0.0028 -0.062 0.023 
10 µm -0.12 -0.0022 -0.065 0.013 
Mass transfer 
fraction from 
surface to hand 
during each 
contact (fs-h) 
1 µm 0.47 0.014 0.34 -0.0088 
3 µm 0.48 0.020 0.35 0.0026 
5 µm 0.49 0.021 0.36 -0.015 
10 µm 0.51 0.018 0.38 -0.0023 
Decay rate in 
this air (γair) 
1 µm -0.10 -0.30 -0.0057 -0.079 
3 µm -0.082 -0.24 -0.0066 -0.058 
5 µm -0.066 -0.18 -0.0059 -0.066 
10 µm -0.042 -0.083 -0.0051 -0.042 
Decay rate on 
fomite (γf) 
1 µm -0.56 -0.0029 -0.53 -0.51 
3 µm -0.57 0.0037 -0.54 -0.56 
5 µm -0.59 0.0048 -0.55 -0.63 
10 µm -0.61 -0.0072 -0.56 -0.57 
Dose-response 
coefficient 
1 µm 0.0058 0.053 0.032 0.032 
3 µm 0.0039 0.056 0.032 0.035 
5 µm 0.0039 0.058 0.032 0.028 
10 µm 0.0055 0.059 0.030 0.038 
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Table C-3. Correlation coefficients for Y. pestis (continued) 
  Retrospective scenario Prospective scenario 
  Ingestion dose Inhalation dose Ingestion dose Inhalation dose 
Breathing rate 
(Inh) 
1 µm 0.0072 0.73 -0.014 0.15 
3 µm 0.0048 0.76 -0.014 0.16 
5 µm 0.0028 0.78 -0.014 0.18 
10 µm -0.00091 0.76 -0.015 0.16 
Nasal passages 
particle remove 
efficiency (en) 
1 µm -0.015 0.011 -0.022 -0.012 
3 µm 0.0029 -0.014 -0.011 -0.0053 
5 µm 0.0019 0.0060 0.0088 -0.0048 
10 µm 0.0087 -0.0079 -0.00028 -0.0015 
Air change rate 
(ACH) 
1 µm -0.11 -0.44 0.0036 -0.080 
3 µm -0.13 -0.52 0.0034 -0.11 
5 µm -0.12 -0.48 0.0035 -0.11 
10 µm -0.070 -0.28 0.0023 -0.057 
Resuspension rate 
(µ2) 
1 µm -0.0018 0.026 -0.0048 0.35 
3 µm -0.028 0.018 -0.0013 0.31 
5 µm -0.00099 0.023 -0.016 0.21 
10 µm -0.00023 0.019 -0.019 0.33 
Turbulence 
intensity (ke) 
1 µm 0.0040 -0.010 0.0018 0.015 
3 µm 0.0037 -0.0064 0.0020 0.0074 
5 µm 0.0037 -0.0039 0.0023 0.013 
10 µm 0.0037 -0.0015 0.0019 0.010 
Density of the 
particle (ρp) 
1 µm 0.24 -0.026 -0.0083 -0.0058 
3 µm 0.22 -0.15 -0.0076 -0.033 
5 µm 0.19 -0.30 -0.0071 -0.070 
10 µm 0.12 -0.54 -0.0085 -0.12 
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Table C-4. Correlation coefficients for F. tularensis 
  Retrospective scenario Prospective scenario 
  Ingestion dose Inhalation dose Ingestion dose Inhalation dose 
Hand-mouth 
contacting rate 
(rh-m) 
1 µm 0.033 0.016 0.011 0.0079 
3 µm 0.033 0.017 0.011 0.0071 
5 µm 0.032 0.017 0.013 -0.0044 
10 µm 0.033 0.019 0.017 -0.0082 
Hand-surface 
contacting rate 
(rh-s) 
1 µm 0.14 0.0020 0.12 0.020 
3 µm 0.17 0.0024 0.12 0.017 
5 µm 0.18 0.00099 0.13 0.021 
10 µm 0.20 -0.0019 0.13 0.023 
Mass transfer 
fraction from 
hand to mouth 
during each 
contact (fh-m) 
1 µm 0.0069 0.0043 0.033 0.0091 
3 µm 0.011 0.0094 0.034 0.0080 
5 µm 0.015 0.013 0.035 0.0067 
10 µm 0.020 0.017 0.038 0.010 
Mass transfer 
fraction from 
hand to surface 
during each 
contact (fh-s) 
1 µm -0.12 -0.0077 -0.085 0.0063 
3 µm -0.14 -0.0037 -0.090 0.00034 
5 µm -0.15 0.0023 -0.096 0.014 
10 µm -0.17 0.017 -0.10 0.0060 
Mass transfer 
fraction from 
surface to hand 
during each 
contact (fs-h) 
1 µm 0.44 -0.012 0.41 0.0031 
3 µm 0.52 -0.016 0.42 -0.0039 
5 µm 0.58 -0.018 0.44 -0.0030 
10 µm 0.67 -0.023 0.47 -0.00091 
Decay rate in 
this air (γair) 
1 µm -0.43 -0.75 0.0055 -0.26 
3 µm -0.40 -0.73 0.0050 -0.24 
5 µm -0.35 -0.67 0.0035 -0.22 
10 µm -0.23 -0.46 -0.0036 -0.14 
Decay rate on 
fomite (γf) 
1 µm -0.33 -0.18 -0.65 -0.42 
3 µm -0.39 -0.21 -0.65 -0.50 
5 µm -0.43 -0.26 -0.64 -0.56 
10 µm -0.49 -0.42 -0.64 -0.59 
Dose-response 
coefficient 
1 µm 0.015 0.0049 0.021 0.0015 
3 µm 0.017 0.0091 0.022 -0.00098 
5 µm 0.017 0.0097 0.022 -0.000097 
10 µm 0.016 0.0061 0.020 0.013 
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Table C-4. Correlation coefficients for F.tularensis (continued) 
  Retrospective scenario Prospective scenario 
  Ingestion dose Inhalation dose Ingestion dose Inhalation dose 
Breathing rate 
(Inh) 
1 µm -0.023 0.35 -0.011 0.12 
3 µm -0.029 0.45 -0.013 0.14 
5 µm -0.033 0.54 -0.015 0.17 
10 µm -0.038 0.69 -0.018 0.20 
Nasal passages 
particle remove 
efficiency (en) 
1 µm -0.024 -0.0042 0.011 0.00061 
3 µm 0.015 0.00042 0.0077 -0.018 
5 µm 0.00056 0.0051 0.010 -0.013 
10 µm 0.0072 -0.00095 0.0066 0.012 
Air change rate 
(ACH) 
1 µm -0.13 -0.23 0.0025 -0.087 
3 µm -0.16 -0.30 0.0026 -0.10 
5 µm -0.15 -0.31 0.0036 -0.11 
10 µm -0.089 -0.22 0.0048 -0.073 
Resuspension rate 
(µ2) 
1 µm 0.0029 -0.0027 0.0053 0.26 
3 µm -0.0079 0.015 -0.0075 0.26 
5 µm -0.016 -0.011 -0.020 0.18 
10 µm -0.0076 0.038 -0.060 0.33 
Turbulence 
intensity (ke) 
1 µm 0.0032 0.018 0.020 0.018 
3 µm -0.0020 0.013 0.020 0.0078 
5 µm -0.0056 0.010 0.020 0.00072 
10 µm -0.011 0.0089 0.021 -0.011 
Density of the 
particle (ρp) 
1 µm 0.22 -0.0066 -0.019 -0.014 
3 µm 0.23 -0.077 -0.019 -0.040 
5 µm 0.21 -0.18 -0.018 -0.067 
10 µm 0.15 -0.44 -0.015 -0.13 
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Table C-5. Correlation coefficients for Variola major 
  Retrospective scenario Prospective scenario 
  Ingestion dose Inhalation dose Ingestion dose Inhalation dose 
Hand-mouth 
contacting rate 
(rh-m) 
1 µm 0.070 0.040 0.057 -0.018 
3 µm 0.080 0.048 0.062 -0.013 
5 µm 0.081 0.044 0.056 -0.0078 
10 µm 0.075 0.033 0.061 -0.0065 
Hand-surface 
contacting rate 
(rh-s) 
1 µm 0.10 -0.0070 0.19 0.0013 
3 µm 0.12 -0.0092 0.19 0.00018 
5 µm 0.14 -0.0060 0.19 -0.0045 
10 µm 0.16 0.0036 0.17 -0.0011 
Mass transfer 
fraction from 
hand to mouth 
during each 
contact (fh-m) 
1 µm 0.021 0.013 0.016 0.0092 
3 µm 0.016 0.0036 0.019 0.0047 
5 µm 0.013 -0.0039 0.021 0.0088 
10 µm 0.011 -0.013 0.025 0.0016 
Mass transfer 
fraction from 
hand to surface 
during each 
contact (fh-s) 
1 µm -0.11 0.0027 -0.16 0.022 
3 µm -0.13 0.0025 -0.17 0.030 
5 µm -0.15 0.0039 -0.17 0.029 
10 µm -0.16 0.0044 -0.15 0.027 
Mass transfer 
fraction from 
surface to hand 
during each 
contact (fs-h) 
1 µm 0.45 -0.013 0.67 -0.033 
3 µm 0.54 -0.012 0.67 -0.017 
5 µm 0.61 -0.011 0.67 -0.011 
10 µm 0.67 -0.0064 0.60 0.00058 
Decay rate in 
this air (γair) 
1 µm -0.023 -0.055 -0.010 -0.19 
3 µm -0.014 -0.032 -0.015 -0.14 
5 µm -0.0090 -0.024 -0.0066 -0.11 
10 µm -0.0043 -0.017 -0.013 -0.081 
Decay rate on 
fomite (γf) 
1 µm 0.0045 0.0030 -0.059 -0.11 
3 µm -0.0021 -0.0025 -0.017 -0.15 
5 µm -0.0072 -0.0047 -0.014 -0.15 
10 µm -0.012 -0.0060 -0.00080 -0.12 
Dose-response 
coefficient 
1 µm 0.38 0.44 0.57 0.30 
3 µm 0.45 0.57 0.56 0.45 
5 µm 0.50 0.67 0.56 0.57 
10 µm 0.54 0.73 0.51 0.61 
 
 
178 
 
Table C-5 Correlation coefficients for Variola major (continued) 
  Retrospective scenario Prospective scenario 
  Ingestion dose Inhalation dose Ingestion dose Inhalation dose 
Breathing rate 
(Inh) 
1 µm -0.0043 0.25 0.010 0.18 
3 µm -0.00019 0.32 0.0038 0.27 
5 µm 0.00032 0.37 0.0099 0.34 
10 µm -0.00060 0.40 0.015 0.36 
Nasal passages 
particle remove 
efficiency (en) 
1 µm -0.015 -0.077 -0.0043 -0.025 
3 µm -0.048 -0.024 0.0057 0.018 
5 µm -0.015 0.0052 0.013 -0.00094 
10 µm -0.0092 -0.0059 -0.011 -0.0064 
Air change rate 
(ACH) 
1 µm -0.37 -0.54 0.018 -0.41 
3 µm -0.36 -0.53 0.0042 -0.45 
5 µm -0.27 -0.42 -0.0092 -0.45 
10 µm -0.11 -0.19 -0.028 -0.25 
Resuspension rate 
(µ2) 
1 µm 0.0031 -0.0038 -0.46 0.36 
3 µm 0.0045 0.0069 -0.15 0.39 
5 µm -0.0041 0.011 -0.16 0.25 
10 µm -0.013 0.039 -0.35 0.39 
Turbulence 
intensity (ke) 
1 µm 0.0043 0.010 -0.022 -0.015 
3 µm 0.0096 0.016 -0.018 -0.017 
5 µm 0.0077 0.013 -0.020 -0.012 
10 µm 0.0028 0.055 -0.024 -0.0089 
Density of the 
particle (ρp) 
1 µm 0.19 -0.069 -0.0065 -0.039 
3 µm 0.14 -0.20 -0.0022 -0.14 
5 µm 0.099 -0.29 0.0025 -0.21 
10 µm 0.031 -0.40 0.018 -0.31 
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Table C-6 Correlation coefficients for Lassa 
  Retrospective scenario Prospective scenario 
  Ingestion dose Inhalation dose Ingestion dose Inhalation dose 
Hand-mouth 
contacting rate 
(rh-m) 
1 µm 0.014 0.0017 0.033 0.0088 
3 µm 0.017 0.0035 0.033 0.022 
5 µm 0.020 0.0059 0.033 0.021 
10 µm 0.024 0.0095 0.033 0.019 
Hand-surface 
contacting rate 
(rh-s) 
1 µm 0.098 -0.022 -0.055 -0.0023 
3 µm 0.10 -0.024 -0.055 -0.0031 
5 µm 0.11 -0.027 -0.055 -0.0081 
10 µm 0.11 -0.031 -0.055 -0.0083 
Mass transfer 
fraction from 
hand to mouth 
during each 
contact (fh-m) 
1 µm 0.019 -0.0038 0.033 0.0088 
3 µm 0.023 -0.0042 0.033 0.022 
5 µm 0.024 -0.0050 0.033 0.021 
10 µm 0.025 -0.0079 0.033 0.019 
Mass transfer 
fraction from 
hand to surface 
during each 
contact (fh-s) 
1 µm -0.074 0.011 -0.055 -0.0023 
3 µm -0.083 0.0077 -0.055 -0.0031 
5 µm -0.090 0.0045 -0.055 -0.0081 
10 µm -0.098 0.0018 -0.055 -0.0083 
Mass transfer 
fraction from 
surface to hand 
during each 
contact (fs-h) 
1 µm 0.40 -0.018 0.51 0.0027 
3 µm 0.42 -0.016 0.51 -0.0058 
5 µm 0.44 -0.013 0.51 -0.0015 
10 µm 0.47 -0.0086 0.51 -0.012 
Decay rate in 
this air (γair) 
1 µm -0.21 -0.31 -0.025 -0.24 
3 µm -0.16 -0.24 -0.025 -0.18 
5 µm -0.12 -0.18 -0.025 -0.17 
10 µm -0.057 -0.082 -0.025 -0.089 
Decay rate on 
fomite (γf) 
1 µm -0.092 -0.017 -0.093 -0.057 
3 µm -0.099 -0.018 -0.093 -0.057 
5 µm -0.11 -0.020 -0.092 -0.079 
10 µm -0.11 -0.025 -0.091 -0.078 
Dose-response 
coefficient 
1 µm 0.60 0.69 0.72 0.61 
3 µm 0.64 0.75 0.72 0.73 
5 µm 0.67 0.80 0.72 0.80 
10 µm 0.70 0.87 0.72 0.73 
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Table C-6 Correlation coefficients for Lassa (continued) 
  Retrospective scenario Prospective scenario 
  Ingestion dose Inhalation dose Ingestion dose Inhalation dose 
Breathing rate 
(Inh) 
1 µm 0.0066 0.26 0.011 0.17 
3 µm 0.0093 0.27 0.011 0.19 
5 µm 0.011 0.28 0.011 0.23 
10 µm 0.012 0.28 0.011 0.20 
Nasal passages 
particle remove 
efficiency (en) 
1 µm 0.016 0.030 0.0022 0.011 
3 µm 0.0040 -0.012 -0.0033 0.0050 
5 µm -0.0049 0.0014 0.016 0.011 
10 µm 0.0029 0.018 0.010 0.0022 
Air change rate 
(ACH) 
1 µm -0.13 -0.20 -0.0030 -0.15 
3 µm -0.14 -0.22 -0.0031 -0.16 
5 µm -0.13 -0.19 -0.0031 -0.17 
10 µm -0.070 -0.098 -0.0031 -0.085 
Resuspension rate 
(µ2) 
1 µm 0.0065 0.0084 0.40 0.021 
3 µm 0.022 0.016 0.38 0.026 
5 µm 0.0090 0.0030 0.26 0.0042 
10 µm 0.011 0.00046 0.37 -0.021 
Turbulence 
intensity (ke) 
1 µm 0.0054 -0.0056 -0.0013 0.0067 
3 µm 0.0069 -0.0041 -0.0013 -0.0021 
5 µm 0.0080 -0.0023 -0.0014 0.0063 
10 µm 0.0098 0.00054 -0.0013 -0.0033 
Density of the 
particle (ρp) 
1 µm 0.19 -0.0056 0.0085 0.011 
3 µm 0.17 -0.050 0.0085 -0.033 
5 µm 0.15 -0.11 0.0086 -0.090 
10 µm 0.087 -0.19 0.0088 -0.16 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
5.1 General conclusion 
This dissertation developed methods for characterizing risks from a release of 
biological agents. The contributions of this dissertation include: 1) a BMC approach to 
calibrate inputs for an integrated fate, transport, and risk assessment model; 2) an 
approach for determining the location and quantity of samples for characterizing a release 
of pathogenic microbes; 3) a framework employing surface contaminations of pathogenic 
microbes to infer human health risk; 4) applying this framework to 5 Category A 
pathogens, and systematically analyzed sources of uncertainty in modeled parameters. 
 
Chapter 2 adopted the BMC method, a robust tool for high dimensional model 
calibration, to update parameter values for an integrated fate, transport, and risk 
assessment model. As a Bayesian approach, this method compared model predictions, 
based on people's prior belief, with surface measurements for concentrations of released 
B. anthracis on various locations, and reweighted the distributions for model inputs. The 
benefits of applying the BMC process include: 1) updated parameter ranges (or validation 
of prior knowledge) for a model predicting the spatial distribution of released biological 
agents; 2) significantly reduced uncertainties in the estimated human health risk, which 
provide more accurate information for the decision makers seeking to identify the proper 
response (i.e., when to distribute prophylactic antibiotic). In addition, Chapter 2 
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conducted a multivariate regression analysis, which aimed to select the best human health 
risk indicators. 
 
Chapter 3 focused on characterizing important information of a biological release, 
such as the quantity and particulate size, based on surface sampling results. It developed a 
7-step evaluation framework for choosing the sampling and modeling approach which 
most accurately recovers details of a release from surface samples. Then the performance 
of the recommended sampling scheme was tested by feeding with data from a large scale 
field test. The findings from this chapter not only answered the question "what is the best 
place to sample?", but also provided insights for the question "how many samples should 
be taken?". However, the answers to those two questions depend on the precision of 
sampling results, which is usually impacted by the sample recovery efficiency. Ideally, 
the required number of surface samples should equal the number of particle sizes to be 
identified. When one considers that the sampling results could be biased, more samples 
are necessary. Thus, the methodology developed in this chapter shows its value, since it 
systemically enumerates and evaluates all the possible approaches and chooses the one 
most resistant to bias. This sampling plan evaluation process should be considered as part 
of preparations towards a biological agent attack. Field tests should be executed before a 
'real' bioterrorism attack, since the characterized release amount and its consequences 
identified from different sampling plans can be compared with the 'correct information', 
which would be unavailable during a biological agent attack. 
 
183 
 
Chapter 4 extended the fate, transport, and risk assessment model by synthesizing 
available information on five Category A pathogens (Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, 
Francisella tularensis, Variola major and Lassa) to develop quantitative guidelines for 
how environmental pathogen concentrations may be related to human health risk. These 
findings provide critical information for developing a risk-informed biological attack 
response system. Questions such as " how to estimate if risks warrant the distribution of 
prophylactic antibiotics?", and " how to choose between active or passive 
decontamination approaches?" were addressed. In addition, this chapter differentiated the 
sources of uncertainties (epistemic uncertainty vs. variability) for modeled parameters. 
An approach was proposed for how to integrate these quantitative assessments of 
parameter uncertainty with broader, qualitative considerations to identify future research 
priorities. 
 
5.2 Future research 
5.2.1 Assumptions and limitations 
In all risk assessments, the estimated risk is based on a number of assumptions, 
which were summarized in Table 5-1. Thus, future researches should be mainly focused 
on those assumptions. The fate and transport model, predicting the spatial distribution of 
released biological agents, was a critical element for the risk assessment framework, 
since many conclusions were drawn based on its predictions. However, this model was 
established based on the assumption that pathogens were instantly uniformly mixed in a 
compartment. This assumption failed to capture localized areas of high risks, such as a 
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high concentrated puff of pathogens right after initial release. Thus the approach 
developed in the dissertation was more appropriate for the situation somewhat removed 
in time and space from the initial release. In the future, I recommend a more detailed 
approach, such as computational fluid dynamics, to extend the fate and transport model, 
although this would be quite computationally intensive.  
 
185 
 
Table 5-1 Table of major assumptions 
Where Assumption Why Drawback Future suggestion 
Fate and transport 
model 
Instantly uniformly 
mixed 
Simplify the 
model 
Fail to capture 
localized areas of 
high risks 
Build a zonal 
model or CFD 
model 
Dose-response 
model 
Same dose-
response 
coefficient for 
different exposure 
routes 
Knowledge gap Fail to represent 
low dose and 
repeated doses 
over time 
Computer 
simulation 
(computational 
biology) Model is based on high dose lab tests 
with limited 
animals 
Knowledge gap 
Analytical method Viable pathogens are measured Knowledge gap 
Actual response 
characterization 
may include 
measurements of 
non-viable 
organisms such as 
qPCR 
Develop 
quantitative 
knowledge of 
qPCR signal 
decay over time 
Pathogen 
attenuation rate 
Log linear over 
time 
Simplify the 
model 
Could 
underestimate 
pathogens' survival 
rate 
Consider other 
types of model 
such as biphasic 
exponential 
model 
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As another important component for the risk assessment framework, many 
assumptions were employed in deriving the dose-response model. In order to improve its 
predictive power, the following related questions are worth further investigation: 1) How 
to extrapolate the results from high dose laboratory tests with limited numbers of animals 
to the effects of lower doses, which is more common during a biological attack?; 2) How 
will the dose response model be changed if the effects of previous exposure on the same 
population is included?; and 3) How to model interactions from exposure to multiple 
pathogens? 
 
The surface sampling results used in Chapter 2 were based on measured viable 
pathogen concentrations. It was quantified by PCR (qPCR), which has been proven to be 
effective in quantifying biological warfare agents (i.e., B. antracis, and Y. pestis) due to 
its rapid, early, and accurate results [200]. Despite the advantages of qPCR analysis, 
several knowledge gaps need to be addressed in the future. The first is that qPCR does 
not distinguish between living or dead pathogens. While researchers have identified 
assays to discriminate between viable and dead fecal bacteroidales bacteria, similar 
methods have not been applied to Category A pathogens [10, 53]. Second there is little 
information on the decay of the qPCR signal over time, which would be an essential 
parameter for the retrospective assessment of risk after a release. Thus, studies are needed 
to quantify parameters such as, the efficiency of DNA extraction, the degradation of 
nucleic acids overtime, and the reactivity of primer and probe [24, 110, 156].  
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Pathogen attenuation rate outside the host was assumed to be log linear over time 
in Chapter 3. However, in reality microorganisms often exhibit “tailing” in which a small, 
highly resistant subpopulation attenuates at a very low rate. Thus the assumption of log-
linear decay may not be health protective. In the future, this attenuation rate should be 
considered as a function of time, which could better characterize pathogens' inactivation 
process. Candidate models include biphasic exponential model, exponentially damped 
model, Juneja & Marks type I, II models, general logistic model, and Gompertz model 
[97, 201]. 
 
In order to make the BMC updating model more readily applicable, the MATLAB 
code developed here could be programmed into a software package to perform the 
updating which would enable the approach to be employed after an incident by 
individuals without specialized computer knowledge. In addition, the speed of BMC 
updating could be improved by conducting most of the computations using a parallel 
computing approach, such as using a GPU instead of a CPU [137]. 
 
5.2.2 Response and recovery framework 
Although models and methods developed in this dissertation successfully 
enhanced the ability of characterizing a biological attack, it only addressed a small 
portion of a biological attack response and recovery framework. Thus, for the purpose of 
reducing the consequences of a terrorist attack, and rebuilding public confidence, future 
research attention should be paid on the phases of initial response, decontamination, and 
aftermath restoration. In the phase of initial response, biological agent detection is the 
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trigger of the whole response system. Thus, it should be given highest research priority, 
recourses should be allocated to constructing an economic and robust pathogen detection 
network, which would be capable of detecting multiple pathogens in real time at a low 
false alarm rate [116]. In this phase, another critical problem should be considered is how 
to treat the exposed people, since without timely medical intervention, the mortality rate 
for inhalational anthrax is almost 100%. Currently antibiotic storage and distribution 
systems, which have the capability to distribute antibiotics to the exposed people before 
the appearance of clinical symptoms, are designed for only three cities, Seattle, Boston, 
and Philadelphia [47]. Thus this system should be expanded and applied for the cities 
with high probability of suffering a biological attack in the future.  
 
In the phase of decontamination, cost-benefit analysis should be introduced to 
lower the overall cost but maintain the residual risk within an acceptable level at the same 
time. Lessons learnt from the 2001 anthrax attacks indicated that the economic loss due 
to the disruption of work could be more than the decontamination cost [147]. Thus, it is 
necessary to have a set of criteria to differentiate whether it is more economical to 
decontaminate or destroy contaminated items. In addition, the following questions are 
worthy of further research: 1) how to choose the proper decontamination method 
especially for weaponized biological agents; 2) how to treat decontamination waste, 
which is a challenge to the environment; and 3) how to validate environmental sampling 
and laboratory analytical methodologies, which verify the effectiveness of 
decontamination [28, 164].  
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In the phase of restoration, future analysis should be focused on the following 
aspects: 1) how to determine a decontaminated area is clean enough, and people are ready 
to come back? 2) should different restoration actives (i.e., residential, business) happened 
parallel or sequentially; 3) how long the health conditions for the reoccupants need to be 
monitored; 4) what is the best strategy to let the public accept the residual contamination 
risk after reoccupation. In reality, the last question should be answered first. Because the 
official confirmation that an area is safe for reoccupation is meaningless, if the public still 
consider their health to be at risk. Thus, it is critical to enable the public to understand 
risk issues they may not be familiar with, which will require the participation of a many 
parties, such as government, media, etc.  
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